This collaboration between GU Press and Georgetown's Center for Peace and Security Studies is an exposition and critique of US intelligence analysis. Drawing on the individual and collective experience of numerous intelligence experts, all of whom were career intelligence officers and some who now teach intelligence in the classroom, the 20 chapters explain how analysis has been conducted and how it can improve. There are six parts. The early chapters examine how intelligence analysis has evolved since its origins in the middle of the 20th century, focusing on traditions, culture, and, ultimately, its mixed track record. Middle parts examine how analysis supports the most senior national security and military policymakers, and how analysts must deal with the perennial challenges of politicization, analytical bias, and denial and deception. (Note distinction between Helms and Casey.) Why do analysts make mistakes? How can they perform better? In the final parts of the book contributors propose new ways to address perennial issues in warning analysis and emerging analytic issues like homeland defense; they suggest new forms of analytic collaboration in a global intelligence environment, and imperatives for the development of a new profession of intelligence analysis. This is key: The editors want to ensure that intelligence analysis becomes a professional discipline, more than a political consideration, with increased training and increased accountability. The book, which includes internal references to fellow chapters, is rife with examples of US intelligence successes and failures throughout the past 65 years: Pearl Harbor, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, Central America, and, of course, 9/11, Afghanistan, and the Iraq WMD justification for the current war.