Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970-2000 [Hardcover]

"Kotkin dismisses the oft-cited explanations that emphasize increased U.S. military spending and the failure of central planning, arguing that as late as 1985 the Soviet Union was 'lethargically stable' (p. 2). Instead, he blames attempts -- first initiated by Khrushchev's de-Stalinization effort and culminating in Gorbachev's policies of perestroika, glasnost, and democratization -- to reform a system that was inherently incapable of reform. To offer only an explanation of the Soviet Union's collapse, no matter how compellingly argued, however, is unsatisfactory because that explanation leaves too many questions unanswered. Why were the reforms undertaken? Why did the Soviet elites not resist them? What effect did the Soviet legacy have on the reforms? By considering these questions, Kotkin provides a deeper understanding of the Soviet Union's astonishing collapse....

"The man to undertake the reforms was Mikhail Gorbachev. Perhaps the most revealing comment on Gorbachev is a 1988 statement by Milovan Djilas that Kotkin quotes: 'Gorbachev, unlike Brezhnev, strikes me as a true believer' (p. 31). Perhaps he was a true believer because, as Kotkin points out, he had witnessed many socialist and Soviet triumphs: for example, Sputnik, manned space flight, and communist takeovers in China and Cuba. Whatever the reason, this belief entailed that Gorbachev would not be satisfied with 'lethargic stability.' He would seek reforms, and, unlike Khrushchev, he had the political skills to carry them through. Perhaps surprisingly, he attempted reform for a largely receptive population who maintained a 'strong allegiance to socialism' (p. 44) despite deteriorating economic conditions (for example, it typically took ten years to get an apartment). Neither Gorbachev nor the populace realized that reform ultimately would lead to collapse....

"According to Kotkin, what made Gorbachev's reforms so risky, far riskier than Gorbachev ever realized, was that he, unlike Khrushchev, did not have an ideological safety net. Whereas Khrushchev could say that socialism's failure was owing to Stalin and that reforms would restore 'Leninism,' when Gorbachev acknowledged socialism's need for reform, the only possible conclusion was that socialism itself was inherently flawed. In the end, the Soviet Union could not afford the superpower competition. Its economy was underperforming, and its ideology was bankrupt. It withdrew from Afghanistan and gave up eastern Europe. In August 1991, conservatives tried to restore the old order, but their attempt failed with Boris Yeltsin's standing triumphantly and defiantly atop a Soviet tank. With nothing to hold the Soviet Union together, it disintegrated without the bloodshed that many had believed inevitable. Gorbachev acknowledged reality by formally dissolving the union in December 1991.

"The USSR may have formally ended its seventy-four-year existence in 1991, but its legacy resulted in a continuing collapse, which Kotkin documents in chapters 5 and 6. In Russia, Yeltsin promised a market economy, although he knew nothing about one. Even a politician with the most thorough understanding of market capitalism would have been unable to withstand the former-Soviet elites who were establishing their own version of 'capitalism.' These elites, many of whom had abandoned any ideological attachment to socialism and the rest of whom were quite willing to do so when faced with the possibility of financial gain, began systematically to appropriate state assets. Kotkin explains the appalling and systemic corruption that contaminated the privatization process, which culminated in perhaps the most egregious episode, the infamous 'loans for shares' deal. Realizing that the 'mass opportunism of self-privatization' was irreversible, vice premier Anatoly Chubais simply chose to 'institutionalize' and 'rationalize' it (p. 130)....

"In sum, Kotkin presents a practical, accessible, and informative account of the Soviet Union's collapse. His book stands as a suitable complement to Richard Pipes's Communism: A History (New York: Modern Library, 2001), which explores more of the philosophical reasons for communism's demise. Yet Kotkin's book is more than a historical retelling of the Soviet Union's fall. It provides an explanation of how and why the Soviet Union fell, a story of socialism's inability to compete with the West, its loss of hope, and the willingness of those in power to prostitute any remaining belief in socialist ideals for corrupt material gain. The book also serves as a case study of socialism's inability to reform itself without self-destruction and of the ensuing institutional shortcomings that render market capitalism and political liberalism difficult to obtain. Those who believed that Russia could quickly copy the economic perfor-mance and political liberty of the West failed to understand that the Soviet Union's legacy was antithetical to markets, private property, and the rule of law. Kotkin's book should appeal to any reader who grew up in the shadow of the Cold War and wants to understand more fully not only how and why the Soviet Union fell, but also why its legacy has been so bitter and enduring."

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Excerpted from a review by Jody Lipford in "The Independent Review," Winter 2004.

Kotkin's first argument is that what has passed for "reform" since 1991 has been the ongoing structural and institutional decay of the old system. Obsolete, inefficient factories are no more productive now than they were during Soviet times; government officials, well-connected insiders, and factory managers continue to bilk the country of its treasure; and presidential perquisites rival those of former politiboro members. With no rule of law, no system of credit, a weak legal system, and a national bank that speculates on its own currency and hides funds in offshore accounts, the reforms of the post-Soviet era are a myth. Indeed, in a de facto sense, the old system is still in its death throes.

The second part of Kotkin's argument concerns the end of Soviet rule in 1991. Kotkin believes that the Soviet regime could have muddled along for several years after 1991 without imploding. It still had a large and powerful military with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons at its disposal. It wasn't the brilliance of American foreign policy or economic decline that caused the regime to fall when it did. Instead, in a paradoxical sense, it was Gorbachev's belief in the humanistic nature of socialism that did in the system. Socialism was supposed to be fair and just, ensuring a decent quality of life for the Soviet people, a dream that Gorbachev tried to deliver. His ideological convictions led him to try to reform a system that could not be reformed. His policy of "glasnost" or openness made even more apparent to the public the failings of the system. And, because he believed that socialism was based on humanistic principles, he refused to resort to violence on a large scale to hold the Union together.

While this is a brilliant little book, some important issues could have been more extensively explored. A greater exploration of the influences underpinning Gorbachev's ideological convictions would have been helpful. What books did he read? Why did he see the good in the system when so many others did not? Other than believing in the inherent goodness of socialism, were there additional factors that fueled Gorbachev's decision to allow the Soviet Union to disintegrate relatively peacefully? For example, some may argue that Gorbachev, keenly aware of his place in history, knew that he would be viewed as a villain had he butchered his own people to save the regime. Indeed, Gorbachev just may have been too decent a human being to preside over a bloodbath, regardless of his ideological convictions. Moreover, from a geopolitical standpoint, it would have been dangerous for Gorbachev to use overwhelming force internally. The United States and the rest of the world were keeping a close watch on him. Gorbachev had no assurances that the West wouldn't support independence movements in the Republics had he moved decisively to suppress them.

In his concluding remarks, Kotkin indicates that Russia's best bet for the future might be to join the euro. While this might be a great idea in theory, one wonders when Russia will be able to meet the economic criteria required to do so.