At the Abyss is a fascinating autobiography of Reed's political career. It is not a history of the Cold War, but a valued, yet partisan, recital of his experiences during that tumultuous period. I recently had the pleasure of hearing him describe his book at a colloquium, and he is a terrific, enjoyable speaker and person. The book provides valuable first-hand knowledge of some of the key people and events of the time.
It also left me with a lot of questions and doubts. He argues that SDI was key contributor to the Soviet collapse, an unsupported notion, easily contested. Reed actually believes that Reagan should be credited with causing the Soviet Union to collapse, but the USSR was already in serious economic decline a decade earlier.
Reed takes the position that a nuclear explosion took place in the South Atlantic in 1979; however, the three items of "truth" cited that "came out" are highly interpretive, anecdotal, and out of date. He implies that Russia has been violating their CTBT commitment against nuclear testing at Novaya Zemlya, but his given reasons don't hold water.
Reed misses a good opportunity to clarify serious present-day questions about nuclear command and control, especially permissive-action links on warheads. Knowledgeable outsiders have doubts about the past, and maybe present-day, weapons security and the presidential-authorization process.
A reader who has not studied Cold War history should beware: Reed is a true-believer in President Reagan's Cold War belligerence and confrontationalism. His book is oblivious and indifferent to the considerable trampling of civil rights and intimidation of dissent during his heyday.
The widespread public opposition to Cold War brinkmanship is dismissed in his book as though it was a mere fly in the ointment. Yet, in a book project in which I am involved (www.NuclearShadowboxing.info) it is shown that, during Reagan's administration, outsiders successfully (1) pressured the administration to negotiate with the Soviet Union, (2) shaped the zero-option proposal for the INF Treaty, (3)stalled MX missile expansion, (3) rejected nuclear civil defense, (4) influenced an end to anti-satellite-weapons testing, (5) caused SDI funding to be limited, and (6) prevented overt military intervention in Central America.
Reed might not have been one of the major hardliners, but he was an enabler to the win-at-all-costs mentality - to hell with human rights - a Cold War legacy of his friends, the Cheneys and Rumsfelds, who have since led us into Iraq.
By all means, enjoy the book, but keep in mind the caveats.