Battle Tactics of the Civil War [Paperback]

Griffith gets the simplest things wrong. Example: on page 147, G. has a table of "Ranges of musketry fire." Do the math yourself, and you find that he can't divide or even add correctly. The tables of p 76 and 77 are even worse.

Griffith distorts his sources. On page 146, he claims "British experts" figured that 200 yards was "the battle range of the Brown Bess smoothbore musket." Turn to the footnotes, and you find a reference to p. 32 of Hew Strachan's FROM WATERLOO TO BALACLAVA. I have the page before me as I type. Nowhere on p. 32 is anyone mentioned as being an expert, nor is it even implied that anyone in the British Army was an expert in the performance of the Brown Bess. Quite the contrary.

What Strachan actually says is that the ability to hit a target with the Brown Bess "dwindled" as the range increased from 100 to 200 yards; that "most manuals" (written by unknown people of unknown knowledge) set the "maximum effective range" of the smoothbore as 200 yards; that "It was only just as the Brown Bess was nearing the end of its long life in the British army that any definite idea of the weapon's performance was secured"; that knowledge of "the range and power of the musket" was "very limited" as late as 1846; that at ranges over 116-126 yards, a considerable number of musket balls hit the dirt before reaching the target; and finally that the British concluded "as a General Rule musketry should not be opened at a distance exceeding 150, and certainly not exceeding 200 yards, as at and beyond that distance it would be a mere wast of ammunition to do so."

Griffith ignores evidence he doesn't like. Strachan's book goes on to say on p. 47 that the rifled musket resulted in "whole regiments 'melting' before British fire" at Inkerman; that penetration was much greater than with the musket (very significant when people fought in closely packed groups); that "At 150 yards the Minie was twice as accurate as the smoothbore musket," and "Furthermore this superiority of practice was not confined to a few marksmen."

Another: in ATTACK AND DIE: CIVIL WAR TACTICS AND THE SOUTHERN HERITAGE, Grady McWhiney & Perry D. Jamieson points out that in the War With Mexico of 1846-47, the U.S. Army fought with Napoleonic war tactics and weapons, and almost every Civil War general on both sides participated. The tactics used worked, even though they were carried out by amateurs. When they were attempted in the Civil War, they didn't work. Griffith blames the failure of Napoleonic tactics in the Civil War on the troops being amateurs and the generals not knowing how to fight.

Griffith misunderstands what's in front of him. G. mentions Jack Coggins's books ARMS AND EQUIPMENT OF THE CIVIL WAR, and calls your attention to an illustration on page 38-39 of Coggins, showing that in order to hit a target at 300 yards range, the bullet traveled 43 inches above line of sight at 150 yards. Griffith fails to realize that if the shooter is standing or kneeling, the bullet will be so high in the air it won't hit people at most ranges, but if the shooter fires from ground level (prone, or from a trench), it will NEVER get too high. Therefore, the effectiveness of rifle fire increased as entrenchments became more common.

Griffith just makes up bullsh*t. E.g., by mid 1863, soldiers were reluctant to attack entrenchments frontally. G. believes they were 'dispirited,' a bunch of 'old lags' who'd lost their nerve. This nonsense is an insult to the brave men on both sides in the last two years of the war. During this period, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia both took about 45% casualties in only 40 days, while in Tennessee and Georgia Hood's Army was destroyed in combat when repeatedly attacking Sherman's troops.

Enough. The bottom line is that this book is so unreliable in every detail, you can't trust a single sentence written by Griffith. The only things of value are the direct quotations and the bibliography. Don't buy it.

Griffith gets the simplest things wrong. Example: on page 147, G. has a table of "Ranges of musketry fire." Do the math yourself, and you find that he can't divide or even add correctly. The tables of p 76 and 77 are even worse.

Griffith distorts his sources. On page 146, he claims "British experts" figured that 200 yards was "the battle range of the Brown Bess smoothbore musket." Turn to the footnotes, and you find a reference to p. 32 of Hew Strachan's FROM WATERLOO TO BALACLAVA. I have the page before me as I type. Nowhere on p. 32 is anyone mentioned as being an expert, nor is it even implied that anyone in the British Army was an expert in the performance of the Brown Bess. Quite the contrary.

What Strachan actually says is that the ability to hit a target with the Brown Bess "dwindled" as the range increased from 100 to 200 yards; that "most manuals" (written by unknown people of unknown knowledge) set the "maximum effective range" of the smoothbore as 200 yards; that "It was only just as the Brown Bess was nearing the end of its long life in the British army that any definite idea of the weapon's performance was secured"; that knowledge of "the range and power of the musket" was "very limited" as late as 1846; that at ranges over 116-126 yards, a considerable number of musket balls hit the dirt before reaching the target; and finally that the British concluded "as a General Rule musketry should not be opened at a distance exceeding 150, and certainly not exceeding 200 yards, as at and beyond that distance it would be a mere wast of ammunition to do so."

Griffith ignores evidence he doesn't like. Strachan's book goes on to say on p. 47 that the rifled musket resulted in "whole regiments 'melting' before British fire" at Inkerman; that penetration was much greater than with the musket (very significant when people fought in closely packed groups); that "At 150 yards the Minie was twice as accurate as the smoothbore musket," and "Furthermore this superiority of practice was not confined to a few marksmen."

Another: in ATTACK AND DIE: CIVIL WAR TACTICS AND THE SOUTHERN HERITAGE, Grady McWhiney & Perry D. Jamieson points out that in the War With Mexico of 1846-47, the U.S. Army fought with Napoleonic war tactics and weapons, and almost every Civil War general on both sides participated. The tactics used worked, even though they were carried out by amateurs. When they were attempted in the Civil War, they didn't work. Griffith blames the failure of Napoleonic tactics in the Civil War on the troops being amateurs and the generals not knowing how to fight.

Griffith misunderstands what's in front of him. G. mentions Jack Coggins's books ARMS AND EQUIPMENT OF THE CIVIL WAR, and calls your attention to an illustration on page 38-39 of Coggins, showing that in order to hit a target at 300 yards range, the bullet traveled 43 inches above line of sight at 150 yards. Griffith fails to realize that if the shooter is standing or kneeling, the bullet will be so high in the air it won't hit people at most ranges, but if the shooter fires from ground level (prone, or from a trench), it will NEVER get too high. Therefore, the effectiveness of rifle fire increased as entrenchments became more common.

5) Just makes up bullsh*t. E.g., by mid 1863, soldiers were reluctant to attack entrenchments frontally. G. believes they were 'dispirited,' a bunch of 'old lags' who'd lost their nerve. This nonsense is an insult to the brave men on both sides in the last two years of the war. During this period, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia both took about 45% casualties in only 40 days, while in Tennessee and Georgia Hood's Army was destroyed in combat when repeatedly attacking Sherman's troops.

Enough. The bottom line is that this book is so unreliable in every detail, you can't trust a single sentence written by Griffith. The only things of value are the direct quotations and the bibliography. Don't buy it.

Field Fortifications - Griffith essentially concludes that field fortifications were a psychological deterrent more than a physical one. Often Griffith states that fieldworks didn't create a big advantage, and in doing this he cites figures on how many people were hit per minute or per shot fired. In other parts of this chapter, he claims that armies were too quick to dig in, even if they were on the offensive. With Jones pointing out how invaluable counter attacks were, and with Shiloh proving that point, I disagree with Griffith there as well. Finally, Griffith seems to ignore that multiple lines of fieldwork were generally put up at places like Gettysburg and Chancellorsville. To sustain big losses to take one set of works doesn't automatically grant a side the strategic or even tactical victory, as the Confederates proved on Culp's Hill on 2 July 1863.

Cavalry - Griffith seems to take others to task for their "romantic lore" over how they view the CW. I wholeheartedly disagree with his conclusion that Civil War cavalry should have been used on the battlefield in condensed charges more often. In making his point, he often hearkens back to Napoleonic times, yet he conveniently omits any mention of how devestated the Grande Armee was at Waterloo by using that tactic. Griffith disregards the obstacle that fieldworks would have made on a cavalry charge by saying horses could jump them. I'd suggest to Griffith that he reads Keegan's chapters on cavalry in "The Face Of Battle."

Finally there were just minor inconsistencies peppered throughout the book, whether negating the importance of Union raiding that mostly commenced in 1864, or suggesting Lee was "hardly surprised" by Hooker's Grand Plan when both Lee and Stuart corresponded in the beginning stages of the Chancellorsville campaign that they didn't know what Hooker was up to.

I'm not going to pretend that these faults were made simply because the guy was British, or that he's either subjectively or objectively biased. I think he simply jumps to conclusions before he can ably prove them.