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Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings, Risk, and the Role of the State [Hardcover]

Roman Frydman , Michael D. Goldberg

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Book Description

Feb 7 2011 0691145776 978-0691145778

In the wake of the global financial crisis that began in 2007, faith in the rationality of markets has lost ground to a new faith in their irrationality. The problem, Roman Frydman and Michael Goldberg argue, is that both the rational and behavioral theories of the market rest on the same fatal assumption--that markets act mechanically and economic change is fully predictable. In Beyond Mechanical Markets, Frydman and Goldberg show how the failure to abandon this assumption hinders our understanding of how markets work, why price swings help allocate capital to worthy companies, and what role government can and can't play.

The financial crisis, Frydman and Goldberg argue, was made more likely, if not inevitable, by contemporary economic theory, yet its core tenets remain unchanged today. In response, the authors show how imperfect knowledge economics, an approach they pioneered, provides a better understanding of markets and the financial crisis. Frydman and Goldberg deliver a withering critique of the widely accepted view that the boom in equity prices that ended in 2007 was a bubble fueled by herd psychology. They argue, instead, that price swings are driven by individuals' ever-imperfect interpretations of the significance of economic fundamentals for future prices and risk. Because swings are at the heart of a dynamic economy, reforms should aim only to curb their excesses.

Showing why we are being dangerously led astray by thinking of markets as predictably rational or irrational, Beyond Mechanical Markets presents a powerful challenge to conventional economic wisdom that we can't afford to ignore.


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Review

The debate over how to re-regulate [markets and banks] to avoid another financial crisis is urgent and it cannot conclude without resolving the problem that economics' most basic assumption is flawed. [Beyond Mechanical Markets is one] of the most interesting contributions [to] find a new way to model markets. (John Authers Financial Times )

[Beyond Mechanical Markets] marshals a powerful argument that's bolstered by empirical reality: the eternal failures of mechanical forecasting; the sheer difficulty of beating the market with consistency; the unforeseeable ways that history unfolds. . . . [It's approach] seeks to reach beneficial outcomes through flexible, empirical response to [changing] conditions. (Robert Teitelman Huffington Post )

[A] groundbreaking look at how to tame asset booms and busts. . . . [O]f all the books I've read on the crisis that began in 2007, this one comes closest to laying foundation for a more pragmatic and genuinely useful school of economics. (James Pressley Bloomberg News )

[Beyond Mechanical Markets points to] a new international order [that] can save lives and stop currencies collapsing. (Anatole Kaletsky The Times )

[Beyond Mechanical Markets]'s criticisms are potent and its suggestions intriguing. It would be a pity if they were ignored by economists too busy working on their next theory of everything. (Keyur Patel Financial World )

The argument of this original and important book is that . . . economic models still used by central banks and others are seriously misleading and basically useless in dealing with a real world in which individuals are making imperfect and unpredictable interpretations of economic events. . . . The authors' practical recommendations for policy are interesting and they can hardly be accused of a lack of boldness. (Graham Bannock Central Banking.com )

From the Inside Flap

"This important book addresses fundamental questions about macroeconomic and financial modeling that too often are sidestepped. It challenges assumptions that are routinely made, both by orthodox theory and by popular 'behavioral' alternatives; still more provocatively, it proposes a way forward, under which economic analysis remains possible, though shorn of some of its pretensions. These are issues with which all students of macroeconomics and finance will have to grapple, and Frydman and Goldberg provide a lively and impassioned opening to what will surely prove one of the crucial debates of our time."--Michael Woodford, author of Interest and Prices

"This is a brilliant, subtle, and powerful book, by far the best work of economic theory that the global financial crisis has yet produced. If any account deserves to rescue formal economics from the dead end that it has reached, and restore the connection between what economists tell you and what actually happens, this is it."--Robert Skidelsky, author of Keynes: Return of the Master

"The economy is not just mechanical; much change is nonroutine. In turn, many important economic decisions are also nonroutine. Based on this insight, Frydman and Goldberg give us a new theory of the business cycle. In market after market, they convincingly argue its realism. What's more, Beyond Mechanical Markets gives us a doctor's prescription for dampening--and possibly even avoiding altogether--the next economic crisis."--George A. Akerlof, Nobel Laureate in Economics

"This book is a milestone. It breaks important new ground in the refoundation that macroeconomics and finance so badly need. The authors' rereading of Keynes will come as a revelation both to Keynesians and behavioralists ."--Edmund S. Phelps, Nobel Laureate in Economics

"The year 2008 saw not only financial failure but the failure of an idea, the economic theory in which financial markets are mechanically determined to settle at equilibrium and economically efficient prices. Roman Frydman and Michael Goldberg demonstrate clearly the fallacy of that idea. Their powerful analysis provides insights which can help us reduce the probability and severity of future crises."--Adair Turner, chairman of Britain's Financial Services Authority

"Beyond Mechanical Markets is a potential turning point in economics. Frydman and Goldberg offer a view that is not only new but almost certainly correct--and that has far-reaching implications. After reading Beyond Mechanical Markets, other economics books seem old-fashioned."--Richard Robb, Columbia University


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Amazon.com: 2.2 out of 5 stars  4 reviews
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful
2.0 out of 5 stars Not really novel and entirely theoretical Dec 22 2011
By anonymous - Published on Amazon.com
Format:Hardcover
The premise that government should intervene in markets in a soft way at the margins just to mitigate the worst run ups (or downs) of asset swings is not novel. The book does not answer the question that has always been asked of any economist seeking to manage markets: how would it be implemented? As with any management of markets for results more beneficial to society, it sounds great. The devil is the details though, and we never get those. I have to agree with the reviewer who said that it is not particularly clearly written and does not seem to know what audience it is adressed to.

I found it strange that the author focused on possible means for governments to mitigate asset swings, but not once mentioned the many government interventions that exascerbate them (Freddie and Fannie, mortgage interest deduction, public campaigns to promote an "ownership society", relaxing regs as the price swing gained strength, etc. in the housing crisis, for example). It was as if asset price swings happen comepletely independently of government policy, except the non-specific government policies he is recommending that will not have any unintended consequences like other government interventions.
8 of 12 people found the following review helpful
1.0 out of 5 stars Understanding this important topic is made difficult because the authors do not express themselves clearly at all. May 26 2011
By Jackal - Published on Amazon.com
Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase
The authors start by going back to Knight and Hayek to make the point that there is genuine uncertainty about the future. Traditional finance models do not take this into account. I fully agree with the gist of this argument. However, it is not at all a novel argument and this chapter reads like a disjointed dissertation chapter. The novel part comes in the second half of the book. Here the book starts to become very blurry. I think for two main reasons:
(1) The authors have not thought about the target audience of the book. Is it regulators (maybe), academics (probably not), traders (probably not but they might pick up the book), economists (probably)? My guess in parenthesis. The key problem is that the authors do not seem to have made up their mind.
(2) The authors never state arguments up-front. Instead they proceed in a meandering manner assuming that the reader is able to tease out their key arguments. This is totally unacceptable.

Some books are difficult to understand but you get a feeling that the author has done everything to make the content accessible. I don't mind struggling to get through such books. In this particular case, I don't get the feeling that the authors have something very unique or clear to state. I might be wrong, but one need to make decisions under uncertainty. I have given four chapters of the book an honest attempt.

UPDATE 2013: Just want to make sure I don't give out one star without it being fully deserved. I have given the book another chance and again I was struck by the poor quality of language. Sadly, the authors just do not command the English language.
6 of 9 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Subtle and powerful concluding resolution Jun 22 2011
By Curious - Published on Amazon.com
Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase
I tend to disagree with most of the previous review, though he said he only read four chapters so...

The authors very clearly state their audience, they aim to make the underlying assumptions of economists' discourse (and thus policy prescriptions) more concretely illustrated to these very economists and the general populace (a daunting task in either instance, let alone both).

I do agree that if they laid out some of their concluding points earlier it would have helped to digest some details building to it for those not familiar with the professional literature (or better the authors' previous work). I think though the goal was for readers to learn through a process of digestive thinking, rather than direct steering to an overall advocacy/understanding/approach (rather they acknowledge some can accept a degree of their points over a spectrum that may fall short of 100%).

It is a very important issue of course (if the way we think about the world is flawed, certainly it will make any attempts to improve the world much more suspect), and one that would take much convincing to uproot the profession of its pretensions (of exact knowledge, barring random shocks, as opposed to the presence of changes in parameters and relationships with expectations, which could be based on an ever changing set of factors).

The final chapters in particular are incredibly substantive, and point to new understandings of risk behavior on a very practical level. According to their model based on more plausible assumptions, as well as their empirical work testing against reality, risk is based not on volatility but the length of upswings and downswings in assets (relative to earnings with stock prices and purchasing power in exchange rates for example). This is a very intuitive understanding, astoundingly still generally absent from much of the academic literature and risk management by private institutions and regulators. Also with instability of economic relationships in terms of exact estimates, though qualitatively useful (quantitative instability likely due to changes not only forecasts, but forecasting strategies, and thus coefficients).

I think some of the beginning epistemological arguments may strike some as too abstract or conversely repetitive and obvious (again a problem of a wide audience), but I think it deserves its own treatment in a book on the philosophy of the science of economics (which they have done). I do think that given the fact they have more to offer from their own research, they might have done readers a favor emphasizing and re-emphasizing their improvements in understanding discussed at the end from the very beginning and repeatedly (though extensively discussed in their earlier book). For example that risk is not based on how much prices go up or down day to day (volatility), but how far they have risen in the recent past (relative to those benchmarks), that upswings in prices don't come from falls in risk preferences (and in fact the exact opposite based on evidence, swings raise risk assessment) but rather are driven by expectations of higher returns. These seem quite obvious in retrospect, though again terribly under recognized. Also that relationships based on (likely any finite) given information sets will break down over time.

Still this is a book which both pragmatists and intellectuals would benefit from reading by leaps and bounds (as evidenced by the ringing endorsements from leading thinkers in both arenas).

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