Blind Trust [Paperback]

If you're interested in the science of human factors, this is an invaluable read. John Nance writes a true page-turner, filled with vivid accounts of tragedy in the air and on the ground.

This great book shows clearly what happens when greedy managers put money at the top of the list in Airline Business. This became possible because of deregulating the market without thinking of the consequences. Nothing was really prepared at that time, the FAA had no real understanding of what is required once "making money" becomes the main objective in Airline Business. Deregulation in a safety sensitive area always must be accompanied by strict rules and supervision otherwise safety will be "sold out" to maximise profit. The examples show impressively how this happend in the US in the 70/80s. If you take a look at Europe nowadays you can see that history repeats itself. Safety degradation clearly happens and was just overcompensated by the positive development due to better technology and due to the fact that human factor research was increasingly accepted as the most important way to increase safety.

"BLIND TRUST: How Deregulation Has Jeopardized Airline Safety and What You Can Do About it."

That is the complete title, which should tip off the reader that this book is an ax-grinding, political agenda piece, which is filled with polemic distortions of airline safety history.

In "Blind Trust," Nance attempts to persuade the reader that airline safety has been jeopardized by the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act.

He devotes 7 chapters to Air Florida Flight 90, which crashed with ice on the wings, on January 13, 1982. In that book, Nance attempts to prove "the crash of Air Florida's Palm 90 was without question a deregulation accident."

It is a very controversial statement, because it ignores crashes which occurred before deregulation, with much the same factors as the Air Florida crash.

An example would be the Ozark takeoff crash of 12-27-68. It crashed on takeoff because of ice on the wings. The plane was a total loss, but there were no fatalities (68 on board). Ten minor injuries (passengers) and 3 crew with serious injuries. The pilots in that crash had far less experience on that DC-9 jet than the Air Florida pilots had in their 737 jet. The high death toll in the AF 90 crash, was the result of where it came down.

The Ozark pilots deliberately used an illegal reduced power for takeoff, whereas the Air Florida pilots inadvertently had reduced power, because they failed to turn on the electric anti-ice heaters for the engine power probes. That caused a false indication of more power than they actually had.

The Air Florida pilots did have their plane de-iced on the ground, but the wait for takeoff was too long, and some ice did re-accumulate. In comparison, the pre-deregulation Ozark captain refused de-icing and refused to go out and look at his wings, even after he was informed his plane was covered with ice. The mistakes and deficiencies in the Ozark crash were much the same as in the Air Florida crash, and in some items, even worse. Yet Air Florida shows up as a fatal crash and Ozark doesn't because of the differences in terrain at the crash sites.

My view is that Nance had a hidden agenda, which helped to motivate his writing of such a flawed thesis book: He was a union pilot that lost his job because his company (Braniff) went bankrupt, after the Airline Deregulation Act went into effect. Airline labor unions have been notorious opponents of Airline Deregulation, because Free-Markets are a potent force which tend to restrain the ability of those who seek to gain and enforce market monopolies, which benefit them at the expense of everyone else.

In a 1986 newspaper article, Nance insisted that airline flying is less safe than it was before Deregulation. However, Nance did not cite any statistics to back up that assertion. That is because accident statistics show just the opposite. "...accident statistics are virtually useless in measuring the potential for airline crashes," said Nance.

In fact, there is no way to objectively measure the potential for airline crashes other than to compile statistics on past accidents and to diligently investigate each new accident, to find the cause so future repetitions can be prevented. When airline safety history is measured with the historical stats, which John Nance rejects, then the only objective conclusion is that airline safety has improved significantly, from what it was before Deregulation.

There isn't one shred of solid, objective evidence to lead any rational person to conclude that the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act has been a threat to airline safety. Flying on an airliner today is far, far safer than it was in the days prior to 1978. That is historical fact.

But, John Nance is adverse to such historical facts, because they prove how wrong his "Blind Trust" thesis really is.

Robert J. Boser
Editor-in-Chief
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