Bussaco 1810: Wellington Defeats Napoleon's Marshals [Hardcover]

As standard in the Osprey Campaign series, the volume begins with a section on the origins of the campaign and a campaign chronology, followed by well-written sections on opposing plans, opposing commanders and opposing armies. While adequate, these sections are succinct and assume that the reader has access to other sources, particularly concerning the French and British armies in the Peninsula. One concern in these sections is the relative pro forma treatment of Marshall André Massena, which is inadequate given the crucial role that his leadership played in the campaign. The stock descriptions of Massena as a barely-literate looter appear in virtually every source, but they are used as substitutes for real insight into the man who was one of Napoleon's best marshals. Massena's brilliant battlefield performance at Aspern and Wagram the year before Bussaco are not even mentioned by Chartrand, but they are certainly relevant.

The campaign itself is covered in six phases: the Battle of the River Coa against the British covering force, the siege of Almeida, the march to Bussaco and preliminary deployments, the Battle of Bussaco and the aftermath. Three battle scenes depict the action at the River Coa Bridge, the explosion of Almeida's main powder magazine and the repulse of Ney's 6th Corps by Craufurd's Light Division at Bussaco. An excellent order of battle for both sides is included, which has units identified down to regimental level and with manpower strengths. The information on Allied artillery is good, but much less is provided on the French artillery.

While the text of this account is excellent, as is usual for Chartrand, the battle itself is difficult to analyze for two reasons. First, Massena's peculiar behavior in the days leading up to Bussaco is not well-addressed; the comments that he was pre-occupied with a mistress might explain a brief lapse, but not a string of bad decisions that were atypical of this otherwise excellent commander. Was Massena sick (for example, modern historians now suspect that heart problems undermined General Robert E. Lee's performance at Gettysburg in 1863), or suffering from post-Wagram battle fatigue? Unlike Wellington, Massena had been in the thick of two major battles in 1809. The other problem that makes analysis difficult is the lack of adequate maps. This volume has one 3-D map of the River Coa engagement, two 3-D maps of the main French attacks at Bussaco but only one small 2-D map that covers the movements toward Bussaco. It is thus difficult to adequately evaluate Massena's approach to Bussaco or Wellington's response to the French invasion. A vital question - could Massena have done anything differently at Bussaco - cannot be answered from this perspective. While Chartrand suggests that Ney's preference for a hasty assault the day before might have produced better results, this is unlikely.

As in the volume on Vimeiro, Chartrand has not attempted much analysis to explain the French failure. There is little doubt that Massena fumbled the Battle of Bussaco due to violation of the principles of security, surprise and maneuver. French pre-battle reconnaissance was abysmal. Wellington used the terrain effectively and was able to mass sufficient combat power to defeat the French column attacks. Yet Bussaco was not a true reflection of French contemporary tactics, since French cavalry was unengaged and their superiority in artillery was not exploited. Nor were Wellington's famous "reverse slope" tactics utilized to any great extent. If the French had attempted a methodical artillery preparation - particularly against the inexperienced Portuguese units - could Wellington have held? A little analysis of what went wrong for the French army at Bussaco would have been useful.