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Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power
 
 

Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power [Paperback]

Victor Hanson
4.1 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (81 customer reviews)
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Many theories have been offered regarding why Western culture has spread so successfully across the world, with arguments ranging from genetics to superior technology to the creation of enlightened economic, moral, and political systems. In Carnage and Culture, military historian Victor Hanson takes all of these factors into account in making a bold, and sure to be controversial, argument: Westerners are more effective killers. Focusing specifically on military power rather than the nature of Western civilization in general, Hanson views war as the ultimate reflection of a society's character: "There is…a cultural crystallization in battle, in which the insidious and more subtle institutions that heretofore are murky and undefined became stark and unforgiving in the finality of organized killing."

Though technological advances and superior weapons have certainly played a role in Western military dominance, Hanson posits that cultural distinctions are the most significant factors. By bringing personal freedom, discipline, and organization to the battlefield, powerful "marching democracies" were more apt to defeat non-Western nations hampered by unstable governments, limited funding, and intolerance of open discussion. These crucial differences often ensured victory even against long odds. Greek armies, for instance, who elected their own generals and freely debated strategy were able to win wars even when far outnumbered and deep within enemy territory. Hanson further argues that granting warriors control of their own destinies results in the kind of glorification of horrific hand-to-hand combat necessary for true domination.

The nine battles Hanson examines include the Greek naval victory against the Persians at Salamis in 480 B.C., Cortes's march on Mexico City in 1521, the battle of Midway in 1942, and the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam. In the book's fascinating final chapter, he then looks forward and ponders the consequences of a complete cultural victory, challenging the widespread belief that democratic nations do not wage war against one another: "We may well be all Westerners in the millennium to come, and that could be a very dangerous thing indeed," he writes. It seems the West will always seek an enemy, even if it must come from within. --Shawn Carkonen --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

From Publishers Weekly

"The Western way of war is so lethal precisely because it is so amoral shackled rarely by concerns of ritual, tradition, religion, or ethics, by anything other than military necessity." Ranging from Salamis in 480 B.C. to the Tet offensive in Vietnam, Hanson, a California State at Fresno classics professor, expands the scope of his The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece, offering a provocative look at occidental aggression as illustrated by nine paradigmatic battles between Western and non-Western armies. Hanson sheds the overly romanticized view of battles as nationalist or ethnic honorifics and vividly portrays the deadly killing machines Western powers evolved for the destruction of non-Western opponents. Throughout, Hanson stresses the technology based lethality of Western warfare, and the role of individual initiative as opposed to the more collectivist strategies of the Persians, Carthaginians, Arabs, Turks, Aztecs, Zulus, Japanese and Vietnamese opponents who get a chapter apiece. The single Western defeat chronicled in these pages, of the Romans in Cannae in 216 B.C., shows a victorious Hannibal unable to capitalize on his win. (The idea of the citizen/soldier, the role of civic militarism and the republican ideals of Rome seem to be the reasons why not.) A number of Hanson's conclusions will engender debate, such as his claim that America won in Vietnam, but failed to recognize it, as well as the larger claim that "free markets, free elections, and free speech" have led directly to superior forces. The book's last few chapters are fairly driven by that idea, which, along with precise, forceful writing, sets it apart from the season's secondary-sourced, battle-based military histories. (Aug.)Forecast: Hanson's direct, literate style and his evenhandedness should appeal to the liberalist middle of the left and right alike. By isolating the ingredients of military success via elaborate examples, the book can potentially draw on two separate military-history readerships: those looking for theory and those for action.

Copyright 2001 Cahners Business Information, Inc.

--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

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Customer Reviews

81 Reviews
5 star:
 (37)
4 star:
 (27)
3 star:
 (10)
2 star:
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1 star:
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Average Customer Review
4.1 out of 5 stars (81 customer reviews)
 
 
 
 
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5.0 out of 5 stars Brutal West, Dec 28 2011
By 
Volpone (Toronto, Ontario Canada) - See all my reviews
This review is from: Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power (Paperback)
The one star reviews are ideological quibbles and prove the book is excellent in its class. In case you missed it, the author's point is: the West wins because of how it fights, and the worst and most terrible wars have been those where western countries square off with each other. Two world wars provide the proof.
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4.0 out of 5 stars From what I've read so far..., July 11 2004
By 
This review is from: Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power (Paperback)
I'm about half way through the book and so far it seems very well thought out. My biggest complaint is how Salamis is glorified and Thermopylae's contribution to the Greek defense is downplayed to a ridiculous extent. Overall Carnage and Culture is a very well thought out book that explains Western military dominance.
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5.0 out of 5 stars Culture: Ultimate Benchmark of Efficient Warfare, Jun 16 2004
By 
Serge J. Van Steenkiste (Atlanta, GA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   
This review is from: Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power (Paperback)
In Carnage and Culture, Victor Hanson regularly warns his readers that he is not interested whether the primacy of the West on the battlefield is morally superior to, or far more despicable, than that of its Non-Western adversaries. Hanson's originality and genius lies in his systematic (to some readers ad nauseam) demonstration that the military superiority of the West mirrors larger social, economical, political and cultural practices that at first glance have not much relevance to the art and science of warfare. Unlike most historians, Hanson rightly believes that this superiority of the West is not merely due to superior weapons. Only the Western culture has had the discipline, morale and sheer technology expertise in perfecting its killing know-how over time as Hanson efficiently demonstrates through his narration and analysis of nine landmark battles. Hanson makes clear that he has not selected a few battles that by coincidence or sheer luck prove his point.

Hanson also drives the point home that he does not downplay the courage that adversaries of the Western armed forces have often displayed for naught on the battlefield. Sometimes, the West was outsmarted temporarily but ultimately regained its supremacy over its Non-Western enemies because of its cultural institutions. Hanson convincingly shows that not even battlefield inexperience, lack of courage, outnumbered troops or poor command has had any lasting impact on Western dominance in battle. Citizens systematically turn out to be history's deadliest killers. Reaction, innovation, initiative and individualism have often outweighed the merits of method, consensus and adherence to hierarchy and protocol.

Furthermore, Hanson states that the West was not naturally smarter than the rest of the world. Unlike some historians, Hanson rightly does not believe in a deterministic approach to Western military superiority based solely on biology, geography and guns. In his examination of the Battle of Tenochtitlan, Hanson however acknowledges that disease and hunger helped Hernan Cortes and his men finish the job and overcome the resistance of Amerindians. However, the victory of Spain over Mexicas was primarily due to the military brilliance, ruthlessness and courage of Cortes and his main lieutenants in 1520-1521.

Evolving capitalist and democratic institutions, free inquiry as well as rationalism, have often given Western capitalists and scientists a pragmatic and utilitarian umbrella protecting them from religious fundamentalists, state censors or stern cultural conservatives. The West has not hesitated to incorporate the best military practices of its adversaries into its wars of annihilation or improvise on the battlefield with deadly effect. Western military forces have almost always been interested first in the decisive crushing and destruction of their adversaries, and then in social recognition, religious salvation and cultural status.

Hanson shows that Alexander the Great discarded Western rationality in favor of Asian theocracy during his Asian conquests in the fourth century BC that ultimately resulted in plutocratic god-kingdoms, unstable Hellenism in Asia and the destruction of embryonic democracy in Greece. Unsurprisingly, the Roman Republic truthful to Hellenic politics, civic militarism and decisive shock-and-awe warfare destroyed these degenerated god-kingdoms across its way one after the other in the next three centuries. Other dynasts fell victim to this Western dual idea of free citizen/soldier in the following centuries without ever getting it before Rome crushed them decisively.

Despite the ultimate destruction of the long-lasting Roman Empire, this Western tradition of warfare was not lost in Europe. Islamic armies got a bitter taste of these warfare strategies and tactics at the decisive land battle of Tours-Poitiers in 732 and at the sea battle of Lepanto in 1571, despite their fighting spirit.

Hanson also reminds his audience that the West generally has a dislike of wars waged in jungles, stealthily at night and as counter-terrorists to combat enemies who avoid direct and open confrontation with it. The frightful losses inflicted on western civilians and soldiers are considered cowardly and do not reflect the open and direct warfare style that the West deems fair on the battlefield. Non-Western men and women have often joined Western armies to help neutralize other Natives due to a perceived fairness of Western conquerors.

Finally, Hanson observes that many adversaries of the West have realized that merely possessing Western weapons is not enough to ultimately be victorious. These adversaries have often made the historic error to assume that Western democracies, slow to anger, are somehow weak and timid.

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