Vous voulez voir cette page en français ? Cliquez ici.

Sign in to turn on 1-Click ordering.
Amazon Prime Free Trial required. Sign up when you check out. Learn More
More Buying Choices
Have one to sell? Sell yours here
Tell the Publisher!
I'd like to read this book on Kindle

Don't have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here, or download a FREE Kindle Reading App.

Competition Policy: A Game-Theoretic Perspective [Paperback]

Louis Phlips

Price: CDN$ 57.95 & FREE Shipping. Details
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
Only 1 left in stock (more on the way).
Ships from and sold by Amazon.ca. Gift-wrap available.
Want it delivered Friday, March 6? Choose One-Day Shipping at checkout.
‹  Return to Product Overview

Inside This Book (Learn More)
First Sentence
From a methodological point of view, the message of this chapter is that explicit collusion can and should be analysed as the solution of a non-cooperative game. Read the first page
Browse Sample Pages
Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover
Search inside this book:

Concordance (Learn More)
These are the most frequently used words in this book.
agreement  akzo  antitrust  assumption  authority  behaviour  between  cannot  capacity  cartel  case  collusion  collusive  commission  competition  competitive  competitors  contract  cost  cournot  customers  decision  demand  does  ecs  entrant  entry  equal  equation  equilibrium  expected  fact  figure  firm  first  following  function  game  given  gives  higher  however  implies  increase  incumbent  industry  information  joint  know  leader  level  marginal  market  may  members  model  monopolist  monopoly  must  nash  number  outcome  output  parameters  payoff  per  period  player  point  policy  possible  predation  predatory  price  pricing  production  profit  public  quantity  quotas  result  rule  second  section  see  share  should  show  since  stage  strategies  therefore  thus  time  total  two  type  uk  value  whether 
‹  Return to Product Overview