Gabriel and Savage wrote Crisis in Command in the immediate aftermath of the Viet Nam War, a period in which the US Army was demoralized and fundamentally damaged by the war. Crisis in Command documents what went wrong within the Army, comparing the "managerial" style of leadership with the leadership methods that General Hans Von Seekt put into place in recreating the German army during the 1920s.
Crisis in Command shows all of the personnel and leadership pathologies that demoralized the army, the individual rotation of troops rather than of complete units, dating back to World War II, which prevented the "FNG" from being integrated into a combat unit during his brief (1 year) tour in country, the Army's desire to "blood" its officer and NCO corps in the only war available and rotating them likewise with blinding speed through units with more care for their careers than for their men. Gabriel and Savage used a memorable phrase to summarize the lack of leadership: "It is impossible to manage men to their deaths."
