- Paperback: 292 pages
- Publisher: Cambridge University Press; 1 edition (Oct 23 1970)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 0521096235
- ISBN-13: 978-0521096232
- Product Dimensions: 23 x 15.6 x 2.6 cm
- Shipping Weight: 481 g
- Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
- Amazon Bestsellers Rank: #274,396 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- See Complete Table of Contents
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Product Details |
Product Description
Review
'An interesting and valuable collection of papers.' Nature
'This book is a fascinating example of philosophical debate about issues which should interest any historian of science concerned with scientific method and the philosophy of scientific change.' Philosophy of Science
'This book is a fascinating example of philosophical debate about issues which should interest any historian of science concerned with scientific method and the philosophy of scientific change.' Philosophy of Science
Product Description
Two books have been particularly influential in contemporary philosophy of science: Karl R. Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery, and Thomas S. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Both agree upon the importance of revolutions in science, but differ about the role of criticism in science's revolutionary growth. This volume arose out of a symposium on Kuhn's work, with Popper in the chair, at an international colloquium held in London in 1965. The book begins with Kuhn's statement of his position followed by seven essays offering criticism and analysis, and finally by Kuhn's reply. The book will interest senior undergraduates and graduate students of the philosophy and history of science, as well as professional philosophers, philosophically inclined scientists, and some psychologists and sociologists.
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First Sentence
My object in these pages is to juxtapose the view of scientific development outlined in my book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, with the better known views of our chairman, Sir Karl Popper. Read the first page
Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover
My object in these pages is to juxtapose the view of scientific development outlined in my book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, with the better known views of our chairman, Sir Karl Popper. Read the first page
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Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover
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Most helpful customer reviews
5.0 out of 5 stars
If you want to understand Kuhn: buy it.,
This review is from: Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Volume 4: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965 (Paperback)
I've been a big Kuhn fan for years. I thought I understood his ideas, too, until I read this book. This gem is a debate among some of the most interesting philosophers of science in the twentieth century-- all trying to make sense of Kuhn, most concluding that his ideas are deeply flawed.The criticism helped me advance my own interpretation of Kuhn, but it was Kuhn's reply to the criticism that brought the whole thing into technicolor 3D. I could hardly have learned more if I had the man in my living room. -- James
5.0 out of 5 stars
Nice collection of Essays,
By A Customer
This review is from: Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Volume 4: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965 (Paperback)
This is a collection of "essays" about T.S. Kuhn's distiction between normal science and revolutionary science. Various philosophers, including Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, criticize various aspects of Kuhn's argument. Finally Kuhn presents a reply to his critics.
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews on Amazon.com (beta) Amazon.com:
5.0 out of 5 stars (4 customer reviews) 10 of 11 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars
Nice collection of Essays,
By A Customer - Published on Amazon.com
This review is from: Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Volume 4: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965 (Paperback)
This is a collection of "essays" about T.S. Kuhn's distiction between normal science and revolutionary science. Various philosophers, including Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, criticize various aspects of Kuhn's argument. Finally Kuhn presents a reply to his critics.
12 of 14 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars
If you want to understand Kuhn: buy it.,
By James Bach - Published on Amazon.com
This review is from: Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Volume 4: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965 (Paperback)
I've been a big Kuhn fan for years. I thought I understood his ideas, too, until I read this book. This gem is a debate among some of the most interesting philosophers of science in the twentieth century-- all trying to make sense of Kuhn, most concluding that his ideas are deeply flawed.The criticism helped me advance my own interpretation of Kuhn, but it was Kuhn's reply to the criticism that brought the whole thing into technicolor 3D. I could hardly have learned more if I had the man in my living room. -- James 2 of 2 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars
Useful confrontations,
By Sergio Flores - Published on Amazon.com
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This review is from: Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Volume 4: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965 (Paperback)
Kuhn was never able to solve the paradox within his idea of sciences: if his "language of incommensurability implies that we cannot understand another's scheme or paradigm" (Dasenbrock, TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES pp. 49), how can we then know that we can't understand this? Other people's sciences are so radically different from "our" science that we can never understand theirs or they ours and, yet, Kuhn can know that: he understands that; the rest of us don't.Kuhn's appeal to fallacy pervades all of his work in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Reflections on my Critics, and The Essential Tension. Basically, Kuhn alleges that we cannot even begin to understand other people's paradigms; we understand only our paradigm. Yet Kuhn understood enough to "see" this. He can use the "historical study of scientific development" to argue that Popper is wrong, but he also wants the rest of us to see that we cannot understand the science paradigm of previous centuries: Kuhn can use history and its language to attack ideas that punch holes in his idea (or to tell us about Aristotle's concept of science); the rest of us cannot use history because, you see, we cannot understand other paradigms. If Kuhn were right, then his theory would be nothing but a fad, a "paradigm" that will pass and be replaced by some other fad. In a sense this has happened, but only in the social sciences because Kuhn was "adopted" by a particular group of philosophers and literary critics who saw the usefulness of a theory that claimed that science, this spawn of the modernism, reason and humanism that Heidegger and more recent characters such as Foucault and Derrida have relentlessly attacked, was nothing but an opinion held by an old boys network. Now that such a philosophical fad has lost much of its appeal in France and the US, Kuhn's theory is seen for what it is: an opinion by a man who protected his opinion with fallacies. This opinion was interesting to many philosophers. These philosophers are either dead now, or interested in their next flavor-of-the-month. This is a good book if you believe, as Popper did, that the clash of ideas and opinions was the best way to get results. Kuhn confesses early on that he does not agree with this position: he has found "the" truth regarding science. Why can't everybody just accept it? Popper is excellent, Kuhn is unintentionally funny, Feyerabend is way out there (no news). |
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