17 of 20 people found the following review helpful
- Published on Amazon.com
This is an incredibly powerful book (and that's not hyperbole). The authors state in the opening, "The core Darwinian principles involve variation, selection, and inheritance (or replication). The claim that Darwinism applies to social evolution must rest on a clear picture of what these concepts mean. Otherwise, the arguments and counterarguments become lost in a fog. Consequently, much of this work is devoted to clarifying concepts and refining definitions at a fairly abstract level...The primary aim of this book is to show that the core Darwinian mechanisms of variation, selection, and replication apply to social entities and processes, and we give some examples of how they pertain to business and other social phenomena." Now, given that this book has apparently been somewhat (erroneously) advertised as a business/economics book (I base this on the blurbs above, i.e. Marion Blue and the Financial Times), I can only say that this manuscript is much more than some Gordon Gekko manifesto - it only loosely applies to economic matters.
In order to keep this review as short as possible let me skip to the chase. The authors begin with a historical account of several individuals who attempted to harness Darwinism (what the author's later call `Generalized Darwinism'), which is simply the application of Darwinism to social phenomenon; the two most discussed individuals are David George Ritchie and Thorstein Veblen. Also, the authors are quick to point out that this is not `Social Darwinism' in the traditional sense of the term (for more information on that path I would suggest reading: Eugenics and the Nature-Nurture Debate in the Twentieth Century (Palgrave Studies in the History of Science and Technology)). The authors then move towards explaining the confusion between the `Detail Level' and the `Abstract Level': "While the biological and the social are different levels of the same world, the detailed ontology of (say) genes is different from the detailed ontology of (say) the immune system, and both are very different from the detailed ontology of the human social world. A generalized Darwinism proposes that, despite these real and severe ontological differences at the level of detail, there are, nevertheless, also common ontological features at an abstract level. Precisely because it abstracts from detailed ontological differences, a generalized Darwinism cannot explain everything." Next, the authors discuss why some alternative theories are deficient (the problem of human intentionality, principles of self-organization, the "continuity hypothesis," and Lamarckism). Another great contribution this book makes is explaining exactly where Richard Dawkins (the 800-pound gorilla) has gone wrong in his works [e.g. The Selfish Gene: 30th Anniversary Edition--with a new Introduction by the Author]. They do this by drawing upon works by other heavy-hitters such as David Sloan Wilson [Evolution for Everyone: How Darwin's Theory Can Change the Way We Think About Our Lives] and Elliot Sober [Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science]. Furthermore, the authors detail the reasons why the concept of the "meme" and the science of "memetics" never panned out [e.g.: Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science]. So, once the authors have cleared the drawing board by explaining what they don't believe is useful, Hodgson and Knudsen begin to lay the groundwork for a much more robust explanatory generalized Darwinism. And this is where the book really takes off.
First, they give a detailed account of what the analogs to the genotypes and phenotypes are, which are the `Generative Replicator' and the `Interactor'. Also, they detail the conditions that must be met in order for an entity to be considered a Replicator or Interactor. This is quite substantial in-and-of itself; however, as I was reading I found a great deal of explanatory power in the book that wasn't explicitly mentioned by the authors. Here are three examples:
1. "Habit replication also often relies on imitation, which need not be fully conscious and can involve some "tacit learning." Imitation can result from an instinctive propensity that has itself evolved for efficacious reasons among social creatures." This is, which the authors don't mention, what I believe is exactly what `Mirror Neurons' do. This is explored by others such as Antonio Damasio in Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain and Marco Iacoboni in Mirroring People: The New Science of How We Connect with Others.
2. "[Sidney] Winters argues that, although tacit or other knowledge must reside in the nerve or brain cells of a set of human beings, its enactment depends crucially on the existence of a structured context in which individuals interact with each other. More broadly, much of the information that is used and transmitted in a culture is embedded in social structures and organizations, in the sense that its existence and transmission depend on them." This is, which the authors don't mention, what I believe is exactly what the `Extended/Embedded/Embodied Cognition' is all about. This is explored by others such as Lawrence Shapiro in Embodied Cognition and Richard Menary in The Extended Mind (Life and Mind: Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psychology).
3. "Through a shared language, one person can access the mental model of another. This transmission of mental models is improved by close interaction with error correction. By means of gestures and questions, agents establish joint attention that increases the accuracy of transmission of mental models and establishes mutual understandings. Language is a vital link in this causal chain. Without language, it would be much more difficult to communicate mental models and develop shared understandings at a detailed level. Habits of thought satisfy all four of our conditions for a generative replicator. They constitute conditional generative mechanisms that are essential to a generative replicator." This is, which the authors don't mention, exactly what John R. Searle discusses (especially his concept of a "Status Function Declaration" in his book Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. In fact, I found that Searle's book and Darwin's Conjecture overlap to a great, and advantageous, extent. I would strongly recommend reading both books together.
In sum, the premise is very simple. Human instincts are grounded in our genetics (Genotype/ Replicator) which is "hosted" in our body (Phenotype/ Interactor). Our instincts are then subverted by our habits and reason (which are Generative Replicators), which we gain through exosomatic and symbolic systems. This is described in the last section of the book, where Hodgson and Knudsen detail historically and chronologically, how generalized Darwinism works through Replicators and Interactors on the `Genetic,' `Cultural,' and `Organizational' levels (there is also a great chart that shows this). For me, this book has filled a tremendous explanatory gap; I was able to place many different things into the model that the authors have devised. And there is more in the book (i.e. how group selection really works) that I don't have the time or the space to include. Suffice it to say that this book is exceedingly important and I hope it receives the attention it deserves by everyone, not just economists or business management types. Lastly, I found it much more beneficial than, Evolution--the Extended Synthesis, which tries to accomplish what Hodgson and Knudsen have done here. This is a fantastic book; I highly recommend it.
- Published on Amazon.com
I have read a few "lite" books on evolution but usually steered away from its applications to the social realm simply because there were too many polarized options, nothing looked like it would walk me through the ideas without preaching them at me or condemning them. This seemed to be a good book to cover this gap, and I was right.
Basically this book provides a fairly sophisticated analysis of social and cultural evolution in the light of the most influential works on the topic. We find out what arguments are for and against it, how we can sanely use the world "evolution" without implying radical change or improvement, and how we can explain both culture and biology using general principles can come from Darwin's empirical observations and relatively basic hypotheses.
In some ways this book was more than I bargained for, and it doesn't take a very straight-forward approach to its topics. I sometimes felt like I had to struggle to understand what, in retrospect, turned out to be a simple concept. Am I dumb or did the book confuse the topic? Who knows. I did find that the glossary was very helpful, and reading it several times to tie all the concepts together into a single interlink system of ideas was an incredibly powerful way to make sense of everything else. If you're not new to any of these ideas, you can just read the book straight through with few problems.
In all I feel like I got what I came here for, and don't feel like I need to spend much more time figuring out the fundamentals. I am now reading a couple social history books and can see the ideas taking better shape. A definite recommendation before embarking on more empirical studies wherein the theoretical ideas become useful if not necessary.
- Published on Amazon.com
When we are talking about biology, I'm an "orthodox", rather inveterate Darwinist. Not of the postmodern, soft-core variety whose members just pay lip service to Darwin and evolution but then try to neutralize "Darwins's dangerous idea" (Daniel C. Dennett) by introducing some human touch because they find the idea of natural selection rather harsh and ruthless. Therefore, the project of Hodgson and Knudsen to create a metatheory called "generalized Darwinism" had all my sympathy. There is already another kind of cultural metatheory called "memetics", which I find not too convincing (see my review of "The meme machine" by Susan Blackmore).
It's pretty easy to apply some basic Darwinian principles to culture, but then the result is a somewhat diluted or mutilated Darwinism: Just take some sort of "variation" + competition + "selection" - you'll find this triad everywhere. But in this case (a) the concept of heritability is missing and (b) it's impossible to distinguish Darwinian from Lamarckian evolution. That's exactly what the authors try to avoid.
In order to apply the full and true Darwinian principles to culture, Hodgson and Knudsen make it clear that the distinction between replicator and interactor is essential (it's basically the dichotomy that Richard Dawkins termed "replicator and vehicle", the first being the genes, the second the phenotype). If this distinction is not made clear, it would be impossible to distinguish between inheritance and contagion.
The next distinction they underline is the one between "units of selection" and "units of replication". They criticize Dawkins for muddling two different aspects of selection: Selection OF vs. Selection FOR: "...there is selection OF interactors leading to selection FOR replicators" (p. 153).
For me, chapter 7.2 CULTURAL GROUP SELECTION is the most important one, because they try to conceptualize GROUPS as units of selection (i.e. interactors). They conclude "that conformist and prestige-based transmission reduces diversity within groups but can accompany greater variation between groups".
On a rather abstract level, Darwinism is not specifically about genes, but about the three key-concepts "trait variation", "heritability" and differential reproduction leading to "natural selection". If Darwinism is to be applied to entities like groups, you have to be able to identify some X that is passed on (i.e. inheritance). Or in other words: If groups are interactors, what are the replicators that are selected FOR?
That's the point where Hodgson and Knudsen arguments failed to convince me. According to their theory, the replicator (the "DNA" so to speak) of a group is its habits (on the level of organisations they call it "routines", as a kind of meta-habit).
I think that "generalized Darwinism" is a nice idea, but only as long as we treat it as a metaphor. It's like the concept "meme": as a metaphor (e.g. "this tune spreads LIKE a virus"), it's an interesting and entertaining idea, but as soon as you try to use it as a scientific theory, which presupposes that the theory has got not only descriptive value but also explicative and above all predictive power, the whole concept goes awry. It's the same with Einstein's theory of relativity or Heisenberg's uncertainty principle: they are extremly powerful theories if applied to physical entities. If transposed to the realm of culture, they are at best metaphors, and probably not very apt ones...
Back to "generalized Darwinism" à la Hodgson and Knudsen: I think that they fail when it comes to identify the "DNA" of groups. To say that "habits and routines" are the replicators of groups and organisations misses an important point: a habit is not necessarily a discret entity that can be inherited (a ritual is one, but rituals are rather rare). It's simply impossible to distinguish (as the authors themselves stipulated!) a habit that is passed on because of contagion from a habit that is truely inherited.
I think that "generalized Darwinism" (like its sister "memetics") is but a mirage. The mirage is so tantalizing because on the one hand it's possible to describe groups as "vehicles" or "interactors", provided that the group has a clear-cut identity, like a soccer team or a religious sect. BUT on the other hand it's impossible to identify corresponding units that qualify as true replicators; habits and routines are too vague and fuzzy for the job.
What really vexed me while reading the book was that Hodgson and Knudsen never left the abstract and theoretical level of discussion to give us some real-world example of the replicator/interactor interaction in culture. I tried to make up my own example : What about Apple or Google? If the company named Apple is a unit of selection = an interactor (it certainly is): what is its replicator, its "DNA"? Is it its specific Apple-like routine? That's preposterous, because Apple's success may be due to a lot of things (probably it has something to do with Steve Jobs), but certainly not to some kind of "routine".
I'd say that it is simply impossible to pinpoint and identify the replicator of social entities like Apple, GM or the Dallas Mavericks. But then "generalized Darwinism" is just a nice idea, a metaphor, but not a scientific concept, despite the highbrow jargon.
0 of 1 people found the following review helpful
- Published on Amazon.com
At the time of writing there is one five star and one four star review. I make life difficult for potential readers by adding a two star review. How to reconcile? If this were the first time I came across the idea that a modified version of Darwinism could be used in social science, then I would probably give the book 3 or possibly 4 stars. However, I do not feel that that my own lack of knowledge of the literature should guide a book review. The book will have to stand on its own when being compared to other similar books.
The key objective of this book is a call to behavioural scientists (to use a somewhat fashionable term) to consider Darwinian explanations. I have absolutely no problem with this call. Neither did Donald Campbell, who wrote a similar programmatic statement in the 1960s. His work is referenced, but hardly commented on. Strange. In my opinion the authors do not thread enough new ground to warrant a book. As a programmatic statement I prefer Cambell's 50 year old article-length call to action. However, the book is not useless. It introduce readers to the interactor/replicator perspective, the Nelson/Winter perspective, etc. If you know what I am talking about you should read these original sources instead. If you do not know what I am talking about, you will learn reading almost anything.
Of course, the authors' do make a points that are interesting, but they never push their points in a very definitive manner. The result is that that book is awfully meandering from topic to topic. They critique Dawkins's meme, but never provide a strong conceptual alternative treatment. Dawkins's idea originates from the 1970s, Sorry to say, but general critique is a bit late. Dawkins, apparently, is responsible for slowing down development because his meme idea is faulty. In the first chapter, the authors argue that a lot of conceptual work is still needed. Fine, agree. Then, dear authors, stop talking and start delivering. Dawkins has not done any actual work on memes. He just threw out the idea in the 1970s. Maybe the authors should blame others for the lack of progress. Finally, the snide remarks against Dawkins seem very petty and inexplicable to any reader.
The chapters of the book are most likely modified journal articles. There is repetition and there is absolutely no notion of progress in the book. It just goes on and on. Chapter after chapter. And then in the end we are told that more work is needed. I generally do not like books that are somewhat lazy reworking of the authors' prior work. Still, some credit to the authors for not throwing in the kitchen sink.
Thinking about other books. To get an overview of the field I would read Organizational Evolution and Strategic Management (SAGE Strategy series) instead. That book is more structured and provides all the key references to other work in the area of organisation. The writing style is much less pretentious. Furthermore it is a book and not a collection of articles. Still, neither book is an especially inspiring call to action. Evolutionary Dynamics of Organizations is an old edited volume, primarily focused on empirical work is much more inspirational.
In my view, the book is a solid two stars. Clearly the authors are thoughtful and sincere academics, but that is not relevant for a book review. Time is limited, we can only read so many books, and I would rather spend time rereading the really good books instead.