Auto boutiques-francophones Simple and secure cloud storage Personal Care Cook Kindle Music Deals Store Fall Tools
CDN$ 17.14
  • List Price: CDN$ 18.99
  • You Save: CDN$ 1.85 (10%)
FREE Shipping on orders over CDN$ 25.
Only 2 left in stock (more on the way).
Ships from and sold by Amazon.ca.
Gift-wrap available.
Quantity:1
Eisenhower And Berlin 194... has been added to your Cart
Have one to sell?
Flip to back Flip to front
Listen Playing... Paused   You're listening to a sample of the Audible audio edition.
Learn more
See this image

Eisenhower And Berlin 1945: The Decision To Halt At The Elbe Paperback – May 30 2000


See all 4 formats and editions Hide other formats and editions
Amazon Price New from Used from
Hardcover
"Please retry"
CDN$ 55.88
Paperback
"Please retry"
CDN$ 17.14
CDN$ 7.14 CDN$ 0.01

Unlimited FREE Two-Day Shipping for Six Months When You Try Amazon Student




Product Details

  • Paperback: 120 pages
  • Publisher: WW Norton (May 30 2000)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0393320103
  • ISBN-13: 978-0393320107
  • Product Dimensions: 14 x 1 x 21.1 cm
  • Shipping Weight: 141 g
  • Average Customer Review: 2.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Bestsellers Rank: #1,038,262 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Product Description

Review

An able and convincing brief, defending Eisenhower's decisions. -- American Historical

The most authoritative, succinct statement of the argument that Eisenhower was correct in his decision. -- Choice

From the Publisher

Maps

See all Product Description

Inside This Book

(Learn More)
First Sentence
OF ALL THE FACTORS that influenced General Dwight D. Eisenhower's decision to stop at the Elbe River, few were more important than one brought about on March 7 by accident. Read the first page
Explore More
Concordance
Browse Sample Pages
Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover
Search inside this book:

Customer Reviews

2.3 out of 5 stars
5 star
0
4 star
0
3 star
2
2 star
0
1 star
1
See all 3 customer reviews
Share your thoughts with other customers

Most helpful customer reviews

Format: Paperback
This is a short book about why Ike did not use the opportunity to capture Berlin in 1945. This is an earlier book before Ambrose became widely known, and to be honest more scholorly and less reader friendly. It is a short read.
Ike did not sanction the capture of Berlin for a number of reasons. First, Berlin was in the Soviet sphere in Germany, and second because his troops were not in as good a position as the Russians of taking the Nazi capital. The cost in human lives would also be great, especially if the city would have to be handed back to the Russians. For these reasons, Ike decided that Berlin was not worth the risk, and sent his forces toward Leipzig. Ike made a sound military decision.
Was this review helpful to you? Yes No Sending feedback...
Thank you for your feedback. If this review is inappropriate, please let us know.
Sorry, we failed to record your vote. Please try again.
Format: Paperback
I am a hugh fan of Stephen Ambrose. However, this very small book was a great disappointment. First of all its only about 100 pages plus appendices. It is more like reading a college history report. Stephen Ambrose is my favorite history author but, he seems to have a blind spot when it comes to Eisenhower. In Ambroses eyes he can do no wrong. If you want a much more detailed viewpoint of the battle for Berlin read The Last Battle by Cornelius Ryan.
Was this review helpful to you? Yes No Sending feedback...
Thank you for your feedback. If this review is inappropriate, please let us know.
Sorry, we failed to record your vote. Please try again.
0 of 1 people found the following review helpful By A Customer on July 20 2000
Format: Paperback
After reading Citizen Soldiers, D-Day, and Band of Brothers, I came to one conclusion. Ambrose is great at interviewing veterans and taking those interviews and making pretty good books out of them. However, he should not attempt to analyze the strategy of several generals in World War 2. Ambrose is ignorant to the fact that even though our allies in the east were communists, they still bled alot more than the Western Allies did and suffered far more from the wrath of the Third Reich. Ambrose is a fool for criticizing Cornelius Ryan's The Last Battle. Ryan was able to interview hundreds from BOTH sides of the war. While Ambrose just interviews Americans, Ryan interviewed Americans, British, Russians, and Germans. Also don't forget that Ryan was able to interview all the key players of the Battle of Berlin; Ike, Bradley, Chuikov, Rokossovskii, Heinrici, and too many more for me to list here. If you want a great account of the Battle of Berlin and the decision of the West not to attack the capital, read Ryan's The Last Battle. Take it from a guy who was with our troops and interviewed ALL of the major players in the battle.
Was this review helpful to you? Yes No Sending feedback...
Thank you for your feedback. If this review is inappropriate, please let us know.
Sorry, we failed to record your vote. Please try again.

Most Helpful Customer Reviews on Amazon.com (beta)

Amazon.com: 10 reviews
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful
The Decision Speaks Well of Eisenhower Oct. 12 2012
By Epistem Quest - Published on Amazon.com
Format: Paperback
I should state right off the bat that I am not a war history buff. I purchased this book, and a couple others, in order to expand my knowledge of World War II. I decided to read this one first.

Knowing something of Stephen Ambrose's view of Eisenhower, I expected a positive presentation of Eisenhower's decision to let the Russians take Berlin. I was not surprised in this regard. The only question for me was, did Eisenhower's decision make military sense? I think he makes his case that Eisenhower made the right decision from many angles.

General Eisenhower asked General Omar Bradley for an estimate of how many soldiers would lose their lives in taking Berlin. Bradley figured 100,000. It was already decided by political means that Berlin would be divided four ways. Similarly,Berlin was within the Russian sector. Eisenhower felt that Berlin was not worth losing 100,000 soldiers over, and that the Russians were closer and better prepared to do that task. In addition, Eisenhower wanted to crush Germany as quickly as possible, and he felt Berlin could take away from that objective. The book is a defense of the military logic of his decision.

I found much to admire about Dwight D. Eisenhower in this book. He was his own man, but sought consensus as best he could without compromising his war plan. He had a deep understanding of the role of military decisions relative to the political process. He valued his troops. Ambrose says of Eisenhower, "Seldom in four years, during which time he had to deal with countless megalomaniacs, innumerable irritating problems, and dozens of major crises, did he lose his temper. He did not carry over into the next day the problems of the moment; he approached every decision on its own merits. He could do so because he liked people and therefore enjoyed life." I can't help but respect his decision not to forfeit 100,000 soldiers for something he later referred to as a "worthless objective." He was the right man, in the right place, at the right time. I like Ike!
6 of 8 people found the following review helpful
MORE LIKE A THESIS PAPER THAN A BOOK May 12 2000
By Jeffrey M. Hyder - Published on Amazon.com
Format: Paperback
I am a hugh fan of Stephen Ambrose. However, this very small book was a great disappointment. First of all its only about 100 pages plus appendices. It is more like reading a college history report. Stephen Ambrose is my favorite history author but, he seems to have a blind spot when it comes to Eisenhower. In Ambroses eyes he can do no wrong. If you want a much more detailed viewpoint of the battle for Berlin read The Last Battle by Cornelius Ryan.
9 of 13 people found the following review helpful
Why Ike decided not to capture Berlin in 1945. May 29 2000
By A Customer - Published on Amazon.com
Format: Paperback
This is a short book about why Ike did not use the opportunity to capture Berlin in 1945. This is an earlier book before Ambrose became widely known, and to be honest more scholorly and less reader friendly. It is a short read.
Ike did not sanction the capture of Berlin for a number of reasons. First, Berlin was in the Soviet sphere in Germany, and second because his troops were not in as good a position as the Russians of taking the Nazi capital. The cost in human lives would also be great, especially if the city would have to be handed back to the Russians. For these reasons, Ike decided that Berlin was not worth the risk, and sent his forces toward Leipzig. Ike made a sound military decision.
At Yalta, it was decided by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin that Berlin and Eastern Europe would be in the Soviet Zone. Aug. 18 2015
By Daniel P. Kneeland - Published on Amazon.com
Format: Paperback
Yalta.
Because of the Yalta Conference from February 4-12, 1945 between "The Big Three"; U.S President Franklin Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet Dictator Joseph Stalin agreed that Berlin and All of Northeastern Germany and Eastern Europe with the Exception of Greece would fall under The Soviet Union Zone of Occupation. Also, by the time of Yalta, The Soviet Army with 300 Divisions was only 40 miles from the Capital of Berlin and decided to clear the flanks from The Baltics, Prussia to the north and especially Budapest, Hungary, to the south, which held the last German Oil Fields. Instead of attacking Berlin which the Soviets would have taken easily by late February 1945, with the usual large amount of casualties which always charecterized the Eastern Front Battles where The Germans suffered 75-80% of their Battle Casualties during World War II from the Soviet Army and Air Forces during all of World War II.
Also, General Eisenhower's Blunder, which his Boss, U.S Army Chief of Staff General of The Army George C. Marshall and the other U.S Chiefs of Staff regretted not "over-ruling" in late November 1944 to the "end of their lives" was "Ike's Monumental Blunder" ordering General Jacob L. Devers U.S 6th Army Group not to cross the Upper Rhine River, north of Strasbourg, with 6-8 Divisions of the U.S 7th Army starting on November 24-26, 1944, at the famed "Vittel Conference between General Eisenhower, General Bradley and General Devers where General Eisenhower would allow no stenographers to record the "minutes of the 2 Day and 2 Night meeting and only those 3 were allowed in the Room" when General Eisenhower made the "admittedly imbecilic" decision and ordered General Jacob L. Devers, the Commander of the U.S 6th Army Group, to stop an attack by the U.S 7th Army across the Upper Rhine River from Gambsheim, France to Rastatt, Germany then North towards Karlruhe, Mannheim and Pforzeim, Germany and the "Southern Fulda Gap" along with General Patton U.S 3rd Army which gave the Germans time to cause almost 250,000 Battle Casualties during the Rhineland Campaign, The Battle of The Bulge and the Final Crossing of The Rhine River, when it was too late, 3 1/2 months later in March of 1945 at Remagen.
Later General Eisenhower came up with a "joke of an excuse" with the "Colmar Pocket" which the Germans would have had to evacuate in late November 1944 to move North to meet the U.S 6th Army Group and It's U.S 7th Army Upper Rhine River crossing from Gambsheim to Rastatt, Karlruhe, Mannheim, Pforzheim and the "Southern Fulda Gap" north of Nurembourg, Germany on the "coveted Eastern Side of The Rhine River which General Eisenhower finally crossed a Quarter of a Million U.S Battle Casualties and 3 1/2 Months later at Remagen in March of 1945 when it was too late to influence the Yalta Conference scheduled for February 1945!
And 45 years, of murderous oppressive Communism in East Germany and Eastern Europe in which millions of Civilian died.
Regardless, the U.S 12 and 21st Army Groups could still have captured Berlin and Northeastern Germany in April of 1945 but because of General Eisenhower's Blunders when he took overall command of all U.S, British and French Ground Forces starting on September 1, 1944 to December 15, 1944 despite the Bravery of the U.S and British Armies, Air Forces and Navies Soldiers, Airmen and Sailors; but would have had to "turn over Berlin, Northeastern Germany and Central Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union and It's communist Puppet States" and the Soviet Union's Colossal 300 Army Divisions and Air Force that inflicted 75-80% of all German Military Battle Casualties during World War II between Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941 and May 8, 1945 on the Russian Front.
On The Western Front between D-Day, June 6, 1944 and V-E Day May 8, 1945, The U.S and British, British Commonwealth, and French Armies inflicted 15% of all Germans Military Battle Casualties for World War II and about 5-10% of The German Battlefield Casualties were inflicted By the British and U.S Army, Air Forces and Navies in N. Africa and Italy and the Mediterranean Theater from 1940-1945
Sincerely, Daniel P. Kneeland, Grafton, Ma.
Very Good ESSAY - Very Short BOOK March 9 2013
By Bill Weidner - Published on Amazon.com
Format: Paperback
Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945: The Decision to Halt at the Elbe. By Stephen E. Ambrose, Published by W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1967.

This is, as Mr. Ambrose admits in his Forward (p. 12), an essay in book form. Minus the Forward and Appendices my copy runs to about 84 pages. There are two excellant maps: one showing the forward position of Eisenhower's Allied Armies and the Russian Armies on March 7, 1945 (p.16). The the other shows their forward positions on April 4, 1945 (p.91). The second map shows that the Russian Armies have not moved since early March; it could have been improved by showing the outline of the Allied Occupation Zones for Germany that the Allies had settled on at Yalta.

In spite of its brevity, Ambrose has got some great stuff in here. He shows how the British had become the weakest ally, were running short of men and desperately needed to end the war in 1944. How the British were always trying to play politics with Allied strategy, "... based on ensuring that British troops were retained in the limelight, if necessary, at the expense of the Americans." (p.26) He quotes Henry Kissinger's famous statement about Allies, about when the enemy is still strong the allies will work together, "But when the enemy has been so weakened that each ally has the power to achieve its ends alone, a coalition is at the mercy of its most determined member." (p.53.)

The British wanted Eisenhower to take Berlin. Specifically, they wanted Eisenhower to leave General William Simpson's 9th US Army with Montgomery's 21st British Army Group, so the Brits could take Berlin and get all the glory, etc. But it was not to be. Ambrose does not make much out of it, but Eisenhower's 28 March 1945 letter to Montgomery was a big deal - it changed the basic direction of Allied Armies and took 9th US Army away from Montgomery and gave it back to General Omar N. Bradley's 12th US Army Group. The British were shocked.

Eisenhower had decided to make his main thrust through the center of Germany to the Elbe River and to ignore Berlin because the Russians were barely 30 miles away and could reach it within a few days. He had also discussed possible Allied casualties involved in the Berlin operation with General Bradley who had estimated it would take about 100,000 casualties. At the end of April, when the decision whether or not to send Patton's people into Prague was being discussed, Ambrose recalls, Marshall's letter to Eisenhower: "Personally and aside from all logistic, tactical or strategical implication I would be loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes." (p.84) Eisenhower made the same decision with Prague he had made for Berlin - he left it to the Russians and thereby saved thousands of Allied soldiers lives. Eisenhower's decision was the strategically correct decision at the time and it still is the correct decision today. The Allied occupation of state capitals in Eastern Europe would have changed nothing in post-war Europe.

One last thought, Ambrose wrote that, "... Eisenhower had tried to refrain from making any decision on nationalistic grounds. He wished always to direct his operations in response to only one criterion - sound military practice." (p.26) This is true as written, it is what "Eisenhower wished." But Ambrose implies that this is what happened and that simply is not true. 'Sound military practice' went out the window early for the Allies, August 13, 1944 to be exact - at the Falaise Gap, when Montgomery issued the ORDER which stopped Patton at Argentan. Montgomery's halt order at Argentan, his decision not to trap van Zangen's 15th German Army at Antwerp and instead go for the Rhine crossing at Arnhem and his continual delays in launching an attack from the northern flank during the Battle of the Bulge were fundamental strategic blunders of the first order. True, these were not Eisenhower's mistakes, but in order to protect the Anglo-American Alliance he chose to cover them up. Eisenhower began bending Allied strategy to British politics back in Normandy and never really stopped until March 28, 1945. It could be argued that his March 28th letter was the first time in the European Theater that Eisenhower had made a decision based on 'sound military practice.'


Feedback