Erich von Manstein: The background, strategies, tactics and battlefield experiences of the greatest commanders of history [Paperback]

Was Erich von Manstein a military genius, or an astute careerist? While the answer lies closer to the former, the alternate view gets an insightful hearing in this title. Concise and highly readable, this biography peers acutely into the complex workings of several Eastern front campaigns. Personal details are kept to a minimum, with a primary focus on Manstein's World War II career.

Guderian may have said it best, when he called Manstein "our finest operational brain," yet pointed out the man was more of a staff officer than battlefield commander. Despite his adeptness at playing "military chess," Manstein was sometimes outwitted by his most frequent Soviet opponent, Nikolai Vatutin.

Manstein's finest hour came with the "backhand blow" in February 1943, when he convinced Vatutin of the Germans' exaggerated weakness, while gathering reserves for a devastating counterattack. Author Robert Forczyk's account of this fascinating action is the most lucid I have yet read. With careful mapping and concise language, this account gets to the heart of how Manstein sprang from the ropes to render an unexpected knockout. Hitler's no-retreat intransigence may have helped, by feeding Soviet overconfidence.

After the war, with the help of well-written memoirs, Manstein cultivated his "brilliant strategist" image, but there was a darker side. Manstein was enmeshed in Holocaust atrocities. Manstein was no "fighting general," preferring the comfort and safety of his railway car to Russian front rigors and dangers. He was willing to sacrifice subordinates' careers, even when trying to save their commands from certain destruction, as with General von Sponeck in Crimea during late December, 1942. Any reader with experience of the career world will recognize in Manstein the familiar qualities - tightly-focused ambition, remorseless and artful manipulation of others, and obsessive image-cultivation - which infect many highly-placed figures in human institutions.

Forczyk uses a workable combination of annotated maps and clear prose to penetrate the military complexities. Like most of the Osprey titles, this book is more of an introduction and survey than an in-depth account. It is well-illustrated with photos, custom paintings, and maps. Forczyk's customary skill at research and writing makes this title a worthwhile read for amateurs and professionals alike.

I read Mr. Lupton's review and I thought it was a great one. But I also thought he totally embraced Dr. Forczyk's perception that Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was overrated and self hype. Of course, if he really was the type of commander the book portrayed him to be, I would doubt if he would make it to this series of great commanders like Napoleon and Julius Caesar. But since Erich von Manstein did make to this list, he must be more then what the author painted him to be. I thought the book was well written and neatly researched as all books written by this author. He has this uncanny ability to jammed great deal of information into a very short book and still make it quite readable. For that reason, he is my favorite author among the Osprey authors. That being said, I may not always agreed with his assessment and perception. In this short biography, the book looked greatly into von Manstein's failings more then his successes. The book mentioned only three major successes in von Manstein's military career during World War II. The revised invasion of France 1940 plan, captured of Sevastopol and the famous "backhand blow" February-March campaign that restored the German eastern front in the south. And each of these accomplishments, mighty as they were, got slightly belittled in this book. All too often, his war crimes were brought up and his shortcomings. Since this series is suppose to tell us why von Manstein was a great commander worthy enough to be listed next to Napoleon and Julius Caesar, I thought the book should explained the strengths and talents of this man instead of expounding his weaknesses and his crimes. I have not read this series book on Napoleon but I doubt if that book centered around Napoleon's 1812 campaign and his Waterloo loss. Well, that what this book feel like on von Manstein. Of course, I read the author's Sevastopol book in the Campaign series and it was a good one although his feeling toward von Manstein reflects well into this current book. Still worth reading but I don't think that the book was fair in assessing von Manstein's real talents as a commander.

It seems apparent that I have a higher opinion of the Field Marshall than Mr Forczyk and was a little surprised and disheartened to see the author's criticism.. The book begins with von Manstein being born into a military family and having the traditional Prussian War Doctrine of Maneuver Warfare ingrained into him from an early age. This training would be invaluable for most of his career. His war experience in WWI and his rise in the Wehrmacht in the interwar war years is then covered. His career during WWII is then gone over with more deliberateness but with only 64 pages to work with, it puts limits on what the author can delve into.

WWII coverage begins with von Manstein's involvement in the Polish and then French invasions. In the war with Russia coverage includes the drive toward Leningrad with special attention to the battle of Soltsy in the opening months that delayed the German advance toward Leningrad for weeks. The capture of the Crimea, relief attempt of Paulus at Stalingrad, the defense of the Chir-Don-Rostov line against Operation Little Saturn, the counterattack in Feb 1943 and the recapture of Kharkov, the Kursk offensive, the retreat to the Dnepr and the loss of Kiev, the Korsun Pocket and Hube's moving pocket affair are then covered.

Perhaps my enthusiasm for von Manstein is tainting my vision but believe the capture of the Crimea was brilliant. The "backhand blow" counterattack and the eventual recapture of Kharkov in 1943 was brilliant, especially after the German and Hungarian 2nd Armies were shattered. The defense against Little Saturn was also excellent as the German forces fell back to the Donets. There was nobody in the German Army could have done better. At Kursk, a battle that couldn't be won by the Germans, von Manstein gained more ground against Vatutin than Model did against Rokossovsky. His panzers destroyed many more tanks than lost. After the losses at Kursk, the Germans didn't have much of a chance against the superior forces of Vatutin, Konev and Malinovsky. Its not surprising Kiev and the Dnepr River couldn't be held in late 1943. At Korsun with the help of von Manstein's relief attempt 40,000 men were able to escape. I believe these actions and others deserved more credit than was given in the book. Also the praise bestowed on Vatutin at Manstein's expense was not appreciated. I agree Vatutin was one of Russia's best commanders but I don't think he was better than von Manstein, especially when Vatutin's superior forces play such a large part in the equation. Hitler's constraining, disruptive orders on von Manstein must also be considered in his evaluation. (The battle at Soltsy and the envelopment of Kiev are two fine examples of Vatutin's ability to take advantage of the prevailing situation. In Manstein's defense: the Soltsy attack wouldn't have been as successful or happened at all if OKH hadn't pulled Totenkopf, who was guarding 56th PzC's right flank and rear, back into reserve just a few days earlier. )

I have to take issue with another comment. Mr Forczyk believes that when von Manstein in his "Lost Victories" blames Hitler for the demise of 6th Army was just trying to pass the blame away from himself is incorrect. Von Manstein was given an impossible task; the relief attempt was sure to fail. AG Don didn't have nearly enough forces to complete the relief and he didn't have any control over Paulus. Paulus didn't have any good options but staying at Stalingrad was the worse. At least an attempted breakout in the early days with Hoth nearby had a small chance for a partial recovery but Hitler wouldn't allow it.

Von Manstein, self centered, was a career soldier and just like von Bock, Guderian, Rommel and a dozen other German officers wanted to prove himself in battle. It should not be surprising that if it came down to a choice of following Nazi doctrine or losing your job, most of these proud men will bend their morals to stay in service. It may not be proper but in a war of annihilation with so much savagery and killing on both sides its understandable. The Allies in post war trials proved von Manstein guilty of war crimes but a small prison term was levied which would seem that his participation was limited compared to some officers.

There was also five 2-D maps which were very good and complemented the narrative. The first map was a composite showing the locations of all major engagements on the eastern front that involved von Manstein. The battle of Soltsy is next where Vatutin catches von Manstein's extended forces in a pincer attack. The retreat to the Donets River is next followed by the recapture of Kharkov and the Korsun Pocket is last. There were also three illustrations that were interesting and many good photos.
The book ends with a small reading list and index.

Despite the criticism, I have high regard for Mr Forczyk's talents and this book is good and worthy of reading. I just feel von Manstein warranted less criticism and more appreciation than was given.

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