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Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour [Paperback]

Fernando Vega-Redondo

Price: CDN$ 109.50 & FREE Shipping. Details
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Inside This Book

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First Sentence
Before starting to explore in detail the wide field of Evolutionary Theory, let me begin by posing the following two basic questions: (i) What is an evolutionary model? Read the first page
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Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover
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