Faith Of The Faithless, The [Hardcover]

One scholar calls it "Post-Atheism." Others call it "Return to the Religious." Critchley just calls it his search for a political theology with a coherent understanding of the meaning of faith.

This book is a scholarly study that opens with a detailed examination of Rousseau's political philosophy and closes with Critchley's tussle with Zizek over the place of violence in politics. What can be found in between is what I find most intriguing. Among other things, Critchley examines the resurgence of interest in Paul's epistles and adds his own analysis. He uses a close reading of Heidegger's THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS LIFE The Phenomenology of Religious Life (Studies in Continental Thought) that then suggests an additional interpretation of BEING AND TIME's Being and Time concept of "thrown projection." It clarifies many of MH's comments for me.

To summarize my best grasp of what MH means would be to accept Critchley's characterization of thrown projection as a double nullity. That is, to be thrown is a nullity (Dasein is "there" if only we knew where that is) and to rely on projection is an additional nullity (Dasein acts as if we know what is coming even though we don't). Dasein finds itself always already somewhere in between those nullities. Heidegger characterizes that position as one of "guilt," which would seem to harmonize with St. Paul's reliance on sin. But the devil is always in the details, and Critchley examines MH's position, instead, as an assertion of the openness of human freedom.

From that I draw the provisional conclusion that there is a slight but profound discrepancy between Paul and MH's Luther-influenced interpretation. We must allow the necessary systemization required for philosophy of religion, in which case, for Paul, we live in a closed system; for MH we live in an open system. So that hair's breadth makes a whole lot of difference.

The current debate over Post Atheism is whether openness can prove more philosophically and theologically useful (although Critchley denies expertise in the latter) than a closed context. Critchley does not cite Jean-Luc Marion or Jean-Luc Nancy in this study, and I am only familiar with the latter, but they both represent (along with Foucault, Klossowski, and Derrida) the open interpretation. Agamben and Badiou somewhere in between.

This debate has gotten increasingly hot and heavy since the latter part of the last century. It may well remain unsettled for the balance of the new term. Yet we can expect the interest to continue and grow with the globalization of the debate, despite all the New Atheism nay-sayers. Critchley writes wonderfully, so he offers an opportunity to jump in if you are still on the shores. Happy splashes!

I am writing this review because I am in trucking and without anyone who could sort out my confusion. I would suppose that those readers who are well grounded in contemporary philosophy would consider my confusion sophomoric. I was drawn to this title through reading Critchley's small but incisive consideration of Wallace Stevens in "Things Merely Are" and his further application of Stevens idea of a Supreme Fiction to the realm of Politics. I was also intrigued by the idea of nothing as a basis for the powerlessness of conscience as related to the last line of Stevens' "The Snowman" (And nothing himself, beholds/Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.) But the ground quakes and avalanches await all the effort that Critchley makes to buttress his theory that for the body Politic, faith must remain a component more than reason. Professionally, I guess I understand why a philosopher would so carefully construct an argument, but even if his thesis is right on, the course of his argument detracts from its persuasiveness.

For example, in the first section of "The Faith of the Failthless" he proceeds with an analysis of Rousseau that depends on ferreting out the differences between the published manuscript and "The Geneva Manuscript." I understand how this guides his interpretation of Rousseau's "The Social Contract," but for me fails to make "The General Will" and the role of the lawgiver a substantive base to build on. Of course, he notes in the text that the reader should refer to his previous work on "infinite demand" and this would add clarity. Nonetheless, he builds on Rousseau's desire for the catechism of the citizen and then adopts Stevens supreme fiction to place the mystical anarchism of Marcion as further support for the need for a religious faith for a commonly held politcal view point. Then it really gets messy, because all the problems of Rousseau are not resolved but instead overlayed with Heideggerean terminology and philosphy even though the basic premises in his argument about Rousseau remain as weak ground. I sense that his work on Rousseau is probably ground breaking interpretation, but like Rousseau Critchley sees applicablity only in small or local groups not even as big as Corsica.

So I don't know if his overarching argument that faith must once again become a component of the progessive wing of western democracies succeeds. From a common sense stand point I would give it an approving nod. But I think the most incisive insight is his interpretation of Paul through the vantage point of Marcionism. Here he explains 1Corinthians in terms of a "double meontology" to explicate the powerless power of the call of conscience and why it is from nothing that all something comes to be. The congruence here between "The Snowman" and "the annihilation of ego" has deepened my reading of the poem and for that I am greatful. Perhaps reading Rousseau, Marx, and the other intrepreters whom Critchley relies on or takes to task would provide refuge from the avalances and the quakes.

This is a rant by Critchley, who writes well even while ranting. I did not find his arguments persuasive of any position except he thinks that Critchley is the best.