One scholar calls it "Post-Atheism." Others call it "Return to the Religious." Critchley just calls it his search for a political theology with a coherent understanding of the meaning of faith.
This book is a scholarly study that opens with a detailed examination of Rousseau's political philosophy and closes with Critchley's tussle with Zizek over the place of violence in politics. What can be found in between is what I find most intriguing. Among other things, Critchley examines the resurgence of interest in Paul's epistles and adds his own analysis. He uses a close reading of Heidegger's THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS LIFE The Phenomenology of Religious Life (Studies in Continental Thought) that then suggests an additional interpretation of BEING AND TIME's Being and Time concept of "thrown projection." It clarifies many of MH's comments for me.
To summarize my best grasp of what MH means would be to accept Critchley's characterization of thrown projection as a double nullity. That is, to be thrown is a nullity (Dasein is "there" if only we knew where that is) and to rely on projection is an additional nullity (Dasein acts as if we know what is coming even though we don't). Dasein finds itself always already somewhere in between those nullities. Heidegger characterizes that position as one of "guilt," which would seem to harmonize with St. Paul's reliance on sin. But the devil is always in the details, and Critchley examines MH's position, instead, as an assertion of the openness of human freedom.
From that I draw the provisional conclusion that there is a slight but profound discrepancy between Paul and MH's Luther-influenced interpretation. We must allow the necessary systemization required for philosophy of religion, in which case, for Paul, we live in a closed system; for MH we live in an open system. So that hair's breadth makes a whole lot of difference.
The current debate over Post Atheism is whether openness can prove more philosophically and theologically useful (although Critchley denies expertise in the latter) than a closed context. Critchley does not cite Jean-Luc Marion or Jean-Luc Nancy in this study, and I am only familiar with the latter, but they both represent (along with Foucault, Klossowski, and Derrida) the open interpretation. Agamben and Badiou somewhere in between.
This debate has gotten increasingly hot and heavy since the latter part of the last century. It may well remain unsettled for the balance of the new term. Yet we can expect the interest to continue and grow with the globalization of the debate, despite all the New Atheism nay-sayers. Critchley writes wonderfully, so he offers an opportunity to jump in if you are still on the shores. Happy splashes!