Farewell To Reason [Paperback]

First, this book focuses more on culture than scientific belifs. Feyerabend makes clear from the get-go that he is a believer in 'democratic relativism" - literally, that what works for one culture may not work for another. This is really not a radical view untill you take Feyerabends conclusion that because of this, there can be no objective truths, standards, or even critierion for deciphering either. Here's how he undercuts himself though. For Feyerabend, this relativism demands that we recognize our ability to learn from other cultures, engage in dialogue and even argue from time to time. The problem is that if reason is just as good (no better) than any other way of proceeding, it is difficult to imagine how dialogue can proceed, outside of a reasoned structure. At the end of the first essay, Feyerabend stretches further still. If quarks and gods are both theoretical (that is, not empirical) then isn't it strange to regard quarks as more 'real' than gods. Well, Paul, not if you consider that quarks are a) open to falsification, b) accountable to scientific prediction that CAN falsify them and c) have so far enabled us to make accurate predictions without being falsified, then I guess the answer is "no".

Many readers will also read this book as a diatribe against Karl Popper. I would urge these readers, if they've not read Popper, to first read either "Conjectures and Refutations" or "Objective Knowledge". Many of Feyerabends characterizations are wrong. Feyerabend constantly underestimates Popper's recongintion of theory and ideology in conjectures and observations. Feyerabend also miscarachterizes Popper's falsification as a view that as soon as an individual sees her theory falsified, she should abandon it as quick as possible. Nope! She should defend it while keeping in mind that she could be wrong. Third, Feyerabend misconstrues Popper as an elitist of science who claims that Western scientific conclusions are the most valid. Popper would be the first to admit that good ideas can come from anywhere. Popper's only suggestion is that matriculation of those ideas into our lives involves making up our minds, which involves reason and that empirical methods are good insofar as they HAVE TO BE the common denominator of intersubjective discussion. Overall, Feyerabends conclusions are all-in-all self defeating, his arguments are largely misunderstandings and his book is verging on being a waste of time.

As usual his groundwork is thorough, although not as detailed as that in "Against Method", and full of interesting asides which both support the argument and fascinate the reader. His energy is infectious although some of his comments are quite abrasive especially those concerning Popper. It compares well to the first book and is far better than his last "Conquest of Abundance" which seemed tired by comparison and lacking the zest of the earlier works such as this one and the first. To me, the two outstanding chapters are the ones on Mach and Aristotle which alone make the book worth buying. Feyerabend is a rare breed of philosopher in that he does not construct systematic theories but rather deconstructs existing ones and criticises them consistently at the same time giving credence to his ideas of relativism which are quite at odds with the usual interpretation of this idea. Feyerabend does not constrain himself overly in the sense of a solid theoretical basis prefering to remain loose and free to move. There are many advantages to this process although it does not introduce new ideas or concepts which by themselves could lead to further insights, this is possible without stagnation or a crystallisation of views which often occurs. He is also aware of his own propensity to intellectualise, something which he tries to supplement with a kind of living discourse which partly compensates.
An energetic read.