Finland's War of Choice: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War II [Hardcover]

The story of Finland's war against the Soviet Union at the side of Nazi Germany from 1941-1944 is one of contradictions and complicated narratives intertwined. Indeed the contradictory memoirs themselves present such a tangled mess of half-truths and outright deceit within the history of the war that they may never be completely straightened out. Complicating an already complicated situation such as this is very uneasiness of Finnish historians attempting to come to grips with the unpalatable fact of cooperation with one of the most repulsive regimes in modern history. As such, attempting to untangle any of this narrative is a supremely challenging undertaking and in itself demands a degree of respect. It has simply not been attempted by a writer in English since the war's end. Attempting to do all of this while also presenting analysis of that narrative is nearly an unbelievable feat.

Retired US Army Col. Henrik O. Lunde's narrative Finland's War of Choice is an excellent and worthy first attempt in the English language. Lunde himself describes the historiographical focus of the book as primarily addressing "the unique problems that arose from an ill-prepared coalition between a democracy and a dictatorship" (3). Secondly, this work is an effort at analysis of the military operations and what decisions led to them. This is investigated both `in theater' and contextually within "the international political arena" as well (5). This is accomplished with varying degrees of success throughout the book.

Lunde is most successful in the straightforward telling of the military operations both on the strategic and tactical level. Although he comments in the introduction that the narrative will frequently deviate from a normal chronological approach, for the most part his retelling does not. Indeed, this is partly why the narrative is so effective. It is quite frankly very smooth and well crafted: a great read. This is by no means to say that what is contained within this book is lightweight. Detail is rarely omitted for the sake of `readability' (whatever that means) and descriptions of combat frequently are covered at the battalion level. Where Lunde does occasionally deviate from a strict chronological approach is in telling the story of the three primary regional efforts of the Finnish/German forces to affect some significant result. Each is covered separately particularly during the initial period of war.

Among the most gripping portions of the book is chapter four which describes the numerous attempts to cut the Murmansk rail line from central Finland and thus cut off the city of Murmansk itself. The next chapter, describing the primarily Finnish offensives in Ladoga Karelia and the Karelian Isthmus are equally enthralling, particularly as it will likely be the first time many readers have ever seen descriptions of the offensives in print. This well crafted narrative actually continues throughout the book after the first chapter and draws in the reader repeatedly. Indeed, at times readers will likely find themselves gritting teeth and nearly shouting at the book for the strategic idiocy demonstrated by both Finnish and German planners in 1941 and 42. Repeatedly Lunde describes the division of effort between numerous objectives along the rail line and failure to identify an area of primary effort.

Somewhat less consistently successful is the author's attempt at analysis. This can be explained to a certain extent by the fact that this is only his second published work. When compared to the giants of the field of World War II history such as Col David Glantz or perhaps holocaust historians Peter Longerich and Christopher Browning this work is revealed as a much lesser work. Typically, the analysis is somewhat superficial and frequently rather brief. Although this is disappointing by and author who's claimed secondary goal was analysis it is certainly not a crucial flaw, merely a mildly frustrating one at times. This is particularly the case with the epilogue. Although he raises some interesting points regarding the nature of the German-Finnish coalition he never really goes much below the surface. A pleasant exception to this was the author's investigation of the failure of the offensives in central Finland to cut the Murmansk rail line, which are quite intriguing and thought provoking.

Least successful for Col Lunde is his effort in telling the story of the initial diplomatic moves which eventually led to the coalition. Frequently the author resorts to assumptions and suppositions in the first chapter. Within one particular section of two pages he can be counted as writing "may have", "assumed" (twice), "unlikely", and "probably" (38-39). This is incredibly passive and poor writing and thankfully disappears for the most part after the initial chapter. It is unfortunate that the author did not benefit from a stronger editor. This weakness also leads on a few occasions to Lunde giving his opinion in the first person which is a huge no-no which would also been avoided with a better editor.

Lastly on the negative side of the ledger are a couple of minor irritations: the somewhat weak selection of primary sources and the shortage of quality maps throughout. As far as the primary sources go, it is unfortunate that the author's admitted lack of fluency in Finnish and outright inability to read Russian so affected his use of contemporary source materials. Really that is what research assistants are for, so the excuse is really not acceptable. The map issue is unfortunate but in general the detail of the narrative is strong enough to follow the story without additional maps.

In conclusion, although certain flaws certainly exist Lunde has done a creditable job in writing the first real history of the Finnish and German coalition against the Soviet Union. The prose is top notch and the narrative is truly engaging at times. Although the analysis is frequently superficial and the editing could certainly have been better, this is overall a very good effort at telling the story of the very strange union between Nazi Germany and democratic Finland. Through Lunde's exceptional efforts this confusing and contradictory story has been made significantly less confusing as well as highly intriguing. This is a solid four-star book marred only by the need for deeper analysis and better editing. These minor flaws are all that separate it from a fifth.

This is a pretty good general account of the war in Finland between 1941 and 1944, but could have been a lot better. The book is focused mainly on the relationship between Germany and Finland and the progress of the war the two countries fought against the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1944 as well as the brief Lapland War between Germany and Finland in 1944. The coverage of these campaigns is generally good, though at times Lunde goes into too much detail. The book's prose is clear and the narrative is well illustrated with maps.

However, for all that this is a bit of a missed opportunity. Lunde admits in the prologue that "my own difficulty in reading Finnish has served as a limitation on the use of Finnish sources" and unfortunately this shows - the book is very German-centric and relies heavily on German sources and the small number of Finnish works which have been translated into English. As a result, it doesn't cover internal affairs within Finland in any detail (political debates over the war and the stress of the war on the country's economy are hinted at, but never described) and the descriptions of Finnish military campaigns are much less detailed than those of the German campaigns. To make matters worse, the book appears to be heavily dependent on the autobiographies of the German generals who served in Finland during the war, with General Mannerheim's memoirs being the main Finnish source cited - while these sources have been used critically, they're no substitute for more neutral sources. The coverage of the Soviet forces which faced the Germans and Finns is also disappointing - what these forces where trying to achieve, and the units involved, often aren't identified.

All up, this book is a reasonable introduction to the war in Finland, but shouldn't be considered definitive.

Henrik O. Lunde, as he did in his previous book, Hitler's Pre-Emptive War, detailing the run-up and aftermath of the 1940 German invasion of Norway, has expertly detailed in Finland's War of Choice, 1941-1945, the political and military decisions facing both sides. He considers in great detail, the personalities involved, including Field Marshal Mannerheim, the Finnish leader, and Hitler himself, as well as their military subordinates. The issues were complicated by the fact that Finland's leaders had to consider homeland opinions whereas Hitler could decide and direct on his own.
In 1940 people listened with fascination to glowing radio accounts of Finland's Winter War with the Soviet Union. At first Finland's army gave the Soviet forces a sound trouncing. Unfortunately for the Finns, after Soviet counterattacks, they soon found that some hard choices lay ahead. In September 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union had attacked Poland simultaneously from two sides and divided it between them.
Possibly the ease with which the Finns initially disposed of Soviet forces led Hitler to downplay the invincibility of the Soviet military. Forgetting what happened to Napoleon, he unwisely left unfinished the war with England and turned against his former Soviet ally.
Finland's leaders, watching from the sidelines, were forced to consider what might happen if Hitler won the war - early military successes clearly pointed in that direction. The continuing Soviet threat certainly influenced Finland's conscious choice to come down on the side of Germany - who might help regain territory previously lost to the Soviets. The Germans, for their part, were willing provided that the Finns help them capture or neutralize the northernmost Soviet port of Murmansk and assist them in their attack on Leningrad, whose old name, St. Petersburg, is now restored. The Finns refused - a failure which eventually opened the port to a flood of Allied supplies to the Soviets.
For Germany, their failed association with Finland turned out to accomplish nothing more than to tie down some of Germany's best troops who were sorely needed elsewhere. For their part, the Finns had no intention of taking Leningrad. Both sides were dancing a dance of false expectations. While they dithered, the Soviet juggernaut, resupplied via Murmansk and Siberian ports, and with a seemingly inexhaustible supply of fresh troops, crashed through to victory on the Eastern Front.
Finland made out better than they had a right to expect. At the last minute they helped drive their German allies out of the country. They lost territory but preserved their nation. Only recent events have helped to somewhat neutralize Russian threats of intimidation to Finland, Poland, and the Baltic states on Russia's western borders.
Colonel Lunde is a combat veteran of the Vietnam War who also served in a political/military position during the implementation phases of its settlement. His military career places him in a unique position to unravel and describe both the military and political complications facing both Finland and Germany in 1941-1945. He describes the battlefield action in great detail - some of these battles were among the most horrific and spectacular in history, engaging huge armies with terrific losses.
The Finnish military proved itself the equal of both Russian and German armies, but unfortunately the failure of the Germans to capture or isolate Murmansk ultimately enabled the Soviet forces to resupply and to bring up huge reinforcements to cover their losses. Both the Finns and the Germans had counted on quick victories which never materialized. ###