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Game Theory [Hardcover]

Drew Fudenberg , Jean Tirole
4.2 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (8 customer reviews)
List Price: CDN$ 101.95
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Book Description

Aug. 29 1991 0262061414 978-0262061414 1

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory - including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information - in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises.The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole are Professors of Economics at MIT.


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Review

"Fudenberg and Tirole's text will have an immediate and important impact on the way game theory is taught at the graduate level. Not only does it cover most of the central topics in noncooperative game theory, it is as up-to-date and complete as a book in this area could hope to be." Charles Wilson , Professor of Economics, New York University

About the Author

Drew Fudenberg is Professor of Economics at MIT.

Jean Tirole is Scientific Director of IDEI (Institut d'Economie Industrielle), Chairman of the Board of TSE (Toulouse School of Economics), and Annual Visiting Professor of Economics at MIT.

Inside This Book (Learn More)
First Sentence
We begin with a simple, informal example of a game. Read the first page
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Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover
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Customer Reviews

4.2 out of 5 stars
4.2 out of 5 stars
Most helpful customer reviews
5.0 out of 5 stars Comprehensive and very well written July 13 2001
Format:Hardcover
The theory of games is now pervasive in the fields of economics, financial modeling, logistics, operations research, network engineering, and population biology. As such a background in game theory is an absolute necessity if one is to deal with problems in these areas. This book is an advanced treatment of game theory, and presupposes the reader already has had some exposure to the subject. There is an excellent set of exercises at the end of each chapter, and so the book can be used as a textbook or for self-study.
After an elementary example of a game in the introduction to motivate the subject, the authors begin in Part I of the book with the subject of static games with complete information. Strategic-form games are defined, along with dominated strategies, and the important concept of Nash equilibrium, the latter being introduced to deal with games that are not solvable by iterated strict dominance. For those with a background in elementary functional analysis, the authors prove that finite strategic-form game has a mixed-strategy equilibrium and prove that the Nash-Equilibrium has a closed graph. The concept of Nash equilibrium is extended to the concept of a correlated equilibrium, wherein each player can send another a private signal before they choose their strategy.
In Part II, the authors discuss dynamic games with complete information. Examples of these kinds of games include a sequential version of the battle of the sexes game, and a sequential version of matching pennies. The authors discuss subgame-perfect equilibria, wherein an n-tuple of strategies constitute Nash equilibria in every subgame. The Stackelberg model of duopoly is discussed along with the repeated Prisoner"s dilemna, the latter being an example of backward induction in finitely repeated games.
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5.0 out of 5 stars An Essential Book June 17 2004
By ktrmes
Format:Hardcover
If you are going to do Micro at more than an undergraduate level, you are going to have this book on your shelf. It is quite comprehensive, although the notation is not always what one might be used to. I do share some of the misgivings voiced in other reviews -- topics sometimes don't appear in the order one might expect and the flow often may not seem natural. Also, the format of the presentation is unlike a mathematics text in that defibnitions, etc. may not always appear in nice blocks, etc. and occassionaly I have found myself wishing for a bit more technical detail, for example on Bayesian Games. But at some stage, if you do enough game theory, you will find yourself looking at it and then buying it.
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4.0 out of 5 stars for a big book , it could be better Oct. 4 1999
By A Customer
Format:Hardcover
The book does a pretty good job of covering Bayesian issues, but one would think that a big book would be better organized and would cover more topics.
I found it difficult to master the issues of equilibrium refinement and of mechanism design using this book and had to turn to outside sources at the time. Many of the problems would be helped by more "mechanical" examples on how to solve them, since the tools needed to solve many of these problems are probably new to a lot of students. The Tirole IO book contains some solved problems...I wish this book did, too.
Overall, it is a fine book...more than adequate. But it could be better.
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5.0 out of 5 stars An Essential Book June 17 2004
By ktrmes
Format:Hardcover
If you are going to do Micro at more than an undergraduate level, you are going to have this book on your shelf. It is quite comprehensive, although the notation is not always what one might be used to. I do share some of the misgivings voiced in other reviews -- topics sometimes don't appear in the order one might expect and the flow often may not seem natural. Also, the format of the presentation is unlike a mathematics text in that defibnitions, etc. may not always appear in nice blocks, etc. But at some stage, if you do enogh game theory, you will find yourself looking at it and then buying it.
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