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A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games [Paperback]

John C. Harsanyi , Reinhard Selten

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Book Description

June 29 1988 MIT Press Classics

The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well.By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality.The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.John C. Harsanyi is Flood Research Professor in Business Administration and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. Reinhard Selten is Professor of Economics Institute of Social and Economic Sciences: University of Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany.


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Product Details

  • Paperback: 365 pages
  • Publisher: The MIT Press; New edition edition (June 29 1988)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0262582384
  • ISBN-13: 978-0262582384
  • Product Dimensions: 23 x 15 x 2 cm
  • Shipping Weight: 454 g
  • Amazon Bestsellers Rank: #1,519,245 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Product Description

Review

"The book provides for the first time a heroic and thorough attempt to suggest a very general selection theory. No other task may be more significant within game theory. A successful theory of this type may change all of economic theory." - Ariel Rubinstein, Hebrew University

About the Author

Reinhard Selten is Professor at the University of Bonn. He is a cowinner of the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics.

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