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4.0 out of 5 stars
Sweet Nutcracker - or - How the Luftwaffe Always Screwed Up, Embodied in One Aircraft, Jan 31 2007
Henschel Hs-129 In Detail
By Denes Bernad
Specialty Press/Midlands Books
Review by Ned Barnett
The Henschel Hs-129 tank-killing ground attack aircraft is one of those remarkable wonders/blunders that have always to me defined the Luftwaffe. Innovative in concept, this plane is a classic example of a great design that was botched in execution. Pummeled by bureaucracy and political in-fighting; the Hs-129 was nonetheless effective in combat. And most important, it was a classic Axis example of too-little, too-late.
As an aircraft, the Hs-129 has always fascinated me. From the early Profile publications and the contemporary Airfix kit to the later and larger-scale kit by ESCI, this plane has always intrigued me. It had the weapons, but not the power to really make use of those weapons. Limited horsepower forced bizarre (to me) design choices that are part of the aircrafts charm, and part of the reason it so utterly failed to make a difference in aerial combat. Now, thanks to Denes Bernad and Specialty Press/Midlands Books, I have been able to be reacquainted with this bizarre precursor to the A-10, Su-25 and MiL-24 dedicated anti-tank ground attack aircraft. For the historian, this book focuses on technological development without focusing over-much on operational use; for the modeler, it is pictures and drawings and text that make it possible to create wonderful models of a variety of special-purpose versions of the Hs-129.
Ill go so far as to say this: If you want to understand German design philosophy (and the equipment shortfalls that influenced that design); if you want to understand how the Luftwaffes command did so much (through indecision and constant change-orders) to assist the Allies eventual victory or if you want to build a superbly-accurate model of this aircraft, you need this book!
But before I go farther into the book, lets look at the plane and its protracted and frustrating development and a bit, too, on its remarkably small production run.
The Luftwaffe along with the Soviet VVS and the Italian Regia Aeronautica had the opportunity to stage a combat dress-rehearsal for World War II in the blood-soaked skies over Spain. Many lessons were learned some legitimate, some not.
On the mistaken side of the ledger, the Soviets learned that the biplane was still viable, and put the I-153 fighter into production in 1939 a lesson the Italians also learned before introducing the CR-42. This lesson represented a huge step backwards for the Soviets, who had introduced the worlds first successful retractable-gear cantilever-wing monoplane fighter (and the first 300 mph fighter) six years earlier. In 1935, the Soviets had in operational squadrons the I-16, the most advanced fighter in the world. Equally mistaken, the Germans learned that the fast medium strategic bomber would always get through, without the need for long-range escort fighters or heavy on-board defensive weapons. So they canceled General Wevers planned Urals Bomber, ensured that the Bf-109 was more a long-range intruder than a viable escort fighter, and protected their bombers with a few puny rifle-caliber machine guns. Four years later in the skies over Southeastern England, the Luftwaffe learned their mistake too late to win the Battle of Britain, but still in plenty of time to lose the war.
However, the Germans did learn a few lessons worth knowing improved versions of the Bf-109 and the Ju-87 were the result of those lessons, as was the value of terror-bombing of unprotected cities. Warsaw in 1939, and Rotterdam and Coventry in 1940 were just tactical extensions of Guernica. But an often-overlooked lesson the Luftwaffe learned was the value of a dedicated ground-attack aircraft in the critical army-support role. The elegant Hs-123 biplane proved adequate in this role in Spain, but Germany knew that a bigger, better and more heavily-armed plane was needed (and so did the Soviets, who learned the same lesson and began developing the war-winning Sturmovik). In 1937, the Germans began the development of one of the worlds first dedicated ground-attack machines a logical extension of the worlds first ground-attack aircraft, the armored and heavily-armed German Junkers J-1 of WW-I. This was the visionary concept. How it was executed becomes the botched part of the equation.
Several manufacturers competed for the production prize but only Henschel started with a clean sheet of paper, and their design won because it most closely met the Luftwaffes requirements. The armored ground-attack version of the Fw-189 was a remarkably similar design to the Henschel, but it was bigger and because it had the same puny Argus 440-horsepower engines it performed less well. However, even the from-the-ground-up attack Henschel created with those two one-lunged Argus engines in mind was underpowered to a remarkable degree.
Id like to make a brief aside here and talk about the importance of aero-motors in the creation of war-winning aircraft. Too often, the importance of having the right engine is overlooked or just assumed. In the U.S. especially, we had enough engine manufacturers, each striving to build engines to meet specific needs (some big and powerful, some small and efficient), to ensure that we had engines for all military aircraft purposes. Hell, we even powered many of our WW-II tanks with aero-engines Wright Whirlwinds, for instance while still building 100,000 planes a year for ourselves and our allies.
Consider radial engines (a comparison I use because the Hs-129 was radial-powered). We started the war with engines in the 1,000-horsepower class which quickly grew to 1,200 horsepower and ultimately almost up to 1,600 the R-1820 started at about 700 hp in the early B-17s, and wound up at 1,475 hp powering the Wilder Wildcat the Grumman/Eastern FM-2. The R-1830 grew in much the same fashion. A step up, our R-2600 radials went from 1,600 hp in the early B-25s and TBFs up to 1,900 hp in late-war aircraft; and a further step up was the R-2800, which grew during the war from 1,900 to about 2,500 hp and powered the B-26, A-26, P-47, F4U, F6F and other war-winners. At lower power levels we had engines to power our trainers and utility aircraft, but no American war-built plane had to enter combat with engines rated at below 1,000 hp, even at the start of the war.
The Soviets had a similar range of engines they never had to face the problem of fielding modern combat aircraft with under-powered engines. The Brits did not have that choice at least not early in the war and they had to send into combat planes like the Blenheim, with engines under 1,000 hp, when the Blenheim needed at least two 1,200 hp engines to have a prayer of performing its mission. Compare that sad-sack aircraft to the American A-20 the Havoc had a smaller crew, a heavier defensive and offensive armament, a larger bomb-load and a longer range. This added performance was thanks to its powerful R-2600 engines, which at 1,600 hp, gave the A-20 a 300-mph-plus top-end speed, even combat-loaded. The British engine problem was due to misguided government policies and a too-small civilian flying industry base to justify creating better radial engines it didnt help the Brits that pre-war, American engines were so readily available, as well as so reliable.
The Germans, unlike the Brits, could at least blame the Versailles Treaty for their woes. The cause was different, but the results were the same a limited selection of mostly old-design (hence heavy for the horsepower produced) and low-powered radial engines. To be sure, the BMW (Bavarian Motor Works) company produced an excellent high-horsepower radial it powered the Fw-190, for instance but between the top-end BMW and the very low-powered engines designed for primary and basic training aircraft, the Germans had nothing in the middle. So instead of designing a ground attack aircraft with a couple of 850 hp engines, in 1937 Henschel created their Hs-129 around a couple of 440-hp Argus engines. Even when horsepower was upgraded in the early 40s, they didnt go to 1,000-to-1,200 hp radials what I consider to be about the functional minimum for this aircraft, considering its mission but did the best they could with a couple of hand-me-down French Gnome-Rhone radials of about 800 hp each.
The US Navys new TBF single-engined attack aircraft which entered combat at about the same time as the Hs-129 had a 1,600 hp R-2600 engine. The roughly mission-comparable (to the Hs-129) US A-20 two engined ground-attack aircraft, which was designed at the same time as the Hs-129, but which saw combat far earlier, had a couple of 1,600 hp R-2600 engines twice the power of the revised and upgraded Hs-129 B, which had two hand-me-down French-built Gnome-Rhone 800 hp radials. Is it any wonder that the Hs-129 was defined by its compromises and performed like a dray wagon instead of a hot-rod?
A comparison between the A-20 series and the Hs-129 series is useful. Both twin-engined ground-attack aircraft began as 1937 design studies, both completed production in September of 1944, and both were heavily influenced by lessons from the Spanish Civil War. Douglas first considered a pair of 450 horsepower radial engines for its 7A design, before rejecting that design as being grossly underpowered for the mission. Later in 1937, Douglas upgraded the design to model 7B, which featured a pair of 1,100 hp R-1830 Twin Wasp engines, while Henschel stayed with the 440-hp engines through at least 1940.
The US Army Air Corps was budget-strangled in the late 30s, but the French ordered 270 of this potential...
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by J. Richard Smith
