Hitler 1936 To 1945 Nemesis [Paperback]

However the biggest flaw of this account is the subtle but pervasive bias throughout. Kershaw states up front that he detests Hitler but is obviously fascinated by his career. Later, Kershaw concludes that Hitler was "an ill-educated beerhall demagogue and racist bigot". While true, it is an incomplete description. Yet for Kershaw it is enough and he uses this account to paint a portrait of Hitler almost as a self-destructive fool who was incapable of seeing reality. Not only Hitler, but the Third Reich, the Whermacht itself, most of the generals and even the German people seem pretty incapable and fatalistic here.

Nowhere is Kershaw's account more biased than in his account of wartime operations. German successes are minimized, the campaigns in Poland, France, Norway and the Balkans get one page or less each. Kershaw attempts to chide the German Navy by stating that the cruiser Blucher was sunk "by a single shell from an ancient coastal battery". In fact, the cruiser was hit by two 11", thirteen 6", thirty 57mm shells and two torpedoes and despite this loss, the Germans still took Oslo. On the other hand, Allied disasters are totally ignored. Kershaw portrays Hitler's anguish over the loss of the Bismarck (mistakenly identified as a "pocket battleship"), but fails to mention the loss of HMS Hood. Hitler triumphs, like the glider assault on Fort Eban Emael or the sinking of HMS Royal Oak in Scapa Flow are ignored. Allied defeats, like Kasserine Pass or Gazala, do not appear in these pages. Later in the war, he notes the "ceaseless bombing that the Luftwaffe was powerless to prevent," while ignoring the fact that the Luftwaffe in fact dealt the Royal Air Force night bombers severe setbacks in early 1944. Arnhem is described as "heavy fighting," no mention of the virtual destruction of the British 1st Airborne Division. The Ardennes Offensive is described only in negative terms, no mention of the surrender of most of the US 106th Division or the initial panic all the way back to Eisenhower.

On the eastern front, it is much the same. Kershaw states about Operation Barbarossa, "in retrospect, it seems sheer idiocy" and says that, "Hitler's best strategy in autumn 1940 would have been to sit tight and await developments". It is hard to see what developments might have occurred to help Germany after 1941, and Hitler was certainly aware of this. Kershaw then claims that Barbarossa failed in July 1941! Absolutely ridiculous. The 1942 Case Blue strategy is described as "sheer lunacy". Certainly Barbarossa and Blue had over-optimistic objectives with inadequate resources, but "idiocy" and "lunacy" are certainly inappropriate descriptions. Kershaw ignores the fact that both offensives gained most of their objectives and had the Germans stopped to consolidate in time and been more flexible about retreats, then both offensives would have ended up as net gains for Germany.

Kershaw, like many other historians, directs intense criticism toward Hitler's intervention in military operations. To be sure, Hitler's mistakes in 1943-1945 cost Germany dearly. However, this doesn't give the reader a balanced view for two reasons. First, Hitler's interventions that were led to success are ignored. The glider attack on Fort Eban Emael was Hitler's idea, but is not mentioned. Nor are Hitler's orders to modify and enhance the German Panzer Arm in 1940-1 covered here, although they might show where Hitler was ahead of the "technical expert" (in fact, there were some real dunces in the German ordnance bureau). On the second count, Kershaw ignores the disastrous interference of other wartimes leaders like Churchill and Stalin. Churchill badly hurt the British war effort by diverting forces to Greece in 1941, then Singapore in 1942, then ordering a "no retreat" from Tobruk and later diverting RAF Bomber Command to bomb political rather than strategic targets. Stalin's stupidity in 1941 cost the Soviet Union 3 million men through "no retreat" tactics, and then thousands more in early 1942 in premature offensives. Furthermore, modern American presidents have involved themselves with micromanagement in military affairs that Hitler would never have dreamed of: Johnson had a terrain model of Khe Sanh built in the White House in 1968 and he attempted to direct units down to company level! The Kosovo War in 1999 allowed leaders to direct individual aircraft or missiles. Furthermore, the loathing and distrust that Hitler felt for his generals was echoed in 1968 and 1999 by US presidents who did not trust their military advisors. A less biased author might have been able to note that Hitler's interference was neither unique or wholly inimical.

By the end, it is apparent that this is a very flawed and biased account. Even murderers like Hitler deserve an honest account but Kershaw does not deliver that. Hitler was evil but he was also tinged with genius (Kershaw would say it was gambler's luck) and charisma, and he was also genuinely popular in Nazi Germany. The fact that a man from such a meager background could rise to control not only Germany but much of Europe is still staggering. So yes, he was "an ill-educated beerhall demagogue and racist bigot" as Kershaw describes, but he was also a lot more than that. He was a man who had the ability to rise from obscurity to threaten the entire human race with his evil vision. However in a self-hating account such as this, Hitler appears little more than a whimsical dreamer.