- Hardcover: 416 pages
- Publisher: Crown; 1 edition (Nov 5 2002)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 0609610392
- ISBN-13: 978-0609610398
- Product Dimensions: 24.1 x 16.3 x 3.4 cm
- Shipping Weight: 703 g
- Average Customer Review: 4.3 out of 5 stars See all reviews (7 customer reviews)
- Amazon Bestsellers Rank: #2,158,257 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
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Product Details |
Product Description
From Publishers Weekly
This is a book whose argument would be more effective had the author not apparently refocused his manuscript after September 11. Alexander, a journalist and writer of general audience works on military subjects, challenges the relevance and effectiveness of the "Western way of war" as articulated by, among others, Victor Davis Hanson and John Keegan. That model emphasizes intense, direct conflict focused on decisive battles whose outcomes are determined by relative loss rates. Alexander's "13 rules," in contrast, emphasize indirection: striking at weak spots, employing deception, paralyzing systems as opposed to killing men. Though the research bases of Alexander's case studies are uniformly thin, he does not seriously abuse his evidence. Most of the battles he cites in demonstration of a particular "rule" more or less support the argument. Cannae, for example, is an appropriate example of a battle of encirclement. Yet Alexander (How Hitler Could Have Won World War II) also seeks to connect his "rules of war" directly to the contemporary "war on terror." In this case, the drastic asymmetries between the adversaries make the relationships to historic battles fought by more similar forces difficult to establish. Alexander usually winds up postulating a connection rather than demonstrating it. The link, for example, between operational-level "cauldron battles" like those fought in Russia in 1941, and the tactics employed by the U.S. in Afghanistan against the Taliban, is at best tenuous, if not entirely inferential. Alexander's case should not be dismissed, but is best approached with intellectual caution. As the U.S. prepares for war, look for interest in this title to be high.
Copyright 2002 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Copyright 2002 Reed Business Information, Inc.
From Library Journal
Using the works of Sun Tzu as a framework, Alexander has formulated 13 rules by which wars are won: striking at enemy weakness, feigning retreat, striking at a weak spot, etc. He devotes a chapter to each rule, describing famous battles that serve as examples of his rules in action, and then concludes each chapter with a post-9/11 implication as to the rule's application to the future of warfare. Some of Alexander's works, such as Lost Victories and How the Great Generals Win, show much original insight; others, like The Future of Warfare and How Hitler Could Have Won World War II, are not exceptional. The present work could be seen as a sequel to How the Great Generals Win, as it describes many of the same battles, and, logically, the great generals (from Napoeon and Genghis Khan to U.S. Grant and Erwin Rommel) utilized many of these principles for victory. His implications for the future are not especially thought-provoking, but this book can still serve as an excellent introduction to his work. Alexander's writing style is fluid, and his insights into many of the battles original. Recommended for military collections.
Richard Nowicki, Emerson Vocational H.S., Buffalo, NY
Copyright 2002 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Richard Nowicki, Emerson Vocational H.S., Buffalo, NY
Copyright 2002 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Inside This Book
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First Sentence
THE ATTACK ON the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, dramatically changed the fare of war. Read the first page
Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index
THE ATTACK ON the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, dramatically changed the fare of war. Read the first page
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Concordance
Browse Sample PagesConcordance
Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index
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Most helpful customer reviews
5.0 out of 5 stars
Winning With Indirect Methods,
By
This review is from: How Wars Are Won: The 13 Rules of War - from Ancient Greece to the War on Terror (Hardcover)
Noted Military Historian Bevin Alexander's latest effort represents an expansion of BH Liddell Hart's work. In his classic text on strategy, Liddell Hart differentiates between direct and indirect methods of warfare, and finds the latter to be by far the more successful approach. Liddell Hart does not examine different types of indirect action, however, and this is where Alexander's work comes in. Alexander begins with the premise that frontal assaults against fortified positions should never be attempted. Attacks should always come from the side or rear. This has the advantage of striking the enemy where they are weaker, and perhaps more importantly, it throws them off psychologically, disorienting, and frightening them. Alexander lists thirteen such variations on these same ideas, such as encirclement, holding in one place and striking another, creating diversions, cutting of the enemy's retreat, etc. Each method receives its own chapter, accompanied by several historical examples of the successful execution of the tactic, usually taken from as many different eras as possible. Of particular note are the examples taken from Stonewall Jackson's campaigns, a subject on which Alexander is one of the leading authorities. In writing this work it seems clear that Alexander is trying to place himself in line with the classics of military theory: Sun-Tzu, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart. Only time will tell whether or not he achieves this lofty goal. In the meantime there is little doubt that this fascinating and well-written work should be closely examined military strategists, historians, and armchair generals.
5.0 out of 5 stars
Not for everyone,
By
This review is from: How Wars Are Won: The 13 Rules of War from Ancient Greece to the War on Terror (Paperback)
This book kinda caught be by surprise at first. Mainly it talked about how to win wars nowadays, against terrorist and not a full fledge conventional army. I continued to read though and found that the author does a very good job of comparing strategies used in the past with ways to win wars today. Another fact I enjoyed was that he does not care which side he is on. Constantly I read books that only take the American side, well in this book it plainly shows stupid maneuvers by American commanders from the enemy side. However, if you are someone who wants a book dedicated to looking at past battles and how they were won this is not for you. Although it does go into fantastic detail with plenty of maps, the book is about today and how to win the small unit actions required in todays world.
1.0 out of 5 stars
13 Rules That No Longer Apply...Or Do They...Maybe,
By
This review is from: How Wars Are Won: The 13 Rules of War - from Ancient Greece to the War on Terror (Hardcover)
One of the few books I've had to put down. This is because of it's redundancy, encyclopaedic breadth at the expense of depth, and it's premature obselesence.Written post 9/11, pre Gulf War II, it's a summary of 13 military battlefield strategies. Pretty much each has an ancient example, middle example (1200-1850), and modern example (1850-1970). All well and good as an excercise in categorization, but each chapter inevitably ends with: this rule has been true for 2000 years; America's military supremacy makes the rule obsolete; I'm not sure what a future battlefield is going to look like, but somehow this rule will apply despite what I just said that the rule no longer applies. The few times Alexander speculates about details of future battlefields--in particular Iraq--actual events have proven him to be off target. He's also enamored with today's technology of instant information, total observation by satellite and unmanned Predator reconnaisance planes; which as far as he's concerned means you'll never see an army larger than a platoon ever again. For every military theorist who's correctly predicted the impact of a new technology, there's a dozen who've been way off. Alexander is most likely going to join the group of dozens. One problem that Alexander sites a few powerful times, but fails to apply to his vision of the future, is the cycle of technological sumpremacy. Inevitably, one side developes a strategy or weapon that makes them king of the world, inevitably opponents develop a defense or a counter to this supremacy thus leveling the battlefield. All of Alexander's predictions essentially point to endless American supremacy thanks to our technology, but doesn't history show enemies of America will (WILL) find a counter someday? Somehow, for Alexander, that timeless rule doesn't apply now either. And just like his book with no conclusion, this review has none either.
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