In FED We Trust: Ben Bernanke's War on the Great Panic [Deckle Edge] [Hardcover]

I am an academic economist doing research on the financial crisis. I read Wessel's book for details about the interventions by the Fed and Treasury in 2008 that I might not have encountered elsewhere. I was not expecting an academic treatise, and my negative review is not in any way related to the journalistic approach taken by the author.

Wessel is the economics editor at the Wall Street Journal and appears to have had a great deal of access to Bernanke and Geithner. His insider's perspective unfortunately produced very little insight. You can learn (p.115 AND p.192) that Bernanke used a "Polycom" speakerphone, but not that Hank Paulson and Richard Fuld were bitter rivals.

On a more substantive level, the book continually updates a "dashboard" with the Dow Jones average and the market cap of Citigroup. The success of each intervention is judged by the reaction of the stock market, generally within the day, to the policy. Does Wessel not remember that the Dow hit an all time high in October 2007, six months after subprime problems had emerged at Bear Stearns?

There is almost no discussion of the complex, leveraged financial instruments (e.g. CDOs and CDS) that amplified the crisis and made traditional monetary policy ineffective. A more thorough account would have also explored the regulatory failure of the Fed and federal government prior to the crisis.

On balance, the book is too narrow for someone just trying to go beyond the headlines and too superficial for those looking ahead to the next crisis.

This book is about how Ben Bernanke / The Fed battled against "The Great Panic" that besieged us. It reads like a fairly dry history of what transpired - kind of like a summary of what we've been watching on CNBC the last 2 years. Somehow Wessel took one of the most exciting moments in our current lives and made it almost bland and somewhat boring. Sure, there are some juicy facts but only after you get through more than half of the book. Overall, there is not much revealed that's earth-shattering if you kept abreast of what happened during this time. The book is at times choppy in motion and repetitive in content. I found that the first half of the book was a waste of my time -- the set-up the author felt necessary could have been presented much more succinctly. Example: there is a section within Bernanke's biographical chapter that details a prank he played on President Bush one day by coordinating the whole economic staff, along with even Dick Cheney, to wear tan socks as an inside joke among Bernanke and Bush. There are other strange off-topic insertions, like the curious offering that Donald Kohn, Fed Vice-Chair, lived in his son's basement for a while and that he used to ride his bike to work, parking his bike in the Fed garage that was reserved for its governors' cars. And that he liked to run up and down the stairs of the Fed building. Uh, huh.

The first inclination you have when you pick up this book is to dive in deep and fast to find out what went on in the minds of Bernanke, Paulson, and Geithner, among others. There must have been some amazing discussions, fraught with fear but Wessel never quite captures this for the reader to experience. Instead of providing a window into these men's thoughts / thought processes during this pivotal, riveting time, the book doesn't go far beyond merely reciting the actions they took, with some quotes from these men, scattered in as almost afterthoughts. [The footnote style is arguably incomplete with respect to some quotes.]

Overall disappointing. Wessels' cursory conclusions end up sounding rudimentary - likely attributable to what was probably a rush to publish and capitalize on the current curiosity-- which is understandable. But, there is still more to this subject. As of today's FOMC meeting, the Fed still hasn't started to unwind its actions. So, the book seems to be a bit early. Wessel even mentions that Hank Paulson is in the process of penning his own account of the economic crisis. Maybe Paulson will take us deeper into the minds of the big players during this frightful period, even if it is through his eyes, and not a third party's.

IN FED WE TRUST, by David Wessel, in the third exceptional book I have read about the recent financial crisis. Unlike TOO BIG TO FAIL and STREET FIGHTERS, IN FED is a more analytical, non-chronological, intensely thoughtful analysis of events leading up to the crisis as well as the crisis itself. We also learn a good deal not only about Bernanke but his predecessor, Alan Greenspan, as well.

In addition, we learn a lot more about Timothy Geithner and Hank Paulson, the other two fascinating characters in this near-calamity.

Wessel is excellent at explaining the intricacies of the complicated, innovative--but ultimately poisonous--instruments that were partially to blame for the meltdown, as well as in translating "FedSpeak" so that the reader understands concepts like the Fed's discount window, how interest rates reverberate throughout the economy, and how there were fundamental changes in the very structure of our financial system that were difficult even for bankers, economists and the best-educated politicians to decipher. What the Chairman of the Fed doesn't say is sometimes as important as what he does say. Bernanke is under the microscope, and this book explains what kinds of pressures are involved in his job.

What I most appreciate about this book is that it does not endeavor to demonize any of the major participants. Wessel is for the most part sympathetic to the efforts and intentions of the major players, although he definitely pulls no punches when pointing out where mistakes were made. And there were plenty, to be sure. He eunerates them in considerable detail (including stupendous goofs by Greenspan).

As a reader, I came away the feeling this was a very balanced, thoughtful and fair book. It also avoids the tawdly sensationalism and hysterical finger-pointing that pockmarks some of the other analyses of what occurred. Nor does it feel rushed, the way Gasparino's SELLOUT feels, or that there is some intense axe to grind, as disturbs some other potentially valuable works on this subject. Unlike some other books, this one seems focused rather than sprawling, cohesive rather than needled together with thread to meet a publishing deadline.

This is an excellent book that strikes a nearly perfect balance between analysis and exposition. What it may lack in immediacy, it more than makes up for in depth.