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In a limited way, Swinburne's work responds to many ideas postulated in books such as Richard Dawkin's "The Blind Watchmaker" (1986) and Stephen Hawking's "A Brief History of Time" (1988)... books which carry the suggestion that there is no God who is in any way involved in the sustaining of the universe. Swinburne's special field of expertise is in Philosophy of Religion, and as such, he is able to show us that "it is not a rational conclusion to suppose that explanation stops where science does". He presents a convincing argument that theism is the best explanation for the conformity of nature to formula, and the vast, all pervasive temporal order that characterizes the known universe. Why is there a universe AT ALL? Why is there ANY life on earth? HOW is it that discoverable scientific laws operate in the universe? Reading this book will help you to consider that perhaps the best answers to these questions can be offered by someone who allows for the existence of God.
Second, Swinburn's theistic theory, although simple in that it postulates only one ultimate cause, cannot replace the materialistic explanations of science and, thus, posits an additional entity. His theism, then, is not an application of Ockham's razor that "entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity." He tries to get around this problem by claiming that materialistic explanations are not "where any rational enquirer will stop" because, "The apparently coincidental cries out for explanation." But his contention is not supported by the evidence, for even the most common occurrences bubble up from and float upon the universal ocean of improbability. For example, the chances of any particular sperm fertilizing any particular egg are almost nil. Nevertheless, sexual reproduction, via millions of sperms and eggs, produces far more individuals than can survive.
This suffering driven by overpopulation brings up the third difficulty in Swinburne's theism--"Why God Allows Evil." He claims that the "theory of ultimate explanation" most likely to be true "is the simplest theory which predicts the observable phenomena," and he adds that "theism provides by far the simplest explanation of all phenomena." Swinburne is certainly wrong here. A theism that postulates an omnipotent, benevolent god neither predicts nor explains evil. Theodicies attempting to justify such a god allowing evil end up asserting that evil is good. Swinburne's attempt does not escape doing the same. He says that "according to the free-will defense, it is the natural possibility of moral evil which is the necessary condition of the great good, not the actual evil itself." But his other statements suggest worse. "I need to want to...see you hurt, if I am to have [a] choice between good and evil. This depravity is itself an evil which is the necessary condition of the greater good." "Being allowed to suffer to make possible a great good is a privilege, even if the privilege is forced upon you." "I am fortunate if the natural possibility of my suffering if you choose to hurt me is the vehicle which makes your choice really matter." There you have it; evil is good in that it make goodness better.
In the last chapter, Swinburne discusses "How the Existence of God Explains Miracles and Religious Experiences." The whole notions, however, of positing God as an ultimate explanation for everything from the universe to consciousness and religious experiences, if it may not be called a "God of the gaps," certainly is open to the charge of being a "God of the limits." In short, Swinburne is a champion of ad hoc hypotheses in defense of theism.
In his earlier work, "The Existence of God", he spent one-third of the book discussing about his methodology (about inductive arguments, what does it mean when we say we explain something, the probability approach, etc). But in this condensed version, he focused more on the arguments - but only a selection of them (brief discussion with only the susbtance presented). And of course, due to limited space, he could not give detailed reply to every single rebuttal against his arguments. It would therefore appear (wrongly) to some that his arguments did not conclusively "prove" the existence of God (in the normal/scientific sense of the word). It is for this reason that Swinburne expressed some dissatisfaction after completing the book. However, in my opinion, one could have a glance of Swinburne's contribution in the whole discussion of Theistic arguments by reading this book. It presents his general approach and some important substance of his arguments. For those who need a bit more detailed arguments, they must refer to the more complicated version, "The Existence of God" published in 1979.
Contrary to some reviews above, it would be fairer to compare Mackie's "The Miracle of Theism" with "The Existence of God" rather than "Is there a God", simply because "Is there a God" is not on the same level of discussion.
To me, this is surely Swinburne's most approachable book. Anyone who is interested in some first-class theistic arguments should begin by reading "Is there a God". I started reading "The Existence of God" first and was greatly troubled by the technical stuff. Now I can appreciate more of it after reading "Is there a God". Buy this book first and then read "The Existence of God" later (when you come to have a good grasp of the materials presented in this book). I am sure you won't be disappointed. Highly recommended.
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