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Among the first things one notices when reading Kuhn vs. Popper is Steven Fuller's preoccupation with Kuhn's politics (or lack thereof, which amounts to the same thing). It is true that in Kuhn's system, science is affected by politics and ideology, among many other factors. But to Kuhn, if you want to solve problems in science you try to see the encumbrances for what they are, as obstacles to be overcome. To Fuller on the other hand, politics or ideology (he might frame it "social responsibility") serve to justify science; they are its raison d'être. But that is exactly the wrong thing for science, because politicizing it serves to corrupt the process, rendering it hopelessly non-objective and biased. Paradigm struggles become ever less about science and ever more about political special interest advocacy.
Fuller is a sociologist and perhaps that is one reason Kuhn irks him so, for Kuhn also seems to be offering a paradigm challenge to the science of sociology itself. "Normal" (i.e. mainstream) sociologists like Fuller take it for granted that ideology should guide the process. But to Kuhn, sociology is more of a necessary evil; akin to group psychology, and as such it is but one factor out of many in paradigm struggles in science. One such group, the scientific community, plays a crucial role during such periods. In settling scientific debates the final authority is and must be the community of scientists. There is no other--unless one prefers a head of state to render a verdict; or better yet, as in Fuller's fantasy, the sociologist-as-philosopher-of-science should have the final word. This is why it is so important to keep science and politics separate.
Fuller criticizes Kuhn for not taking a stand on political issues, making him into something akin to a "Nazi sympathizer," (in this case a Conservative sympathizer, no doubt), for how else are we to read the analogy to Heidegger? There is little doubt where Fuller's sympathies and priorities lie. In a perverse sort of way I can see Fuller's point. Several notable philosophers and scientists, "intellectuals" of the early to mid-twentieth century like Russell and Einstein, took (left wing) political positions on the pressing issues of their day. Kuhn refused to do so. If I were to guess at his reason I would say he thought it might compromise his philosophical/historical theory on how science develops over time, and turn him into a mere partisan. Fuller characterizes Kuhn's failure to engage in political mud slinging as "cowardice;" I call it being professional and scientific.
As for the book itself; Kuhn vs. Popper has some value in that it gets the reader to think about a very important subject. But that's as far as it goes. Almost from the outset, Fuller plays fast and loose with language. In almost every paragraph, he makes reckless claims, faulty analogies, and erroneous assumptions. Fuller is a loose thinker for whom words have amorphous meanings; the very opposite of thinkers like Kuhn and Popper, however one might judge their respective philosophies.
If one intends to critique an author's work, it helps to first summarize what it says. But Fuller immediately launches into his interpretation before any facts are laid out. For example, on page 13, while ostensibly giving a synopsis of Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Fuller reports that Kuhn "heightens the tension between, on the one hand, the sort of heroic and progressive history that scientists must tell themselves...and, on the other hand, the actual history of science with all its diversions, complexities, and imperfections. Kuhn treats these histories as `separate but equal,'...[and this] would be undermined if scientists had the professional historian's demythologized sense of their history."
But what does all this hyperbole mean? Neither Structure, nor the Postscript to Structure, nor The Road Since Structure say anything like it, and certainly not in that way. There are endless similar examples of Fuller's misinterpretation of Kuhn's theory. Compare the above quote to Kuhn's description of the way science is portrayed in the textbooks:
"From the beginning of the scientific enterprise, a textbook presentation implies scientists have striven for the particular objectives that are embodied in today's paradigms. One by one, in a process often compared to the addition of bricks to a building, scientists have added another fact, concept, law, or theory to the body of information supplied in the contemporary science text...But this is not the way science develops. Many of the puzzles of contemporary normal science did not exist until after the most recent scientific revolution." (Structure, 140)