Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance [Hardcover]

Avinash K. Dixit (Author)

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Product Details

Hardcover: 184 pages
Publisher: Princeton University Press (Mar 16 2004)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 0691114862
ISBN-13: 978-0691114866
Product Dimensions: 23.6 x 14.7 x 2 cm
Shipping Weight: 68 g
Amazon Bestsellers Rank: #1,701,985 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Product Description

Review

[In a] broad field that is by its very nature multidisciplinary, Lawlessness and Economics is very straightforward and comprehensive in its survey of this emerging and complex phenomenon. . . . Perhaps the most compelling attribute of this endeavor is Dixit's tenacious ability to place each section and his various models into a clear and precise context with the already vast literature.
(Wesley T. Milner Law and Politics Book Review )

Concise yet comprehensive, Professor Dixit's work may well become an essential handbook for this rapidly developing field of study.
(Harvard Law Review )

Policy-oriented or not, scholars hoping to make a contribution in the area of governance in less developed countries would do well to begin with this brilliant book.
(es E. Rauch," Journal of Economic Literature )

Review

Avinash Dixit, a superb economist at the very peak of his profession, is one of the best-qualified economists in the world to write this book. With exceptional clarity he develops an elegant model of the scope of informal governance, one that will be indispensable for economists working in this area and for some political scientists as well.
(James E. Rauch, University of California, San Diego )

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First Sentence
Most economic activities and interactions share several properties that together create the need for an institutional infrastructure of governance. Read the first page

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Concordance

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Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index

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Amazon.com: 5.0 out of 5 stars (1 customer review)

6 of 6 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars How economies function without laws., Nov 29 2007

By Rolf Dobelli "getAbstract" - Published on Amazon.com

This review is from: Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance (Hardcover)

In Shakespeare's Henry VI Part 2, a member of John Cade's gang famously suggests that the rebels should, as an initial step toward utopia, "Kill all the lawyers." Certainly, anyone who has forked over a hefty retainer can sympathize, but can societies function without legal systems? And if so, how? The answer, according to Princeton economist Avinash Dixit, is that they can indeed function and have for thousand of years, provided the right kinds of social institutions are in place. In fact, lawless systems can work better than traditional justice systems for some small, homogenous groups. Thus, extralegal institutions are still common, from trade associations that arbitrate members' disputes to private security guards. While this slim book is thick with equations, we think it gives a nice overview of the empirical literature. The game-theory models yield a few surprising conclusions and many areas for further research. While killing all the lawyers still is probably not prudent, Dixit begins to show when quasi-legal institutions lubricate and when they gum up the wheels of commerce.

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