Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict [Paperback]

Among the most frequently heard proposals for reform of the judicial system are those calling for strict adherence to guidelines, be they sentencing, constitutional, or otherwise. Cass Sunstein says it doesn't really work that way. Sunstein, a leading author on legal theory, has added to his body of work this well-reasoned case for variations on a theory of law known as "legal pragmatism"--an approach that gives those in the judiciary greater latitude to decide cases on a variety on grounds. This theory is used as a centerpiece for this discussion on how law, lawyers, and judges work. Sunstein moves through legal theory to examine landmark cases and practical applications. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

"The arguments are elegant and the writing smooth and witty; the book deserves to be among the first taken down from the self by any student of legal theory and practice."--Choice

"[Sunstein's] carefully nuanced description of the kind of reasoning employed in law, a process often mysterious to outsiders, is the best I've seen, and captures the way judges actually make decisions in most cases....Mr. Sunstein has provided an articulate and comprehensible entry into the intellectual world of lawyers and judges....Anyone who wishes to learn what 'thinking like a lawyer' is all about should read this book."--The New York Times Book Review

"An eloquent review of how the law works."--Joan Biskupic, The Washington Post Book World

"If you are looking for an account of law that avoids the impossibly abstract choices posed by most legal theory and puts you in touch with the law as it really works, this is it."--Stanley Fish, Duke University

"Outside observers of American legal theory and practice can easily form the impression that American law is tortuous and arbitrary. Since everything is a bit like everything else, any conclusion can be justified. In this innovative work Cass Sunstein deals head-on with this problem. He argues persuasively that analogies form part of any legal system, and that the request for judges to make their decisions on the basis of first principles runs into decisive pragmatic objections. It is a book that is obligatory reading for anyone concerned with the nature of law as it is actually practiced."--Jon Elster, Robert K. Merton Professor of Social Science, Columbia University

"A central characteristic of American judicial reasoning is its particularity. Indeed, the best of American legal theory has attempted to explain and justify an approach focusing on the features of individual cases and avoiding reliance on rigid rules. Sunstein's book not only offers the most comprehensive attempt to defend particularistic decisionmaking in all of its manifestations, but also gives the most powerful defense. Defenders of rules, categories, and abstraction will have a formidable task in trying to penetrate the armor of Sunstein's normative defense of particularistic decisionmaking."--Frederick Schauer, Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, Harvard University

"Cass Sunstein's new book makes a significant addition to our understanding of how law works and of the nature of law itself. He explains in lucid prose, with many concrete examples, the components of good (and bad) legal reasoning and how they contribute to the outcome of legal controversies. Sunstein's ideas, which combine keen insight, common sense, and a vast knowledge of legal materials, are sure to prompt discussion. His account of 'incompletely theorized agreements' especially is original and important. The book will be of great value to scholars as well as to those who are beginning the study of law."--Lloyd L. Weinreb, Dane Professor of Law, Harvard University