Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy [Paperback]

But if institutional design has limited explanatory power, then what other variable can better account for institutional performance? This is the more important half of Putnam's work, for it is where he shows that "social context and history profoundly condition the effectiveness of institutions" (182), by unveiling his more controversial and powerful independent variable: civic culture. What is civic culture? It goes by many names and concepts for Putnam (civic traditions, political culture, civic involvement, social capital, republican virtues) but in its most basic form it is "norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement" (167).

In contrast with the existence of this civic culture in Northern Italy, identified as having a millenium-long pedigree due to the North's highly decentralized political history, Putnam uses the concept of "amoral familism" to characterize the civic culture (or lack thereof) in Southern Italy. Amoral familism implies that reciprocity and engagement are limited to family relations and to vertical networks of hierarchical power alone (in contrast to more participatory and egalitarian horizontal networks in the North), and that all other social relations, as a consequence, are characterized by material self-interest. Tracing the evolution of amoral familism to Southern Italy's monarchical past, Putnam finds that Southern regions have been doomed to institutional failure by their civic legacy, just as the North was guaranteed a relatively easy success by theirs. Putnam summarizes these two divergent starting points as "vicious and virtuous circles that have led to contrasting, path-dependent social equilibria" (180).

To prove this main causal argument, that civic culture determines institutional performance, one would obviously need adequate measures for both civic culture and institutional performance. As evidence of institutional performance, or "good government," Putnam chooses twelve indicators: cabinet stability, budget promptness, statistical and information services, reform legislation, legislative innovation, day care centers, family clinics, industrial policy instruments, agricultural spending capacity, local health unit expenditures, housing and urban development and bureaucratic responsiveness. Putnam then further evaluates the validity of these indicators by surveying both elite and public opinions regarding the institutional performance of their regional governments, to see if the public's perception matches his own.

For evidence of his primary independent variable, civic culture, Putnam proposes four indicators to put his finger on this elusive entity. These indicators are: voluntary associations, newspaper readership, referenda turnout, and (lack of) personalized preference voting. Putnam also correlates these "objective" measures with more opinion-based survey indicators of civic culture.

Most of Putnam's evidence coheres quite well with his causal argument. His quantitative indicators of both institutional performance and civic culture are relatively broad and accurate, with the minor exceptions that would be inherent in any attempt to quantify a complex, multi-dimensional concept like "civic culture". The strong statistical correlations identified by the measurement of his indicators, backed up with corresponding qualitative evidence (some, but not all of it historical), can probably be taken as reliable evidence of a meaningful causal relationship (in Italy) between civic culture and institutional performance. Perhaps the most striking implication of these results is that the ubiquitous relationship between economic development and democracy is actually shown to "disappear" in a statistical sense. In other words, Putnam has controlled for economic development and found that civic culture predicts both democracy and economic development, perhaps even better than economic development itself. This finding, if confirmed in other studies and settings, would obviously topple quite a few of the canonical theories in comparative politics.

That said, Making Democracy Work is not a boring read, and its flaws at least encourage the reader to contemplate the million ways the book and the study it describes might have been better.

Beginning in 1977, Putnam and his colleagues studied the performance and reception of the 15 regional governments that had been first established in 1970. Given pre-existing disparities among the regions -- economic, cultural, political, demographic, nevermind linguistic and geographic -- it's little surprise that the researchers found that not all the regional governments developed the same way. While he found that the 'institutional socialization' of the new parliamentary bodies had a consistently positive effect on the regional politicians' growing professionalism and willingness to explore constructive compromises with ideological opponents, the governments were not uniformly effective or responsive, nor were their constituents uniformly happy with their efforts.

Ruling out economics as a determining factor in these disparities (through a series of statistical negotiations that show an appalling lack of understanding about basic economics), and drawing heavily from Tocqueville's ideas about the mystical cultural underpinnings for successful democracy, Putnam constructed a 'civic community index' -- a list of indicators including newspaper readership, membership in associations, and what might be called 'enlightened' (abstract, issue-oriented) versus 'parochial' (personal) voting patterns. Again, it's small surprise that he finds a close correlation between the regions' scores on this index and their constituents' relative satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their regional governments.

Trying to explain why this might be so, Putnam then launches into a heavily simplified -- at times almost fanciful -- exposition of 1,000 years of Italian history in which somehow economic development patterns, demographics, religious institutions, and systems of political organization experience enormous changes while cultural traditions of 'civic-ness' remain more or less consistent, wonderfully cohering to the boundaries described by the modern regions and their scores on Putnam's civic community index. He concludes that habits die hard -- whether these be 'good' habits of mutual trust and social reciprocity or 'bad' habits of atomistic self-interest and traditionalist dependency -- and that the effects of institutional change on social and cultural norms is gradual, perhaps so gradual as to be almost imperceptible within a single lifetime.

Stopping just a hair's breadth short of claiming that culture determines economic and political success in the modern world, Putnam does the next worst thing, which is to give credit for present-day disparities in wealth and power to 'historical trends' in cultural development that don't bear close examination by anyone even slightly familiar with Italian history. For example, given Putnam's assessment of the disparity between North/Central Italy (very civic) and the 'amoral' South (terribly un-civic), the first with its innovative and republican cultural of mutual trust and democracy, the second with its stubbornly backward vertical social hierarchies, one could be forgiven for imagining that the South must certainly have been the base of support for Italian fascism in the 30s and 40s -- while in fact it was the gloriously civic-minded North that provided Mussolini with his most consistent support.

On the surface, there's nothing wrong with Putnam's basic political belief -- that democracy is strongest when it's built on a foundation of social reciprocity and trust, civic engagement, etc. My criticism shouldn't be taken as a condemnation of efforts to build or strengthen civil society, or to promote participatory democracy -- far from it! The trouble with Putnam's argument is its methodology, and the pernicious cultural determinism that lurks behind his rhetoric about path-dependent history.