Seeking a way out of today's bewildering rush of rights claims, Tara Smith's "Moral Rights and Political Freedom" offers a systematic account of the nature and foundations of rights. The book carefully elucidates what political freedom is and demonstrates why it should be protected by rights. Smith's thesis is that rights are teleological: respect for freedom is necessary for individuals' flourishing or "eudaimonia." Smith illustrates how many alleged rights would actually undermine that objective. Her decisive refutation of the assumption that conflicts between rights are inevitable--demonstrating how such conflicts are theoretically incoherent and practically self-defeating--should go a long way toward resolving many contemporary disputes about rights.
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About the Author
Tara Smith is assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Texas in Austin.
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Customer Reviews
Most helpful customer reviews
Format:Paperback
Tara Smith is a professor of philosophy and a follower of the ideas of novelist-philosopher Ayn Rand (called "Objectivism"). Prof. Smith offers a strong defense of individual rights based on an Objectivist conception of reason and human nature. (Curiously, while Rand is mentioned in the footnotes, she is never mentioned in the body of the text.)
There are a number of merits to this book. Prof. Smith is a clear writer who sets forth her arguments forcefully in jargon-free language. Unlike much Objectivist writing, she interacts with other traditions in a non-vituperative manner. Rather than give Rand all the credit, she indicates where she is indebted to others. Finally, she responds to potential arguments and counterexamples to her theory. Compare, for example, her section on "the ethics of emergencies" with Rand's article of the same name. Rand's article quickly descends into a screed against "altruism."
Prof. Smith argues that rights find their justification in man's need to advance his own life. Without rights, I can't exercise my reason and therefore can't live. Prof. Smith's argument, although fairly persuasive, runs into some obvious problems. Most importantly is the question of why one person should respect the rights of others. If, as Prof. Smith argues, rights have an egoistic foundation, then why should I respect someone else's rights? In fairness, to Prof. Smith, she realizes that this is a question that needs to be addressed, but I don't find her answer completely satisfactory. Finally, is the only justification for rights their role in advancing life? If I knew that I was going to die next week, would it be okay for me to cheat and steal?
Prof. Smith is also the author of a work on metaethics called VIABLE VALUES, which is quite good. A work that interacts with some of the topics covered by Prof. Smith is Roderick Long's REASON AND VALUE: ARISTOTLE VERSUS RAND (which, unfortunately does not reference Prof. Smith). Thomas Fleming takes on the tradition represented by Prof. Smith in THE MORALITY OF EVERDAY LIFE.
By Mike999
Format:Hardcover
Smith's book is a thorough defense of individual rights from an Objectivist perspective. She presents her case clearly, and, despite what other reviewers have said, answers the question of how it is always in my interest to respect the rights of others. Her argument hinges on the point that human action must be guided by principle, and, as this applies to rights, the principle is that reason, not force, is the only means to value.
She critiques (with devastating results) deontological and consequentialist theories of rights and offers a teleological view as superior. This is a unique perspective and is itself more than enough to warrant buying the book. Smith's book is good because of both its defense of rights from a teleological perspective and its criticisms of competing views.
Most Helpful Customer Reviews on Amazon.com (beta)
Amazon.com:
4.2 out of 5 stars
4 reviews
27 of 30 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars
The Objectivist case for individual rights
Oct 26 1998
By Gideon Reich
- Published on Amazon.com
Format:Hardcover
Prof. Smith does a wonderful job of giving a proper academic presentation of the Objectivist case for individual rights. She first presents a detailed moral teleological argument for why individuals should have rights. She then proceeds to argue against both deontological and consequentialist justifications for rights and makes the case that her teleological justification is the only proper one which has none of the weaknesses of the other attempts at justifying rights. Finally she takes on so-called "positive freedoms" or "welfare rights" and shows how recognizing such rights negates actual freedoms and thus that such positive rights are not proper rights and freedoms at all.
This book would be beneficially used in any political science or moral/political philosophy course.
10 of 11 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars
A Viable Politics?
Jun 19 2004
By Steve Jackson
- Published on Amazon.com
Format:Paperback
Tara Smith is a professor of philosophy and a follower of the ideas of novelist-philosopher Ayn Rand (called "Objectivism"). Prof. Smith offers a strong defense of individual rights based on an Objectivist conception of reason and human nature. (Curiously, while Rand is mentioned in the footnotes, she is never mentioned in the body of the text.)
There are a number of merits to this book. Prof. Smith is a clear writer who sets forth her arguments forcefully in jargon-free language. Unlike much Objectivist writing, she interacts with other traditions in a non-vituperative manner. Rather than give Rand all the credit, she indicates where she is indebted to others. Finally, she responds to potential arguments and counterexamples to her theory. Compare, for example, her section on "the ethics of emergencies" with Rand's article of the same name. Rand's article quickly descends into a screed against "altruism."
Prof. Smith argues that rights find their justification in man's need to advance his own life. Without rights, I can't exercise my reason and therefore can't live. Prof. Smith's argument, although fairly persuasive, runs into some obvious problems. Most importantly is the question of why one person should respect the rights of others. If, as Prof. Smith argues, rights have an egoistic foundation, then why should I respect someone else's rights? In fairness, to Prof. Smith, she realizes that this is a question that needs to be addressed, but I don't find her answer completely satisfactory. Finally, is the only justification for rights their role in advancing life? If I knew that I was going to die next week, would it be okay for me to cheat and steal?
Prof. Smith is also the author of a work on metaethics called VIABLE VALUES, which is quite good. A work that interacts with some of the topics covered by Prof. Smith is Roderick Long's REASON AND VALUE: ARISTOTLE VERSUS RAND (which, unfortunately does not reference Prof. Smith). Thomas Fleming takes on the tradition represented by Prof. Smith in THE MORALITY OF EVERDAY LIFE.
1 of 6 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars
Ad "Emergency"
Feb 21 2007
By W. Schultz
- Published on Amazon.com
Format:Hardcover
"Scott Ryan", my favorite Amazon (and other places) Rand critic writes:
If I'm driving at ninety miles an hour toward a bridge abutment, am I not in some way obliged to avoid mowing down the little girl who wanders out in front of my car? If so, then my obligation to respect your rights is founded, at least in part, on something other than my own "choice to live."
Is our case for ethics based on this scenario? Further, do you have a right to end your own life? Third, in what *context* does a discussion about what rights (if any) anyone (if anyone) holds? Fourth, how does the concept 'rights' exist *between* individuals?
Tara Smith has written a solid book that I highly enjoyed. If one grants Smith some epistemological room -- she presents a great case for individual rights. Ultimately -- and I think the other reviewers here would agree -- Smith's account of rights and how they exist between individuals is based on Rand's epistemology. So, if its the case that Rand's epistemology is bogus -- than this account of rights, although interesting -- will fail to persaude.
If I'm driving at ninety miles an hour toward a bridge abutment, am I not in some way obliged to avoid mowing down the little girl who wanders out in front of my car? If so, then my obligation to respect your rights is founded, at least in part, on something other than my own "choice to live."
Is our case for ethics based on this scenario? Further, do you have a right to end your own life? Third, in what *context* does a discussion about what rights (if any) anyone (if anyone) holds? Fourth, how does the concept 'rights' exist *between* individuals?
Tara Smith has written a solid book that I highly enjoyed. If one grants Smith some epistemological room -- she presents a great case for individual rights. Ultimately -- and I think the other reviewers here would agree -- Smith's account of rights and how they exist between individuals is based on Rand's epistemology. So, if its the case that Rand's epistemology is bogus -- than this account of rights, although interesting -- will fail to persaude.
›
Go to Amazon.com to see all 4 reviews
4.2 out of 5 stars
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