- Paperback: 241 pages
- Publisher: Temple University Press (July 31 2000)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 1566398487
- ISBN-13: 978-1566398480
- Product Dimensions: 22.8 x 15.3 x 1.9 cm
- Shipping Weight: 404 g
- Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
- Amazon Bestsellers Rank: #2,196,451 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- See Complete Table of Contents
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Product Details |
Product Description
Review
"The distinguished contributors to this book present a wide range of perspectives from which to assess our intelligence system. Their decades of public service command tremendous respect. Their views break new ground and demand the attention of the White House and of lawmakers on both sides of the aisle. This book should be required reading by all congressional committees concerned with intelligence policy, surveillance, and appropriations, and by all Americans." --Senator Tom Harkin, from the Foreword "[A] comprehensive sweep of the disputes and principles that underlie the struggle for an ethics-grounded U.S. intelligence commitment." --Baltimore Sun "[The book] was published in 2000 but unfortunately, its relevance and importance have increased exponentially since the turn of the century... This book is a must read."--The Journal of European Affairs
Book Description
The Cold War has been over for ten years and no country threatens this nation's existence, yet, we still spend billions of dollars on covert action and espionage. Even during the Cold War, when intelligence was seen as a matter of life and death, our system served us badly. It provided unreliable information (leading, among other things, to a grossly inflated military budget) as it supported corrupt regimes around the world, promoted the drug trade, and repeatedly violated foreign and domestic laws. And worse, protected by a shroud of secrecy, it paid no price for its mistakes. Instead, it grew larger and more insulated every year. In "National Insecurity" ten prominent experts describe, from an insider perspective, what went wrong with U.S. intelligence and what needs to be done to fix it. Drawing on their experience in government administration, research, and the foreign service, they propose a radical rethinking of the United States' intelligence needs in the post-Cold War world. In addition, they offer a coherent and unified plan for reform that can protect U.S. Security while upholding the values of our democratic system. The contributors include Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State, advisor to President Kennedy, and author of "The Cuban Missile Crisis"; Melvin A. Goodman, former division chief and senior analyst at the CIA's Office of Soviet Affairs; Robert E. White, former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador and Paraguay and president of the Center for International Policy; and, Robert V. Keeley, former ambassador to Greece, Zimbabwe, and Mauritius. It also includes: Jack A. Blum, chief investigator for Senator Church's Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for the Senate investigation of the Iran-Contra scandal; Kate Doyle, analyst at the National Security Archive; Alfred W. McCoy, author of "The Politics of Heroin"; Robert Dreyfuss, a journalist who publishes regularly on intelligence matters; Richard A. Stubbing, who for twenty years handled the intelligence budget for the Office of Management and Budget; Pat M. Holt, former chief of the Senate Foreign Relations committee and author of "Secret Intelligence and Public Policy"; and the editor. Author note: Craig Eisendrath is Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C. He served as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer.
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Most helpful customer reviews
5.0 out of 5 stars
An Intelligence Community Reform Agenda,
This review is from: National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War (Hardcover)
Most thoughtful observers agree that our intelligence community (Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of State, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office and National Imagery and Mapping Agency) remains structured for the Cold War and badly needs reform to meet the challenges of the new century. And they tend to agree on its principal weaknesses, a familiar litany for those who follow these matters: inability to produce analysis useful to policy makers, politicization of intelligence product, emergence of an "intelligence-industrial complex", wasteful spending, damaging and counterproductive covert operations, inadequate legislative oversight, overly restrictive secrecy regime and so on.But when it comes to what should be done, the consensus breaks down. The Center for International Policy, editor Craig Eisendrath and the ten other contributors to this volume have provided a comprehensive assessment of the community's current ills and prescribed remedial actions. Their numbers include: a former director of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, a long-time chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), a former CIA analyst and division head, a former OMB budget examiner for intelligence, two former career ambassadors, and the former chief investigator for the SFRC and the Iran-Contra investigation. All bring extensive experience with or within the intelligence community to the table, provide a wide range of practical knowledge and argue the case for reform persuasively. For the most part the reforms they recommend seem reasoned and reasonable, though many, as they note, strike at the heart of bureaucratic and vested interests and are likely to be difficult to implement. There was, however, one glaring exception to my "reasoned and reasonable" rule: several of the contributors suggested that at least part of the CIA's covert operations responsibility be transferred to Defense. I can think of no worse solution to the quandaries posed by maintaining a covert operations capability. In sum, this is an extremely important and readable book on a subject that should be high on the next administration's list of priorities. Most of its recommendations deserve very serious consideration and, hopefully, adoption.
4.0 out of 5 stars
Useful Annecdotal Opinions, Should be Bought and Read,
By Robert D. Steele (Oakton, VA United States) - See all my reviews
This review is from: National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War (Hardcover)
A project by the Center for International Policy, founded by Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), this book brings together a series of chapters that are largely anecdotal (but reasoned) pieces from former foreign service officers recalling all the terrible things CIA did or did not do while they were in service. It includes a chapter by Mel Goodman that some thought was to have been a full-blown book. The chapter by Richard A. Stubbing on "Improving the Output of Intelligence: Priorities, Managerial Changes, and Funding" is quite interesting. There is a great deal of truth in all that is presented here-Ambassador Bob White, for example, was in El Salvador when I reported, a graduate thesis on predicting (and preventing) revolution in my past, and I remember vividly our conversation about the need to suppress the extreme right if we were to stabilize the country.
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4.5 out of 5 stars (2 customer reviews) 6 of 6 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars
An Intelligence Community Reform Agenda,
By Jack R. Binns - Published on Amazon.com
This review is from: National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War (Hardcover)
Most thoughtful observers agree that our intelligence community (Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of State, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office and National Imagery and Mapping Agency) remains structured for the Cold War and badly needs reform to meet the challenges of the new century. And they tend to agree on its principal weaknesses, a familiar litany for those who follow these matters: inability to produce analysis useful to policy makers, politicization of intelligence product, emergence of an "intelligence-industrial complex", wasteful spending, damaging and counterproductive covert operations, inadequate legislative oversight, overly restrictive secrecy regime and so on.But when it comes to what should be done, the consensus breaks down. The Center for International Policy, editor Craig Eisendrath and the ten other contributors to this volume have provided a comprehensive assessment of the community's current ills and prescribed remedial actions. Their numbers include: a former director of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, a long-time chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), a former CIA analyst and division head, a former OMB budget examiner for intelligence, two former career ambassadors, and the former chief investigator for the SFRC and the Iran-Contra investigation. All bring extensive experience with or within the intelligence community to the table, provide a wide range of practical knowledge and argue the case for reform persuasively. For the most part the reforms they recommend seem reasoned and reasonable, though many, as they note, strike at the heart of bureaucratic and vested interests and are likely to be difficult to implement. There was, however, one glaring exception to my "reasoned and reasonable" rule: several of the contributors suggested that at least part of the CIA's covert operations responsibility be transferred to Defense. I can think of no worse solution to the quandaries posed by maintaining a covert operations capability. In sum, this is an extremely important and readable book on a subject that should be high on the next administration's list of priorities. Most of its recommendations deserve very serious consideration and, hopefully, adoption. 0 of 1 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars
Useful Annecdotal Opinions, Should be Bought and Read,
By Robert D. Steele - Published on Amazon.com
Amazon Verified Purchase(What's this?)
This review is from: National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War (Hardcover)
A project by the Center for International Policy, founded by Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), this book brings together a series of chapters that are largely anecdotal (but reasoned) pieces from former foreign service officers recalling all the terrible things CIA did or did not do while they were in service. It includes a chapter by Mel Goodman that some thought was to have been a full-blown book. The chapter by Richard A. Stubbing on "Improving the Output of Intelligence: Priorities, Managerial Changes, and Funding" is quite interesting. There is a great deal of truth in all that is presented here-Ambassador Bob White, for example, was in El Salvador when I reported, a graduate thesis on predicting (and preventing) revolution in my past, and I remember vividly our conversation about the need to suppress the extreme right if we were to stabilize the country.
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