40 of 40 people found the following review helpful
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This is the 4th volume of Rorty's Philosophical Papers, and the 1st volume since his retirement from Stanford University. This 4th collection is not as summoning as his 3rd, and although it is as diverse in topics as the 3rd collection it is not as specific in its topics compared to the 3rd or 2nd collection.
Rorty has etched out his place in contemporary philosophy by arguing much to the same critique of philosophy for over 20 years. But he has had many interesting ideas (with their inherent controversies). What has increased is the diversity of the subject matter that he considers relevant to his overall themes, and also, he writes more elegantly and simply than he used to write (compare this volume with the collection in Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays, 1972-1980).
I will give a summary of each argument in each essay by finding the most representative quote within each essay....If these arguments do not interest you, but you're still interested in Rorty, I would suggest Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (a critique of representationalism), Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Rorty's infamous "liberal ironist"), and Achieving Our Country : Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America (Rorty's political manifesto). Or, check out the book list I created on Amazon entitled "Richard Rorty"
CULTURAL POLITICS AND THE QUESTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
"I want to argue that cultural politics should replace ontology, and also that whether it should or not is itself a matter of cultural politics" (pg. 5).
PRAGMATISM AND ROMANTIC POLYTHEISM
"You are a polytheist if you think that there is no actual or possible object of knowledge that would permit you to commensurate and rank all human needs. Isaiah Berlin's well-known doctrine of immensurable human values is, in my sense, a polytheistic manifesto. Polytheism...is pretty much coextensive with romantic utilitarianism....no way of ranking human needs...Mill's `On Liberty' provides all the ethical instruction you need" (pg. 30).
JUSTICE AS A LARGER LOYALTY
"Should we describe such moral dilemmas as conflicts between loyalty and justice, or rather, as I have suggested between loyalties to smaller groups and loyalties to larger groups?" (pg. 44).
"Honesty and honorableness are measured by the degree of coherence of the stories people tell themselves and come to believe" (pg. 68).
GRANDEUR, PROFUNDITY, AND FINITUDE
"The main reason for philosophy's marginalization...is the same as the reason why the warfare between science and theology looks quaint - the fact that nowadays we are all commonsensically materialist and utilitarian....further reason...the quarrels which, in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, gradually replaced the warfare between the gods and the giants - the quarrels between philosophy and poetry and between philosophy and sophistry - have themselves become quaint" (pg. 87).
PHILOSOPHY AS A TRANSITIONAL GENRE
"We think that inquiry is just another name for problem-solving, and we cannot imagine inquiry into how human beings should live, into what we should make ourselves, coming to an end. For solutions to old problems will produce fresh problems, and so on forever" (pg. 89).
PRAGMATISM AND ROMANTICISM
"...imagination is the source of freedom because it is the source of language...Nothing at all was obvious, because obviousness is not a notion that can be applied to organisms that do not use language...imagination is not a distinctively human capacity...But giving and asking for reasons is distinctively human, and coextensive with rationality. The more an organism can get what it wants by persuasion rather than force, the more rational it is" (pg. 114-115).
ANALYTIC AND CONVERSATIONAL PHILOSOPHY
"I am suggesting we drop the term `continental' and instead contrast analytic philosophy with conversational philosophy. This change would shift attention from differences between job requirements imposed on young philosophers in different regions of the world to issues I just sketched: that there is something that philosophers can get right. The term `getting it right'...is appropriate only when everybody interested in the topics draws pretty much the same inferences from the same assertions" (pg. 124).
A PRAGMATIST VIEW OF CONTEMPORARY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
"...we should be neither realist nor antirealists, that the entire realism-antirealism issue should be set aside" (pg. 133). "In the sort of culture I hope our remote descendants may inhabit, the philosophical literature about realism and antirealism will have been aestheticized in the way that we moderns have aestheticized medieval disputations about the ontological status of universals" (pg. 137).
NATURALISM AND QUIETISM
"Most people who think of themselves in the quietist camps, as I do, would hesitate to say that the problems studied by our activist colleagues are unreal. [Rather, we divide philosophical problems] into those that retain some relevance to cultural politics and those that do not" (pg. 149; my brackets).
WITTGENSTEIN AND THE LINGUISTIC TURN
"I shall divide three views of Wittgenstein, corresponding to three ways of thinking about the so-called `linguistic turn in philosophy'" (pg. 160). These views include "naturalists," "Wittgensteinian therapists," and "pragmatic Wittgensteinians." (Rorty is in the third camp). Rorty argues 2 things: "there is no interesting sense in which philosophical problems are problems of language,...and the linguistic turn was useful nevertheless, for it turned philosophers'' attentions from the topic of experience toward that of linguistic behavior. That shift helped break the hold of empiricism - and, more broadly, representationalism" (pg. 160).
HOLISM AND HISTORICISM
"[If you are like a holist] you will try...to explain how certain organisms managed to become rational by telling stories about how various different practices came into being. You will be more interested in historical change than in neurobiological arrangements" (pg. 176).
KANT VS. DEWEY
Against the moral philosophers in the Kantian tradition and in support of the Deweyian, Rorty writes, "To say that moral principles have no inherent nature is to imply that they have no distinct source. They emerge from our encounters with our surroundings in the same way that hypotheses about planetary motion, codes of etiquette, epic poems, and all our other patterns of linguistic behavior emerge" (pg. 192).
16 of 16 people found the following review helpful
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This is Rorty in his later years. It makes for at wonderful summing up. Because he has said the same things again and again, there is a delightful lightness to his tone. The many ramifications of his cumulative research have become clearer. I think Rorty is almost hated by some of his professional colleagues. I am not a professional philosopher, so I cannot comment on his many sins. But as a working psycholgist I love his work. He has made many of my "epistemological sins" clear. And over the years reading his books has changed me. I think this book along with "Philosophy and Social Hope" give the easiest access to his work. Highly recommended.
5 of 5 people found the following review helpful
Michael G. Shafto
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It is somewhat ironic that Rorty often referred to Donald Davidson as his "favorite philosopher". It was far from certain that Davidson returned the favor. In fact, it often seemed that Davidson felt acutely co-opted or revised by Rorty. In any case, Davidson and Rorty shared a kind of ambivalence toward Philosophy, even as they contributed strongly to the best core traditions of that discipline. That is, both Davidson and Rorty felt some allegiance to disciplines (or departments) other than Philosophy -- Davidson to Psychology and Rorty to Literary Criticism and the Humanities. But in both cases, their stances were philosophical, in the best sense, in that they were unwilling to hide behind "scientific", "logical", or other artificially formal intellectual technologies. In short, as philosophers they took a flat-footed stance in confronting experience with language. The experience and the language were finally grounded in the experience and language shared by all human beings.
In Rorty's later works, his overall approach had a direct emotional appeal, not just a logical appeal. The foundation of his arguments was not of the old-school sort; it was neither logical or scientific. Rather, it was an appeal to shared experience and shared interpretation. In one sense he was on shaky ground. Nothing could be "proved". Nevertheless, Rorty was reaching for -- and in his best later work reached -- a foundation more compelling and more universal than science or logic. His arguments were based on a profound knowledge and understanding of human history, expressed and analyzed in engaging and conversational prose.
His best essays in this volume (and see also Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America) are reminiscent of personal letters from that smarter roommate we all had in college -- someone we could trust to enlighten us, someone we could assume was right when we didn't get it at first.
5 of 9 people found the following review helpful
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More fantastic essays by the wordsmith who says everything just as beautifully as you would say it if only you had thought of it first.
4 of 11 people found the following review helpful
John M. Giannone
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In the work of Richard Rorty, I have found great support for my own treatment of important matters in philosophy. Had I not thought, as I do,that
realism is just so much well-entrenched sci-fi, I might not have gone back to Rorty and Rorty's et alia (in Truth and Progress and Consequences of Pragmatism) However, having said this much, I should add that if one wants Rorty in depth, read something else, but do not ignore this work. For those who, like myself, are unfamiliar with many of Rorty's invited guests, the work is simple and important. We owe Rorty a debt.