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Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry, Volume 9: Poles, Jews, Socialists: The Failure of an Ideal Paperback – Jan 1 2007


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Product Details

  • Paperback: 372 pages
  • Publisher: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization (Jan. 1 2007)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 1904113818
  • ISBN-13: 978-1904113812
  • Product Dimensions: 1.9 x 23 x 15.4 cm
  • Shipping Weight: 540 g
  • Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
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Format: Hardcover
Most Holocaust-related material, especially the films, seem to always portray Poles in a unilaterally negative light. This volume, by contrast, is well worth the reader's time. It gives various perspectives on Jewish-Polish relations during and immediately after WWII. But I take issue with some claims. In one article, Antony Polonsky cites a document from the mainstream Polish underground (AK) wherein the AK would come out in open combat if the Germans tried the same thing to Polish gentiles that they did to the Jews. From this, Polonsky infers that the leadership of the Polish underground saw Polish deaths as worth averting, but not Jewish deaths. But this is a complete non-sequitur on Polonsky's part. Remember that, along with 3 million Polish Jews, 2-3 million Polish gentiles were also being murdered by the Germans, yet the AK did not start a national uprising on behalf of the 2-3 million gentiles any more than it did on behalf of the 3 million Polish Jews. What the AK leadership was actually saying was that a national uprising would not be in the offing unless a large fraction of the Polish population was in danger of being exterminated in a full-blown genocide, at which time there would be nothing to lose, for Polish people as a whole, to come out in open warfare against the German occupation authorities. The Jews, of course, had nothing to lose already in 1942, but the Polish gentiles, as a whole, still did. That is the actual reason for the AK witholding more overt military action on behalf of the Jews. Nevertheless, the AK did aid Jews in various ways, including supplying the Jewish Warsaw Ghetto Uprising with 50 firearms. This may not seem like much, but remember that every gun was worth its weight in gold.Read more ›
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews on Amazon.com (beta)

Amazon.com: 2 reviews
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful
Has an English Translation of Andrzej Paczkowski's Study of Jews in the Post-WWII Communist Security Forces (U. B., or Bezpieka) June 30 2010
By Jan Peczkis - Published on Amazon.com
Format: Paperback
This review expands an earlier one. Andrzej Paczkowski (pp. 453-464), using archival sources, examines the over-representation of Jews in the leadership of the UB, or Bezpieka. He comments: "One of the few reliable sources is a report sent by Nikolay Selivanovsky, the chief Soviet advisor at the Ministerstwo Bezpieczenstwa Publicznego (Ministry of Public Security, MBP) to Beria on 20 October 1945. According to this report, Jews made up 18.7 per cent of the ministry's workforce and held half of the managerial positions...we must accept these data, at least initially, as reliable." (p. 456). To put these numbers in perspective, post-Holocaust Jews constituted only 1% of Poland's postwar population.

Other figures cited by Paczkowski are either lower or higher, and these discrepancies probably stem from different reckonings based on geographical coverage, different criteria for "managerial position", etc. (p. 457). In any case, they all agree on the gross over-representation of Jews in the leadership of the hated Bezpieka--a force responsible for the torture and murder of tens of thousands of Poles.

The over-representation of Jews in the Bezpieka has at times been equated with Poles' over-representation earlier in the Cheka (the post-1917 Soviet Communist police). In actuality, the former was much more extreme than the latter. Poles, at about 2% of USSR's population, peaked at 6.3% membership in the Cheka (in September 1918), and declined rapidly thereafter. (p. 454).

Paczkowski rejects those who say that U.B.-serving Jews were no longer Jews. He compares it to those who say that Polish Communists are not "real" Poles. Besides, many U.B. Jews identified, to varying degrees, with their Judaism. (pp. 459-460). (Finally, according to Israel's Law of Return, one is Jewish if born to a Jewish mother, provided that one does not convert to another religion.)

Studying the U.B.--Jewish connection, according to Paczkowski, is a legitimate one, and is not "racist". (Is study of Polish misdeeds against Jews "racist"?)

Overall, this volume gives various perspectives on Jewish-Polish relations during and immediately after WWII. But I take issue with some claims. In one article, Antony Polonsky cites a document from the mainstream Polish underground (AK) wherein the AK would come out in open combat if the Germans tried the same thing to Polish gentiles that they did to the Jews. From this, Polonsky infers that the leadership of the Polish underground saw Polish deaths as worth averting, but not Jewish deaths. But this is a complete non-sequitur on Polonsky's part. Remember that, along with 3 million Polish Jews, 2-3 million Polish gentiles were also being murdered by the Germans, yet the AK did not start a national uprising on behalf of the 2-3 million gentiles any more than it did on behalf of the 3 million Polish Jews. What the AK leadership was actually saying was that a national uprising would not be in the offing unless a large fraction of the Polish population was in danger of being exterminated in a full-blown genocide, at which time there would be nothing to lose, for Polish people as a whole, to come out in open warfare against the German occupation authorities. The Jews, of course, had nothing to lose already in 1942, but the Polish gentiles, as a whole, still did. That is the actual reason for the AK withholding more overt military action on behalf of the Jews.

Nevertheless, the AK did aid Jews in various ways, including supplying the Jewish Warsaw Ghetto Uprising not with 50, but with several hundred firearms. (See Peczkis review of Two Flags: Return to the Warsaw Ghetto). Even this may not seem like much, but remember that every gun was worth its weight in gold. In fact, if was worth human lives, as each donated firearm had been procured at risk of a Polish gentile's life, and kept at risk of a Polish gentile's life. And, of course, each gun donated to the Jews meant one less gun available to Polish gentiles to conduct guerrilla actions against the Germans, and to protect Polish gentiles in the event of a full-blown German genocide against the entire Polish population.
11 of 19 people found the following review helpful
Seldom-Heard Perspectives On Polish-Jewish Relations Aug. 8 2001
By Jan Peczkis - Published on Amazon.com
Format: Hardcover
Most Holocaust-related material, especially the films, seem to always portray Poles in a unilaterally negative light. This volume, by contrast, is well worth the reader's time. It gives various perspectives on Jewish-Polish relations during and immediately after WWII. But I take issue with some claims. In one article, Antony Polonsky cites a document from the mainstream Polish underground (AK) wherein the AK would come out in open combat if the Germans tried the same thing to Polish gentiles that they did to the Jews. From this, Polonsky infers that the leadership of the Polish underground saw Polish deaths as worth averting, but not Jewish deaths. But this is a complete non-sequitur on Polonsky's part. Remember that, along with 3 million Polish Jews, 2-3 million Polish gentiles were also being murdered by the Germans, yet the AK did not start a national uprising on behalf of the 2-3 million gentiles any more than it did on behalf of the 3 million Polish Jews. What the AK leadership was actually saying was that a national uprising would not be in the offing unless a large fraction of the Polish population was in danger of being exterminated in a full-blown genocide, at which time there would be nothing to lose, for Polish people as a whole, to come out in open warfare against the German occupation authorities. The Jews, of course, had nothing to lose already in 1942, but the Polish gentiles, as a whole, still did. That is the actual reason for the AK witholding more overt military action on behalf of the Jews. Nevertheless, the AK did aid Jews in various ways, including supplying the Jewish Warsaw Ghetto Uprising with 50 firearms. This may not seem like much, but remember that every gun was worth its weight in gold. In fact, if was worth human lives, as each donated firearm had been procured at risk of a Polish gentile's life, and kept at risk of a Polish gentile's life. And, of course, each gun donated to the Jews meant one less gun available to Polish gentiles to conduct guerrilla actions against the Germans, and to protect Polish gentiles in the event of a full-blown German genocide against the entire Polish population.

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