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3.0 out of 5 stars
More sociology than history, May 1 2004
Seymour Lipset's and Earl Raab's "The Politics of Unreason: Right Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1970" is an attempt to explain the history of far right movements through a sociological methodology. The result is a dense book running 500 pages that uses many charts and statistical breakdowns but offers little in the way of historical analysis. Perhaps the lack of history in the book should come as little surprise as neither of the authors possesses training in the techniques of historical investigation. Lipset's sociology credentials are well known. Earl Raab worked on the staff of the Jewish Community Relations Council in San Francisco along with other civil rights organizations. The authors point out that the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith underwrote the costs of "The Politics of Unreason," a fact that probably helped the authors conduct research but one that should give serious students of right wing political movements some pause. Fortunately, both writers readily reveal their potential biases at the beginning of the book in an effort to offset potential criticisms.
The two writers easily escape censure concerning their central thesis, which is logical, well stated, and maddeningly long-winded. Far right wing movements, Lipset and Raab contend, share several recurring themes. First, they are almost always "preservationist," meaning groups like the anti-Masonic party of the 1820s, the Know-Nothings of the 1850s, and the American Protective Associations of the 1890s arose in an effort to guard their members' social status from encroachment by others. Second, organizations of the radical right were monistic-meaning they perceived the world as a place of "uniform and fixed standards"-as opposed to pluralistic. Third, a type of "simplism" infected the tracts and speeches of proponents of extreme right wing ideologies, a simplism that led to "the unambiguous ascription of single causes and remedies for multifactored phenomena." Closely allied with this uncomplicated view of "multifactored phenomena" is a historical moralism that only allows "the tendency to believe that human events are totally shaped by the supremacy of good intentions over bad at any given moment, or vice versa." Fourth, all movements worth their salt must have a conspiracy theory around which the forces can rally. The conspiracy must move from the abstract into reality by explaining a particular social dilemma and identifying a physical foe. Fifth, "Such a movement requires a coalition between some elite groups and some plebian groups, both of which are in some state of preservatist backlash against different forms of displacement or status deprivation in a period of sharp change." Neat, huh?
The emergence of the anti-Illuminist movement in the 1790s serves as a good example of the authors' theory. Federalist New Englanders, challenged by threats to their Congregationalist faith and by the growing power of farmers, formulated a conspiracy theory to explain their loss of status and to preserve their political power. By attaching sinister motivations to Illuminism, these Federalists developed a simple, historically moralistic conspiracy theory explaining why they were losing status. Moreover, the movement united elites and lower class elements of society. The anti-Illuminism movement ultimately failed, explain the authors, because it could not identify an easily recognizable physical enemy against which the movement could fight. Only when the Federalists substituted the Society of United Irishmen in place of the Illuminati around 1797 did they attain some success in their goals. Subsequent resurrections of the movement in the 1820s achieved greater triumphs because they linked Illuminism with the very real Freemasons. The authors repeatedly find this pattern played out through American history. Even after the 1930s, when Catholics such as Father Coughlin and Joseph McCarthy became the persecutors and not the victims, the same theory holds true.
Historian David Bennett revisited the ground covered in "The Politics of Unreason" in his book "The Party of Fear," but did a much better job of placing far right movements into a historical context. For example, the anti-Catholic movements of the eighteenth century arose in large part against the massive waves of Irish immigration in the 1840s and 1850s. The chapter on the 1930s examines in some depth the usual suspects-Coughlin, Gerald Winrod, William Dudley Pelley, Huey Long, and Gerald L.K. Smith, but fails to look at other large pro-isolationist, anti-Semitic, pro-fascist groups of the era. Even the reference to Smith is incomplete because his influence on the far right became more important after the fall of the Union Party in 1936 drove this former Long lieutenant farther right. Bennett took the time to document in thorough detail the arrival of these immigrants and the host of attendant social, political, and economic strains their influx imposed on the American system. He also described more of the personalities and groups involved in far right politics in the 1930s and beyond. While violence against any group or individual is abhorrent in a supposedly "pluralistic" society, "The Politics of Unreason" does not adequately explain why these groups arose and why they thought such extreme actions were necessary. An important reason for the lack of historical background in this book may stem from the sources used to construct the study. Statistical sources occupy a primary position although the information is often incomplete or measured on a few variables. For example, the authors concede that a correlation table on Klan membership is probably inaccurate because figures on the group are notoriously unreliable, but they include the table anyway. Additionally, a list of theses and dissertations listed in the preface as being invaluable to the book's construction are either from sociology or political science departments. While the authors do use history books and articles, the emphasis here is definitely on sociology, on social bases and statistical analyses rather than one of historical research. The theory is ultimately a good one, but historians will want to seek out a copy of David Bennett's "The Party of Fear" for a better treatment of the far right in American history.
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