Pregnable Fortress - A Study in Deception, Discord and Desertion [Hardcover]

If David Rew actually takes pains to read Peter Elphick's exceptionally well-researched and lucid account of the events leading up to the fall of Singapore, he will note that the author delves quite far into Singapore's administrative history in the 1920's and 1930's to explain the reason for the inadequacy of Singapore's northern fortifications. In simplistically attributing the error to General Percival and his staff, Mr. Rew overlooks the fact that the failure to adequately fortify "Fortress" Singapore was the fault not only of Sir Shenton Thomas, the colonial Governor since 1935, but of the local War Committee which presided over the immediate outbreak of hostilities in the West and the imminent threat of Japanese invasion in the East. The indecisiveness of the War Committee was further compounded by the infighting between the General Officer Commanding Malaya, General Bond (Percival's predecessor) and the Air Officer Commanding Malaya, General Babbington and the situation was not in the least ameliorated by the presence of Air Vice Marshall Brooke Popham, the GOC Far East or such key players as Sir Archibald Wavell. Indeed, the root of Singapore's false sense of security seems to have been Churchill himself, a well-known fact which Elphick alludes to. All in all, Elphick devotes considerable pages and chapters to explaining the complexity in terms of Colonial office directives, Cabinet policy and local infighting at the pinnacle of the settlement's very leadership itself which contributed to the unpreparedness which was a decisive factor in the disaster.

But to attribute everything to the lack of guns facing Johore is equally simplistic. The agreed strategy had been to defend the Malayan peninsula in the first instance as it contained valuable tin and rubber resources which couldn't simply be handed over to an occupying force. One must therefore also consider other contributory factors such as the Allies' shilly-shallying over the execution of Operation Matador - the plan to oppose any Japanese landings in Thailand by invading the nation first, a move which would have outflanked the Japanese operations on Peninsula Malaya & made life more difficult for them. Another factor is the failure of the Royal Air Force to secure enough servicable aircraft to successfully oppose the arriving Japanese fleet at sea - in spite of the fact that the air strategy had been agreed as taking precedence over contesting the landings primarily by land. The intervention of collaborators and fifth columnists also added to the confusion of the Allies, as the premature evacuation of several Northern airfields bears testimony to.

As to the ill discipline and mutinous behaviour of (some of) the Australian soldiers, this is a well-documented and generally accepted fact which is borne out by both civilian and military eye witness accounts.

Having said this, Elphick credits the Australians, Indian and British soldiers who fought so doggedly to defend mainland Malaya and Singapore despite the incompetence of their senior officers, notwithstanding that that incompetence had resulted in a situation of near zero morale amongst the Allied troops from the very outset. I don't feel Elphick has any "hidden agenda" above & beyond the urge to definitively explain the whole complex comedy of errors which, beginning well in the 1920's, continued into the critical months and weeks before the actual Japanese landings at Kota Bahru. The Pregnable Fortress is a veritable mine of factual information and one of the most gripping stories of military strategy-gone-awry that any reader is likely to come across.

But on seeing the author's own comments made on the 60th anniversary of the fall of Singapore, I question Elphick's efforts as an historian to thoroughly research his material, and even to make the simplest check on the veracity of his secondary sources.

On that basis, I am forced to question his entire posture in the book, with its claims that the Australians deserted in great numbers.

For example, in the book Elphick said that some Australian deserters had allegedly boarded a ship, the "Empire Star". They were led, he wrote, by a Australian officer: Captain Blackwood. However, there's no record of a Captain Blackwood in the Australian 8th Division. When asked about this, Elphick answered: "Er, well, maybe they got the name wrong."

Elphick also named a "Roy Cornford", as an Australian soldier whom Elphick says deserted by his own admission. Cornford denies this. In fact, Cornford not only easily explains his whereabouts and activities, but his record goes on to show that he returned to the frontline only to be later captured in Java, and nearly killed when his prisoner-of-the-Japanese ship was sunk by US submarines.

When asked if it was wrong to call Cornford a deserter, Elphick answers: "No, if I am wrong then so was the author of the book who actually interviewed Roy Cornford. And HE said that Roy Cornford, on his own admission, was a deserter. And I took that verbatim from the book."

Elphick admits he never spoke to Roy Cornford. When pressed again as to why not, particularly given that Elphick was prepared to name Cornford as a deserter, Elphick replied: "Well -it's a moot point. Would it have been worth my while to journey out to Australia to interview one man? I don't think so." Perhaps a simple telephone call could have turned ruinous and wrong "hearsay as history" into valid research.

On the casual responses above alone, I began to question what else Elphick was so lackadaisical about in his tome. In the end, I've concluded that if you want to read a history, a real history, on the Fall of Singapore, perhaps seek out a work by someone prepared to check the facts of what they write under their name, rather than using hearsay. As for me: I have thrown "The Pregnable Fortress" on the rubbish heap for, based on Elphick's own statements, I find it to be garbage.

The contemporary observer would note that had these events occured in this day and age, the British Commander would have eventually faced charges of negligence.

The surprises for the British Command during this dark period were many and varied. Some impossible to anticipate. Others were more obvious. The world had changed. The British mentality in the Far East had not. The most contentious surprises? These three amongst them: 1. Troops from a conquered and oppressed nation (India), with aspirations for self rule, did not make willing cannon fodder for British colonial interests. The reluctance of some Indian troops to die for British interests is not hard to understand and should have been anticipated.

2. The first Australian military action in World War 1 was the famous British led debacle at Gallipoli resulting in a great loss of Australian lives for no gain. In Singapore, the Australian troops anger at finding themselves involved in another World War 1 style debacle cannot be underestimated. The Australian soldiers outright refusal to take orders from English officers was hardly a surprise. Which citizens of a foreign nation would? Strangely, Elphick wrestles with this simple fact.

3. This was the 20th century, not the 19th. No more excuses please.