Books in Canada
The collapse of Paul Martin’s government and with it the hopes of a politician widely believed to be a man of vision and determination is a worthy story in itself. Maclean’s writer Paul Wells has combined that story with an insightful and witty account of how Stephen Harper captured the Conservative leadership and mounted a strategically adept campaign that turned Martin’s woes into a Conservative victory.
It is worth recalling both Martin’s formidable command of the Liberal Party and the parlous state of the fractured Conservatives to understand the magnitude of the historical shift. Stockwell Day’s leadership of the Canadian Alliance caused leading MPs to flee the caucus while traditional Conservatives found confirmation that they, not Preston Manning’s upstarts, held the key to the future. It is tempting to attribute Martin’s problems to the stench of corruption left by Chrétien’s long premiership, but Wells presents a convincing case for laying the blame firmly at the door of Martin and his coterie of advisors. Wells suggests that Martin’s cabal suffered from a severe case of ‘groupthink’, displaying a degree of arrogance other party members found offensive, and a tin ear to evidence of increasing problems. The group’s very cohesiveness was the source of its inability to respond flexibly: “The group was confident of its morality, suspicious of out-groups, collapsed in its time-perspective, and unfettered by regional and ideological diversity. It worked out about as well as could be expected, given the circumstances.”
Harper was able to identify and stick to a clearly articulated set of priorities. Martin, by contrast, seemed incapable of defining an agenda in spite of years of preparation. It was as though having finally reached his goal Martin forgot why he had wanted to arrive.
Harper’s five priorities-GST cuts, child-care pay-outs to parents of children under six, coming down hard on crime, accountability, and cuts to patient waiting times- carried him through the election and provided a script for delivery in the early months of the new government. Wells suggests that Harper is most successful when he has a script to follow; he is very controlling, and no one’s tool. Harper, Wells observes, is both his own strategist and his own cabinet (as the ill-fated inter-governmental affairs minister Michael Chong would find out). In that regard, the picture of Harper that emerges is not entirely favourable. Preston Manning’s Reformers promised to give power back to parliamentarians, and through them to their constituents. Harper’s instinct is to gather power into his own hands, and to punish those who have the temerity to disagree with him. Harper has turned the constitutional practice of cabinet government, on which Canada’s government is based, into a travesty. While Martin may have consulted endlessly and dithered eternally, Harper decides and lets the relevant minister read about it in the papers. Wells doesn’t dwell on the long-term implications of such conduct, but in the absence of a vigorous and effective cabinet it is unclear how good ideas will defeat bad ones or how new ideas will emerge.
Harper’s famously bad relations with the national media also reflect a disturbing attempt to control the agenda; pique at what is seen as unfair media coverage may be indicative of his misunderstanding of the role the media should play in a dynamic democracy. Harper’s enthusiasm for Canada’s participation in the invasion of Iraq is well known. As the spuriousness of the WMD claims emerged, and was followed in Iraq by sectarian violence and conditions resembling civil war, Harper sought to put a different spin on his position, claiming that he simply thought Canada should have wished its traditional allies in the English-speaking world well. Toronto Star journalist Tonda MacCharles confronted him with a press release calling for Canadian troops issued by then foreign affairs spokesman, Stockwell Day. Harper responded with anger, refusing to look at the release. MacCharles was not only doing her job, she was, as Wells points out, entirely correct in spotting the inconsistency.
Harper’s decision to appoint a communications neophyte and former lobbyist, Sandra Buckler, to the position of communications director perhaps reflected a shared contempt for the press. Buckler was, Wells notes, “the first communications director anyone could remember who simply wouldn’t return most routine calls from reporters.” The Martin campaign folks were supposed to be media relations pros, but as the last campaign unravelled their flair gave way to a dour intensity in defending their position. In the next election, Harper will not have a well of good will to draw on.
Wells presents Harper as a supreme strategist, dismissing attempts to portray him as the Strom Thurmond of Canadian conservatism. Harper’s intention of building a winning big tent alliance is the key to his politics. He has no secret yearning to impose a socially conservative agenda. True, Harper wants to contain the size of government, but Wells notes that Flaherty’s first budget forecasts only a small decline in the proportion of Canada’s GDP devoted to federal program spending. Flaherty’s latest fiscal update, released since Wells went to press, indicates that in per capita terms, program spending will continue to increase! This is a long way from the sharp cuts proposed by Manning and other critics of government excesses.
Many books about politics are not just heavy going, but carry an overt agenda, to persuade the reader of this or that cause. Wells not only offers a lively narrative, he enlightens the reader with the perspectives of a close observer with no visible axe to grind. His humour is a delightful bonus. All in all, this is a first-rate read. It brings recent history into focus and is good preparation for viewing the coming clash with the rejigged Dion Liberals. Whatever you may think of Harper, Wells leaves no doubt that as a political strategist you underestimate him at your peril.
Martin Loney (Books in Canada)
It is worth recalling both Martin’s formidable command of the Liberal Party and the parlous state of the fractured Conservatives to understand the magnitude of the historical shift. Stockwell Day’s leadership of the Canadian Alliance caused leading MPs to flee the caucus while traditional Conservatives found confirmation that they, not Preston Manning’s upstarts, held the key to the future. It is tempting to attribute Martin’s problems to the stench of corruption left by Chrétien’s long premiership, but Wells presents a convincing case for laying the blame firmly at the door of Martin and his coterie of advisors. Wells suggests that Martin’s cabal suffered from a severe case of ‘groupthink’, displaying a degree of arrogance other party members found offensive, and a tin ear to evidence of increasing problems. The group’s very cohesiveness was the source of its inability to respond flexibly: “The group was confident of its morality, suspicious of out-groups, collapsed in its time-perspective, and unfettered by regional and ideological diversity. It worked out about as well as could be expected, given the circumstances.”
Harper was able to identify and stick to a clearly articulated set of priorities. Martin, by contrast, seemed incapable of defining an agenda in spite of years of preparation. It was as though having finally reached his goal Martin forgot why he had wanted to arrive.
Harper’s five priorities-GST cuts, child-care pay-outs to parents of children under six, coming down hard on crime, accountability, and cuts to patient waiting times- carried him through the election and provided a script for delivery in the early months of the new government. Wells suggests that Harper is most successful when he has a script to follow; he is very controlling, and no one’s tool. Harper, Wells observes, is both his own strategist and his own cabinet (as the ill-fated inter-governmental affairs minister Michael Chong would find out). In that regard, the picture of Harper that emerges is not entirely favourable. Preston Manning’s Reformers promised to give power back to parliamentarians, and through them to their constituents. Harper’s instinct is to gather power into his own hands, and to punish those who have the temerity to disagree with him. Harper has turned the constitutional practice of cabinet government, on which Canada’s government is based, into a travesty. While Martin may have consulted endlessly and dithered eternally, Harper decides and lets the relevant minister read about it in the papers. Wells doesn’t dwell on the long-term implications of such conduct, but in the absence of a vigorous and effective cabinet it is unclear how good ideas will defeat bad ones or how new ideas will emerge.
Harper’s famously bad relations with the national media also reflect a disturbing attempt to control the agenda; pique at what is seen as unfair media coverage may be indicative of his misunderstanding of the role the media should play in a dynamic democracy. Harper’s enthusiasm for Canada’s participation in the invasion of Iraq is well known. As the spuriousness of the WMD claims emerged, and was followed in Iraq by sectarian violence and conditions resembling civil war, Harper sought to put a different spin on his position, claiming that he simply thought Canada should have wished its traditional allies in the English-speaking world well. Toronto Star journalist Tonda MacCharles confronted him with a press release calling for Canadian troops issued by then foreign affairs spokesman, Stockwell Day. Harper responded with anger, refusing to look at the release. MacCharles was not only doing her job, she was, as Wells points out, entirely correct in spotting the inconsistency.
Harper’s decision to appoint a communications neophyte and former lobbyist, Sandra Buckler, to the position of communications director perhaps reflected a shared contempt for the press. Buckler was, Wells notes, “the first communications director anyone could remember who simply wouldn’t return most routine calls from reporters.” The Martin campaign folks were supposed to be media relations pros, but as the last campaign unravelled their flair gave way to a dour intensity in defending their position. In the next election, Harper will not have a well of good will to draw on.
Wells presents Harper as a supreme strategist, dismissing attempts to portray him as the Strom Thurmond of Canadian conservatism. Harper’s intention of building a winning big tent alliance is the key to his politics. He has no secret yearning to impose a socially conservative agenda. True, Harper wants to contain the size of government, but Wells notes that Flaherty’s first budget forecasts only a small decline in the proportion of Canada’s GDP devoted to federal program spending. Flaherty’s latest fiscal update, released since Wells went to press, indicates that in per capita terms, program spending will continue to increase! This is a long way from the sharp cuts proposed by Manning and other critics of government excesses.
Many books about politics are not just heavy going, but carry an overt agenda, to persuade the reader of this or that cause. Wells not only offers a lively narrative, he enlightens the reader with the perspectives of a close observer with no visible axe to grind. His humour is a delightful bonus. All in all, this is a first-rate read. It brings recent history into focus and is good preparation for viewing the coming clash with the rejigged Dion Liberals. Whatever you may think of Harper, Wells leaves no doubt that as a political strategist you underestimate him at your peril.
Martin Loney (Books in Canada)
Review
“Wells tells both sides of the story in his trademark style — bright, breezy, accessible, irreverent and insightful.”
— Montreal Gazette
“This is a most readable book by one of the country’s most original journalists.”
— Globe and Mail
“A feast for the politically inclined.”
— London Free Press
“Wells is lucid, funny, revealing, opinionated and sometimes wickedly snarky.”
— National Post
From the Trade Paperback edition.
— Montreal Gazette
“This is a most readable book by one of the country’s most original journalists.”
— Globe and Mail
“A feast for the politically inclined.”
— London Free Press
“Wells is lucid, funny, revealing, opinionated and sometimes wickedly snarky.”
— National Post
From the Trade Paperback edition.
Product Description
The Fall of Paul Martin and the Rise of Stephen Harper’s New Conservatism.
Shakespeare isn’t around to write it — so we have Paul Wells!
Think of it. Two men on an opposite yet parallel trajectory. In the space of only three years, one man, a huge success as the Minister of Finance, goes from his new role as the leader of an all-powerful party with a huge majority all the way down to a retired also-ran. The other one reluctantly steps in to salvage a dying party, links it to another dying party, “unites the right,” becomes its leader, goes through trying times, and inside three years rises to become prime minister, against all odds.
It’s an amazing drama, told here in three acts. First, Paul Wells takes us through all of the events (from Martin’s assassination of Chrétien onward) that led up to the election campaign of January 2006.
The second act deals with the campaign itself, where the Harper armies conquered, with the assistance of an RCMP cavalry raid, and less-than-brilliant opposing campaigns: “We’re not allowed to make this stuff up.” Full of new, amazing inside details.
The final part answers the What now? that so many Canadians are asking about Stephen Harper’s "new conservatism." Nobody can answer that question better than Paul Wells. Witty, irreverent, opinionated, personal, and very, very funny, this book launches Wells’s career as an author.
Shakespeare isn’t around to write it — so we have Paul Wells!
Think of it. Two men on an opposite yet parallel trajectory. In the space of only three years, one man, a huge success as the Minister of Finance, goes from his new role as the leader of an all-powerful party with a huge majority all the way down to a retired also-ran. The other one reluctantly steps in to salvage a dying party, links it to another dying party, “unites the right,” becomes its leader, goes through trying times, and inside three years rises to become prime minister, against all odds.
It’s an amazing drama, told here in three acts. First, Paul Wells takes us through all of the events (from Martin’s assassination of Chrétien onward) that led up to the election campaign of January 2006.
The second act deals with the campaign itself, where the Harper armies conquered, with the assistance of an RCMP cavalry raid, and less-than-brilliant opposing campaigns: “We’re not allowed to make this stuff up.” Full of new, amazing inside details.
The final part answers the What now? that so many Canadians are asking about Stephen Harper’s "new conservatism." Nobody can answer that question better than Paul Wells. Witty, irreverent, opinionated, personal, and very, very funny, this book launches Wells’s career as an author.
About the Author
Born in Sarnia, Paul Wells has worked for the Montreal Gazette, and as a columnist for the National Post. He is now Maclean’s chief Ottawa correspondent, and a frequent panelist and speaker.
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
To understand who Stephen Harper is, it helps to know who he isn’t. For starters, he’s not Strom Thurmond. Probably this shouldn’t need saying. But I keep hearing from readers who believe, or claim to believe, that racial segregation, an abortion ban, the institution of a state religion, and an aggressive program of chastity-belt distribution for all Canadian women under thirty are just over the next hill.
Before the January 23 election I became very cross with a reader who emailed me to announce that with Harper in charge it would be only a matter of time before they were teaching creationism in the schools again. And that it would be my fault, because I hadn’t done enough to stop him. Actually, what got me angriest was the hash this reader was making of constitutional law: school curriculum is a matter of provincial jurisdiction. But besides that, the reader’s note demonstrated how deaf some left-of-centre Canadians are to the differences of tone among the various strains of conservatism. Social conservatives know Harper isn’t really one of them. Legislating right moral conduct isn’t his game.
“This is the interesting story of Stephen Harper,” Pierre Poilièvre, the young Ontario Conservative MP who once worked as an assistant to Stockwell Day, told me one day. “Everyone thinks he seduced the centre. It’s actually the way he tamed the right.
“Let’s get this straight. He’s now taken the most left-wing position of any conservative party in the world on gay marriage. He’s adopted the position of European socialists that gays should have civil unions — full marital rights without the word marriage. Harper has ruled out any abortion legislation. He has basically moved the party onto an agenda that is centrist and acceptable to mainstream people.
“And he’s done it almost without a peep from the right — from the people who founded the Reform Party, who had made the bombastic and even embarrassing remarks that had come to typify the Reform era. All of those people have gone along with this swift, centrist move while making almost no sounds at all.”
Why? Why are social conservatives so willing to let Harper pursue a not-particularly-socially-conservative policy? One school of thought, of course, holds that the hard-core right wingers know that Harper is one of them. They’re just biding their time. Once he gets his majority, the masks will fall and the real Harper will become visible. This theory will certainly be a centrepiece of any Liberal leader’s campaign to block Harper from gaining seats at the next election. “Oh sure, you haven’t seen any hidden agenda…yet…”
But for my money this analysis misunderstands Harper too. First, because I don’t believe his political beliefs are wildly out of the Canadian mainstream. But second, because even if they were, he has never been interested in implementing wrenching change if it means doing lasting damage to Canadian conservatism’s electoral chances. The “penchant for incremental change” he valued in Progressive Conservatives so long ago has become an integral part of his own political philosophy.
From the Trade Paperback edition.
Before the January 23 election I became very cross with a reader who emailed me to announce that with Harper in charge it would be only a matter of time before they were teaching creationism in the schools again. And that it would be my fault, because I hadn’t done enough to stop him. Actually, what got me angriest was the hash this reader was making of constitutional law: school curriculum is a matter of provincial jurisdiction. But besides that, the reader’s note demonstrated how deaf some left-of-centre Canadians are to the differences of tone among the various strains of conservatism. Social conservatives know Harper isn’t really one of them. Legislating right moral conduct isn’t his game.
“This is the interesting story of Stephen Harper,” Pierre Poilièvre, the young Ontario Conservative MP who once worked as an assistant to Stockwell Day, told me one day. “Everyone thinks he seduced the centre. It’s actually the way he tamed the right.
“Let’s get this straight. He’s now taken the most left-wing position of any conservative party in the world on gay marriage. He’s adopted the position of European socialists that gays should have civil unions — full marital rights without the word marriage. Harper has ruled out any abortion legislation. He has basically moved the party onto an agenda that is centrist and acceptable to mainstream people.
“And he’s done it almost without a peep from the right — from the people who founded the Reform Party, who had made the bombastic and even embarrassing remarks that had come to typify the Reform era. All of those people have gone along with this swift, centrist move while making almost no sounds at all.”
Why? Why are social conservatives so willing to let Harper pursue a not-particularly-socially-conservative policy? One school of thought, of course, holds that the hard-core right wingers know that Harper is one of them. They’re just biding their time. Once he gets his majority, the masks will fall and the real Harper will become visible. This theory will certainly be a centrepiece of any Liberal leader’s campaign to block Harper from gaining seats at the next election. “Oh sure, you haven’t seen any hidden agenda…yet…”
But for my money this analysis misunderstands Harper too. First, because I don’t believe his political beliefs are wildly out of the Canadian mainstream. But second, because even if they were, he has never been interested in implementing wrenching change if it means doing lasting damage to Canadian conservatism’s electoral chances. The “penchant for incremental change” he valued in Progressive Conservatives so long ago has become an integral part of his own political philosophy.
From the Trade Paperback edition.
