Strategy: Second Revised Edition [Paperback]

Hart has a positive fixation with "the indirect approach" to war. Just what this is, is never made entirely clear, except that it seems to be whatever wins a battle. The phrase seemed meaningful enough when Hart first used it, but the page after tedious page that followed left me more uncertain just what it meant than when I started.

One gets the sense that Hart is determined to prove that "the indirect approach" is the only way a battle can be won, even if this requires massive massaging of the facts. For example, the Normandy campaign, beginning with D-Day, was about as direct and frontal an assault as one can imagine. The breakout was successful mainly because weeks of brutal frontal assaults, at Caen and in the hedgerows, had created room for maneuver, and because the breakout was preceeded by the most massive tactical carpet bombing history had seen to that time. But -- lo and behold! -- this was really an indirect approach, because Operation Fortitude had so badly mislead the Germans. Fortitude certainly played an important role, but only because it was coupled with a very direct and massive application of air power to the Frenchg transportation system. Hart is suspending some mighty heavy weights from some awfully slender threads here.

But the biggest problem is that the book is simply _boring_. If Hart's point is that Clausewitz' principle of attacking the main body of the enemy is outdated, he could have said so in a few pages and spared us the other 300 pages of repetition. Of course, he would have to prove this highly questionable assertion. Maybe those 300 pages are inadvertent proof that the assertion is wrong and therefore unprovable.

Keep your object always in mind, while adapting your plan to circumstances
Recognize that alternatives exist but make sure they all bear on the object. Weigh the feasibility of attaining an objective against its contribution to the attainment of the end in mind.

Choose the line (or course) of least expectation.
Put yourself in your opposition's shoes and try to see what course of action he will see as least probable and thus not try to forestall.

Exploit the line of least resistance -- so long as it can lead you to any objective that would contribute to your underlying object.
Seize on opportunity -- but not any opportunity. Tactically, this refers to following up on success; strategically, it refers to the management and deployment of your reserves.

Take a line of operation which offers alternative objectives.
Choose a single course of action that could have several objectives; do not let your actions reveal your objectives. This puts your opponent on the horns of a dilemma. It introduces uncertainty regarding that which is to be guarded against.

Ensure that both plans and dispositions are flexible -- adaptable to circumstances.
Include contingencies or next steps -- for success as well as failure. Organize and deploy your resources in ways that facilitate adaptation to either.

Do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst your opponent is on guard -- whilst he is well placed to parry or evade it.
Unless your opponent is much inferior, do not attack until he has been disorganized and demoralized. Psychological warfare precedes physical warfare. Similarly, physical warfare can be psychological in nature.

Do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it has once failed.
If at first you don't succeed, give up. Your reinforcements will likely be matched by the enemy. Moreover, successfully repulsing you the first time will morally strengthen him for the second.