Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon [Paperback]

The first thing the reader discovers is that, despite the title, the book is not about Napoleon's tactics or the experiences of soldiers in Napoleon's armies. Rather, it is about the tactics and experiences of British soldiers during the age of Napoleon.
Muir relies almost exclusively on British soldiers' experience, arguing that it is universally applicable. Relying on memoirs, diaries and letters of mostly British soldiers, he defends his premise, stating:

"I doubt that this emphasis [on British] sources greatly affects the result, for at this level of combat national differences mattered comparatively little: Russian, Scot or Portuguese, a line of horsemen galloping straight at you looks much the same, and the steadiness of your unit will depend on its confidence and training, its recent experiences and losses, not on its mother tongue."

While Muir assumed that the British experience was universally applicable, a premise I disagree with, it is doubtful that he would have found the reverse acceptable. Certainly, he would not have found the experience of the French, Russians, Prussians or Austrians as "universally applicable" and therefore indicative of the British experience. We will not know this, however, as Muir did not extend his research beyond British sources, except for a few minor French sources. Thus, the overall flavor of the book is Anglocentric.

Muir defends the Anglo point of view, stating:

"The Anglocentrism of [writers on the Peninsular Wars] approach was not simply the product of national bias ... but rather reflects the fact that for the period of the Napoleonic Wars there is an extraordinarily rich collection of first-hand British accounts of combat, which appears unmatched in any other language."

He cites the frustration other authors have encountered in their attempts to find sources of Napoleonic history comparable to British ones. He acknowledges one author was able to uncover significant new material in the French archives, but even then, he notes:

"[I]t is fair to say that it is seldom as rich and detailed as the British literature."

Muir attempts to extend John Keegan's chapter Waterloo and also attempts to emulate Keegan's style in discussing the glory and horror of the battlefield from the perspective of the combatant. However, Muir's book does not have the historical authenticity of In the Face of Battle. While Keegan's book relied on well-researched, factual evidence, which then were presented to the reader along with the author's analysis and conclusions, Muir heavily relies on soldiers' subjective recollection, recorded long after the events, as the basis of his book. There is no attempt to offer any corroborating evidence supporting this limited, inherently unreliable form of research. Muir's book thus dangerously approaches the realm of "historical fiction."

The book is fairly easy to read, except for Part III, dealing with Command and Control. This section discusses a number of different battles, and constantly shifts between them, making it very confusing. Otherwise, the book is written in fairly plain English.

I would not recommend this book as a study of Napoleonic Wars. As to its value as a book on British tactics and experience, I would still have reservations due to the inherent unreliability of Muir's sources. However it is a book that is a good contrast to Keegan's and serves as a reminder to the student of history to consider the reliability of the author's sources.

Well Done!