The author fails in what is usually called the "principle of charity": he fails to give the view he opposes the strongest defense available, and ends up setting up weak straw men.
The book explores a vast scientific and epistemological territory and touches on a even vaster set of issues (morality, aesthetics, personal identity, ...). While nobody is expected to master the intricacies of all these fields at the same time, it should be the author responsibility to show how his point of view correlates with the ongoing discussions in the relative fields, ideally pointing to "references" to help the reader gain a deeper perspective.
Since the core of the book revolves around a certain epistemological position, roughly corresponding to Popper's Conjectures and Refutations, I would consider mandatory to answer to the objections presented by Kuhn's classic The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
While I could imagine that the author is not familiar with the standard literature in personal identity (e.g. Parfit's Reasons and Persons or Nozick's Philosophical Explanations), even though it would have been interesting to look at the multiverse implications for personal identity, I cannot suppose that he is not familiar with the standard arguments presented by Kuhn. He must have deliberately chosen not to address such arguments, leaving his core structure exposed to fairly common attacks, and removing much value to the edifice he builds on top of such assumptions.
The author paints a very misleading picture of instrumentalism (saying that it implies relativism: "once one has denied this [realism], the logical implication is that all claims about reality are equivalent to myths, none of them being better than the others in any objective sense. That is relativism").
He enunciates a paradoxical "criterion for reality" : "a particular thing is real if and only if it figures in our best explanation of something" (since our best explanations change over time, should we derive that the reality they describe also change over time? That's clearly not the objective world the author wanted to describe).
He falls into the easy trap of saying (pg. 26) that we should drop explanations that are falsified by observations, only for saying later on that we know that both our best physical theories (quantum mechanics and relativity) are false since incompatible with each other, while the difference between some anomaly and a true falsification can be made only after a new theory has been established and accepted (Kuhn says "The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other.", "To reject one paradigm without simultaneously substituting another is to reject science itself.")
He argues (incredibly) that (pg.45) "the Earth's biosphere is incapable of supporting human life", that morality is objective (pg.121) "since the universe is explicable, it must be that morally right values are connected in this way with true factual theories, and morally wrong values with false theories".
He makes the mistake of saying that digital systems are not effected by errors (pg.141), while we know that normal error distributions imply there is always "some" probability that the signals falls outside the quantization threshold. Error probability can be reduced arbitrarily by adding redundancy, but can never be eliminated.
In general he doesn't clearly define his basic terms so we don't know, for example, what he really means for "explanation" and how he can ground his explanations into other terms without falling into circularity, unexplained statements, or infinity (!), as in Agrippa's trilemma.
He fails to comment on the fact that something can be unbounded without being infinite (it can for example tend asymptotically to a fixed value, so there is no max value, but there are values that will never be reached), he just says, pg. 165 "I use those concepts interchangeably, because in this context there is no substantive difference between them".
He says (pg. 221) that we should take very personally that Athens has been defeated by Sparta because "if any of those earlier experiments in optimism had succeeded, our species would be exploring the stars by now, and you and I would be immortal" (no further details given for this estimate ...). Also human will be immortal in a couple of generations (no details given ...)
and so on ...
As Einstein apparently said: "Two things are infinite, the universe and human stupidity, and I am not yet completely sure about the universe.".
The author instead sees human beings at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of knowledge, since they are universal explainers. No knowledge is, in principle, impossible to them, and no "super human" mind can be possibly imagined (isn't that a very "finite" image of knowledge?)
He attacks Jared Diamond Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies while ignoring the clear arguments against historical determinism he explicitly makes in Collapse.
He attacks ecological sustainability saying that we should worry about creating more solution instead of less problems, while failing to give any argument to show that we are able to create more solutions than problems (which is what really matters). He doesn't bother to give detailed factual arguments for this position, but remains in the distant world of a priori truths, untroubled, for example, by the actual data of failing ecosystems.
The whole argument comes down to accepting that
1) all problems are solvable
2) humans are universal explainers
3) human will eventually solve all problems.
There's a lot of handwaiving, but no real argument there.
The picture he paints might be attractive to some, but I found it really shallow, and that is a pity because the author is clearly a very intelligent individual. He should have devoted more time to secure his arguments, instead of using the book to attack the "-isms" he doesn't like ...