The Evolution of Cooperation: Revised Edition and over one million other books are available for Amazon Kindle. Learn more
Buy Used
CDN$ 0.01
+ CDN$ 6.49 shipping
Used: Good | Details
Condition: Used: Good
Comment: Ships from the USA. Please allow 2 to 3 weeks for delivery.  Book shows minor use. Cover and Binding have minimal wear and the pages have only minimal creases. A tradition of quality and service.
Have one to sell?
Flip to back Flip to front
Listen Playing... Paused   You're listening to a sample of the Audible audio edition.
Learn more
See this image

The Evolution Of Cooperation Paperback – Oct 1 1985


See all 8 formats and editions Hide other formats and editions
Amazon Price New from Used from
Kindle Edition
"Please retry"
Paperback, Oct 1 1985
CDN$ 30.00 CDN$ 0.01

There is a newer edition of this item:




Product Details

  • Paperback: 256 pages
  • Publisher: Basic Books; Reprint edition (Oct. 1 1985)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0465021212
  • ISBN-13: 978-0465021215
  • Product Dimensions: 20.4 x 13.5 x 1.7 cm
  • Shipping Weight: 358 g
  • Average Customer Review: 4.9 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (13 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Bestsellers Rank: #943,794 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • See Complete Table of Contents

Product Description

About the Author

Robert Axelrod is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Michigan. A MacArthur Prize Fellow, he is a leading expert on game theory, artificial intelligence, evolutionary biology, mathematical modeling, and complexity theory. He lives in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Inside This Book (Learn More)
Browse and search another edition of this book.
First Sentence
UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority? This question has intrigued people for a long time. Read the first page
Browse Sample Pages
Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover
Search inside this book:

Customer Reviews

4.9 out of 5 stars
5 star
12
4 star
1
3 star
0
2 star
0
1 star
0
See all 13 customer reviews
Share your thoughts with other customers

Most helpful customer reviews

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful By R. Williams on Feb. 12 2004
Format: Paperback
A lot of interesting material is spun up from a simple premise: a two round tournament of programs for playing Prisoner's Dilemma. Game theory is one of the great cross-disciplinary topics. As the web is woven with nodes as distinct as Jean Jacques Rousseau and why the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor (a personal favorite for Socratic historical discussions), somehow it not only all makes sense, but you are left with the impression that the topic and the book combine to achieve the brass ring of writing: repeatedly fetching the proufound while remaining clear and simple. (Ironically, this book makes a good companion to readings on Complexity and Emergence. But that makes some sense since those topics have turned to automata and the realization that complexity is most often a function of simple constituents iterated.)
The read this and pass it on advice from the other reviewer here is good, and apropos, as this is about the infection of cooperative strategies in populations.
Was this review helpful to you? Yes No Sending feedback...
Thank you for your feedback. If this review is inappropriate, please let us know.
Sorry, we failed to record your vote. Please try again.
By wiredweird on Jan. 20 2004
Format: Paperback
This book has information for military theorists, biologists exploring gene regulation, antitrust policy-makers, and Miss Manners. It is a wonderfully clear explanation of how almost any two entities, interacting over time, develop a mutualism more profitable than greed.
The experimental support for these claims comes from a series of contests. Dozens of authors provided computer programs to play in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma - a simple model, but one that describes a surprising number of real-world phenomena. Most importantly, it's a testable model. It almost puts a common aspect of social interaction into a test tube. What came out of that test tube was startling in its clarity and simplicity.
The book is very readable. Axelrod segregates the mathematical and non-mathematical discussions with some care. Math-free readers see the whole set of experiments and conclusions, clearly explained, and need to skip only a few paragraphs during the main discussion. The last few chapters reward math-positive readers with additional precision and rigor. Even then, the math is accessible to someone with good high-school algebra skills.
Axelrod's discussion truly timeless, except for references to the Cold War as current events. I can accept that. Even though that un-war is mostly over, it's a critical part of modern history and it still informs current policy. Any insight into that madness helps, and Axelrod is very helpful.
This book stands above any one category. It's one of very few that I recommend to the bookshelves of every educated person.
Was this review helpful to you? Yes No Sending feedback...
Thank you for your feedback. If this review is inappropriate, please let us know.
Sorry, we failed to record your vote. Please try again.
Format: Paperback
If you read this book as long ago as I did, you probably
first heard about it from Douglas Hofstadter's "Metamagical Themas" column in _Scientific American_, or the book in which his columns were collected. (If you're just now being introduced to this book, check out Hofstadter's too; his discussion of it is very helpful and insightful.)
What Robert Axelrod describes in this book is a novel round-robin tournament (actually two such tournaments) in which various game-theoretic strategies were pitted against one another in the game known as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Each strategy was scored, not according to how many times it "beat" its "opponent," but according to how many points it accumulated for itself. The surprising result: a strategy dubbed TIT FOR TAT, submitted by Anatol Rapaport, cleaned everybody's clocks in both tournaments.
Why was this surprising? First, because TIT FOR TAT was such a simple strategy. It didn't try to figure out what its "opponent" was going to do, or even keep much track of what its "opponent" had _already_ done. All it did was cooperate on the first move, and thereafter do whatever its "opponent" had done on the previous move. And second, because this strategy can _never_ do better than its "opponent" in any single game; the best result it could achieve, in terms of comparison with the other player, is a tie.
So it was odd that such a simple strategy, one that went up against all sorts of sophisticated strategies that spent a lot of time trying to dope out what their "opponents" were up to, should do so much better than all the "clever" strategies.
Read more ›
Was this review helpful to you? Yes No Sending feedback...
Thank you for your feedback. If this review is inappropriate, please let us know.
Sorry, we failed to record your vote. Please try again.
Format: Paperback
If you're an intellectual and want to read a book that will change your perception of many facets of the world forever, this is the book for you. It's not a long read, but you will spend a lot of time thinking about all its implications as you read it. I found it applicable to everything from inviting people to parties, to business and personal relationships, to species competition, to wondering whether a theoretical race of super-powerful extraterrestrials would enslave us, to... Well, you just have to check it out!
I'm reading the sequel ("The Complexity of Cooperation") right now, which is also amazing. In it he quotes a letter written to him about EoC by a woman who claims that the principle developed in it helped her with her divorce proceedings! How can you miss a book with such broad applications.
Was this review helpful to you? Yes No Sending feedback...
Thank you for your feedback. If this review is inappropriate, please let us know.
Sorry, we failed to record your vote. Please try again.

Most recent customer reviews



Feedback