The First World War - Volume 1: To Arms [Paperback]

He brings out, in depth, aspects of the war that are often forgotten; from the African campaigns to the critical issues around financing and supplying the war. He has drawn on sources from many countries that allow him to give one of the most balanced accounts of this or other conflicts.

However, sometimes in his desire to deliver or show off his incredibly detailed knowledge, there is a tendency to lose track of the forest because of all the trees. Particularly in the financial and industrial mobilization chapters, the sheer weight of information can numb the brain (at least this brain) and important general points can be missed.

A lot of this is made worse by the way data is presented. Other reviewers have commented on the poor quality of the maps. They are of limited value but at least there are some. In the 125 page chapter on "Financing the War" and the over 50 page chapter on "Industrial Mobilization" there is not a single chart or graph, although much of the information would have been appropriately and more clearly presented in graphic form.

Having said that, this is truly a great piece of work. Perhaps in later volumes Strachan can get some more editorial/graphical support to ensure the book the 5 stars it really deserves.

The book is quite long over 1,000 pages but it is a thorough treatment of the subject. Not only does it cover the diplomatic lead up to the war and the initial campaigns, but it also covers the naval war, financing the war and the problems faced by both sides in producing weapons and munitions.

The book is without doubt the best volume so far written on what is now a rather remote conflict. The reason for this is the partisan nature of previous histories. The First World War saw a number of technical developments including the invention of barbed wire, smokeless powder, the magazine rifle, the machine gun and recoil mechanisms for artillery which enabled battlefields to be engulfed in rapid accurate high explosive and shrapnel fire. These developments favoured the defence. In the confined area of the Western Front battles turned into a form of siege warfare that led to immense numbers of casualties for attacking forces. (The Eastern Front because of the much greater distances operated differently)

Following the war many British Writers such as Hart and Fuller wrote a number of books which shaped our understanding of the war. These histories were in general terms rather simplified schematic and sought to portray the military leaders of mainly the allied powers as dull blockheads who butchered thousands of men with little regard for the cost. It picked out a small number of leaders such as Monash as examples of the doctrines which these authors thought the key to future warfare. This view of things is the basis on which military history of the conflict has relied until recently.

Strachan has only written about a small amount of the actual conflict, but what he has said so far paints a different picture from the normal orthodoxy. To illustrate:

In deciding to go to war Germany faced considerable problems. Although the German High Command believed that their troops were of higher quality than those of the allied powers, it was clear that they were outnumbered because of the potential number of troops that could be mobilised by Russian. The Germans were also aware of the potentiality of new weapons and the changes which favoured the defence. Their planning for war depended on invading Belgium thus avoiding a frontal contact with the French and using the room gained by invading a neutral country to surround and role back the French Army. The initial proposal of this strategy was made in 1906 by Alfred von Schlieffen a member of the German general staff. Histories of the conflict have tended to focus on the Schlieffen plan? as if it was a set in concrete operational plan which was set in concrete. Historians have tended to focus on the German operations in 1914 and suggested the reasons for defeat were because of minor alterations to this ?plan?.

The reality is that in reality there was no such ?plan?. Rather the invasion of Belgium was seen by successive General Staffs as a rational solution of how to overcome the problem of numerical inferiority. Various plans would be brought out depending on the strategic situation as it evolved from 1906 to 1914.

Strachan also attempts to rehabilitate the reputation of Joffre, the French Supreme Commander. Hart and Fuller portrayed him as a fool who rather than examining the reality of war, was obsessed with the notion of the offensive and the importance of the bayonet charge. The French Plan for an offensive into Alscace and Lorraine was portrayed as suicidal nonsense which could only lead to immense casualties because of the invention of the machine gun and magazine rifle. Strachan shows that Joffre?s offensive plans were in fact flexible and rational. In addition it was Joffre who responded to the German attack through Belgium by the manoeuvres which were to become the battle of the Marne and ended in German defeat and the relieving of the German commander Moltke.

This is indeed a fine book. One criticism of it is the maps. The author instead of providing maps with military units displayed with arrows to show their movement, simply has terrain maps and one has to concentrate on the text to work out what has happened. This is slightly annoying but a minor irritation in what is otherwise a fine book.

The discussions also about Naval Strategy, the Shell ?crisis?, the entry of Turkey into the war and the African campaigns are all first class. This is the best book written to date on the war.