The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward -- A New Approach [Hardcover]

With an economy of words, the book begins: "There is no guarantee for success in Iraq. The situation in Baghdad and several provinces is dire.... There is great suffering and the daily lives of Iraqis show little or no improvement." It then details the problems with security, politics, economics, and international support that transcend a purely military solution to Iraq.

The problems of security begin with the factions of Shiite leaders who do not want to surrender their new-found power and disarm their militias. The Sunni Arabs, long the rulers of Iraq are not ready to abandon their insurgency, al-Qaeda must be progressively pursued and destroyed, and the Kurds are not willing to give up their autonomy.

The politics is equally bleak. The Iraqi government is unable to provide essential services. There is no security for key infrastructure. Corruption is rampant and capacity is inadequate. Their elected representatives "treat ministries as political spoils." The judiciary is also weak and intimidation against them has been ruthless.

With inflation at more than fifty percent and unemployment running from 20-60 percent, Iraq is not ripe for international investment. Oil production has fallen because of a lack of security, investment, and technical expertise. With corruption and negligible security accounting for as much as 500,000 barrels of oil a day being stolen, international support and investment are not likely to occur in the near future.

The Study Group adds seventy-nine recommendations for change in Iraq. First and foremost, it would be wrong for US forces to leave, which has consequences if we do stay, and consequences if we don't. It's the classic lose-lose situation. Unfortunately, the study does not go into any depth how these recommendations are to be accomplished.

Initially, I was skeptical of a board that was co-chaired by James A. Baker III, the virtual Bush family lawyer who argued before the Supreme Court that the all the votes had been recounted when they hadn't been. Seeing the name of Edwin Meese didn't allay my suspicions that this study group might end up throwing soft balls George Bush's way, or would not hold him accountable. On the contrary, they have made it clear that this administration made many mistakes and severely underestimated the situation after it declared that "major combat operations in Iraq have ended."

The study group makes it abundantly clear that Iraq is a complex problem that goes far beyond simple-minded phrases of "stay the course," or "we will not leave until victory is achieved."

For anyone wishing to get a thorough and concise description of the complex problems we face in Iraq, this is an excellent compendium.

It's not surprising that George W. Bush rejected the report.

ECP
01.04.08: 1,710 days since major combat operations in Iraq have ended.

P.S. Also recommended:

"The Battle for Peace" by General Anthony Zinni
"Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq" by Thomas E. Ricks

This is a review of The Iraq Study Group Report by James A. Baker, Lee H. Hamilton, et al.

If you have any interest in having an informed opinion about the war in Iraq -- regardless of your political orientation or current level of knowledge -- I highly recommend this book. This book is still worth reading despite the fact that the President has chosen not to implement its primary recommendations.

First, this book is an easy read. It's 142 pages long, but the real content of the report is the "Executive Summary" on pp. xiii-xviii (read this if you read nothing else and you'll get the gist) and the main body of the report on pp. 1-96. The rest of the book is a series of Appendices, which include some helpful maps, but also some less crucial information like biographies of the Study Group members.

Second, whatever your political orientation, this book gives you a quick, readable overview of what problems face us (and the Iraqis).

Third, the President's proposal to inject signifiantly more combat troops was considered and rejected by the Study Group. Even if you disagree, it is worth knowing why they considered this a losing strategy.

The Report gives a series of recommendations aimed at achieving a stable, democratic Iraq that no longer needs the support of the US military. After reading the Report, I am personally not optimistic that this can actually be achieved. (Most of the criticisms of the report focus on the likelihood that its recommendations would succeed.) However, I suspect that the Study Group felt it was not politically viable to simply declare that Iraq cannot be saved. Consequently, they had to suggest some actionable policy besides immediate withdrawal. But the Report makes clear that the US must gradually withdraw from Iraq, and what continued US support there is must be contigent on the Iraqis taking substantive steps toward resolving their own problems. If the President had followed these recommendations, we would have been out of Iraq within a couple of years at most -- one way or the other.

Again, one may not agree, but the Report gives many interesting and pertinent facts. Shia, Sunni and Kurds do not trust one another, and divide the military and police forces along sectarian lines. Because of the lack of reliable central political authority, "Sunni insurgents will not lay down arms unless the Shia militias are disarmed. Shia militias will not disarm until the Sunni insurgency is destroyed" (20). Furthermore, 61% of Iraqis APPROVE of attacks on US forces (35).

The Study Group argues that increasing the US military presence (as suggested by the President) will not help the current situation because of three facts. (1) More troops would strengthen the impression that the US plans a long-term "occupation" of Iraq. (This impression will, in turn, increase anti-US sentiment and violence.) (2) Maintaining forces in Iraq will decrease US readiness to deal with problems in other parts of the world, including Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea. (I would add myself that a crisis could erupt between Taiwan and China within the next few years.) (3) As long as the US is propping up the Iraq government, it has no incentive to undertake the fundamental reforms that are necessary to achieve peace and stability.

To put it really simply, if we put a US soldier beside every man, woman and child in Iraq, it would (probably) stop the violence for as long as we could maintain it. However, the second we turn away, the violence will start up again, unless and until the Iraqis decide that they want to end the violence themselves. We cannot make them do that, and they have no incentive to do it as long as we are propping their government up.

Even if you are sure the President is right, this book is a must-read for anyone who wants to be well informed.

The book arrived in excellent condition and in short order. It was fascinating to see the degree to which the media distorted the study group report by selection. eg. Did you ever hear that the committee recommended a surge of 20,000 troops as part of its report? Neither did I, but its right there in the executive summary and in the internal options section of the report. And there are 77 other recommendations, not just the three or four that the media keeps talking about.

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