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Product Details
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This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.
The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.
The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.
This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.
All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.
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Most helpful customer reviews
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars
The Power of the Individual in the Group!,
By Ian Gordon Malcomson (Victoria, BC) - See all my reviews (HALL OF FAME) (TOP 10 REVIEWER) (REAL NAME)
This review is from: The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Second printing with new preface and appendix (Paperback)
According to Mancur Olson, one of the world's leading experts on the dynamics of collective action, social and economic groups generally form to promote collective goals in respect to personal interests. Ideally-sized groups work well only because its overall interests can be shown to mesh with those of the individual. On the other hand, large groups tend to function less cohesively because the individual does not have the same opportunity to realize personal gain or recoognition as in a small group. Small groups tend to be more able to involve the interests of the individual in defining the good of the whole, but, at the same time, less able because of financial restrictions to offer financial security to its members. As you can see, Olson has presented a number of trade-offs for his reader to consider when settling the issue of what degree of collective action best suits our economic needs. By the way, being a lone-wolf is not an option because according to Olson's theory, there is no social or economic benefit to be derived from standing alone. Somewhere, somehow we, as members of the human race, must attach ourselves to a group; it all comes down to how comfortable one is in relation to the size of the organization and personal benefit to be derived from it. When reading this book, I thought of Hillary Clinton's present position within the Democratic Party. Using some of Mancur Olson's observations, it might be said that egotistically, Hillary and Bill has grown too big for the party to handle. Though she wields consider influence within its ranks, many Democrats are starting to resent her influence as being inordinate. A collective action by a dominant subgroup called the Obama camp is clamoring for her to leave the field and surrender the nomination to their champion. According to Olson, such a dynamic of inner group dissatisfaction and turmoil often happens when its numbers become too large and its membership too active. As proof of that, which of the two main parties has been actively signing up new members to the fold? Of course the Democrats, and very new member enlisted becomes a potential delegate for either candidate. I would go one step further and suggest that collective action works as long as people work together in harmony or step aside and let a certain subgroup take over in the interests of the whole. If neither of these scenarios work, the group effort becomes fractured, which is where I think the Democrats might be heading before too long if they can't, at least, agree to disagree. For the Republicans, the story is slightly different. There is no evidence of unhappiness in the ranks but there is, in its place, a palpable lack of enthusiasm and optimism. I highly recommend this little book for what it says about the irrefutable logic of how groups of any size work in relation to the needs of the individual.
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars
Logically indeed,
By
This review is from: The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Second printing with new preface and appendix (Paperback)
In this influential work, Mancur Olson is dismissing the 'classical' group theories, as he calls them. Rational individuals will rarely contribute to a common (or collective in the economics-lingo) good, because their contribution will be insignificant and the good will be produced whether the individual provides the good or not. With his stringent logic, the late Olson reminds his readers that groups of all kinds consist of individuals, and that these individuals usually follow there own interest, which not necessarily correspond with the organization's. The book's explanatory powers are tremendous. Why large groups very rarely if ever are able to organize, and at the same time why some small groups exercise extraordinary amounts of power is Olsons main point of interest. In the very interesting last chapter he describes which features an organization, be it a farmer union, a labor union, a profession lobby or a special interest group, must inhibit to attain members. The best trait of the book (at least for this reviewing economist) is the persuasive logic with which the arguments are hammered home, and the instructive examples that are used to illustrate the point just made. One little objection should be Olson's (human) tendency to arrogance when he is most pleased with his own conclusions. However: still an excellent read, 40 years after it's first printing.
5.0 out of 5 stars
Succinct and Devastating,
By
This review is from: The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Second printing with new preface and appendix (Paperback)
A very short book that lays out, well, the logic of collective action very effectively. The counterintuitive fact that the smaller lobby groups tend to dominate the wider public is mechanically explained, and once you turn your mind to it, a lot of what goes on in politics becomes much clearer measured against Olson's theory.
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