“More than a story of pipeline markets and regulation, this book also offers a rich study of how asset specificity, non-deployable capital, and high up-front capital costs affect market development, regulation, pricing, and entry. Makholm takes what would otherwise be a pretty unexceptional industry—pipeline transport—and makes it of interest to a broader audience, especially those concerned with the new institutional economics.”
(Gary D. Libecap, University of California, Santa Barbara)
“This book comes at the right moment. It blends insights into the technology, economics, and institutional development of an industry that has long been ignored in the US and elsewhere. With the ongoing transformation of the energy sector, The Political Economy of Pipelines is a must-read for anyone interested in the natural gas and other pipeline industries as well as those interested in the evolution of economic and institutional thought. —Christian von Hirschhausen, Berlin University of Technology
(Christian von Hirschhausen, Berlin University of Technology)
“Both invaluable and disheartening, The Political Economy of Pipelines helps readers to understand why the European gas market does not work—not because reforms have not gone far enough, but because they are fundamentally flawed. In place of the current patchwork of nationally regulated pipeline monopolies, Europe must put in place institutions allowing the emergence and evolution of a competitive market for gas transportation capacity rights that ignores national borders. As Jeff D. Makholm’s institutional economic analysis confirms, such a shift is almost as unlikely as it is needed.”—Pierre Noël, University of Cambridge
(Pierre No�l, University of Cambridge)
How did different regulatory frameworks arise for gas pipelines that have largely similar infrastructures? And why are US gas pipelines the only successful example of a competitive infrastructure market based on Coasian bargaining? Since neoclassical theory is not able to provide adequate answers to these questions or optimal regulatory solutions, Jeff D. Makholm employs the New Institutional Economics, utilizing the work of Oliver E. Williamson to offer a convincing discussion of how regulatory frameworks have developed and possible implications for future regulatory design.
(Hendrik Finger Journal of Regulatory Economics
About the Author
Jeff D. Makholm is an economist with National Economic Research Associates, an international firm providing economic analysis to corporations, governments, regulatory agencies, and special interest groups. He is the author of The Distribution and Pricing of Sichuan Natural Gas.