The Problem Of Pain [Paperback]

The first three elements are: (1) experience of numinous awe, (2) consciousness of a moral law which we both approve and yet disobey, and (3) identification of the "Numinous Power of which we feel awe" as also being "the guardian of the morality to which [we] feel ablation." Lewis perhaps rightly contends that these experieces are neither "the result of an inference from the visible universe" nor a logical deduction "from the environment and [our] physical experiences." He then contends that our religious experience must be either "a mere twist in the human mind, corresponding to nothing objective and serving no bioligical function...or else it is a direct experience of the really supernatural." Religious experience and thought may indeed be a "twist in the human mind" that nevertheless has a useful function without necessarily being an actual experience of the supernatural. Anyone interested in finding out more about how religious thought may have developed without invoking the supernatural may consult Pascal Boyer's excellent book, Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought (New York: Basic Books, 2001).

The fourth religious element Lewis discusses is the Incarnation as follows:

"Either he [Jesus Christ] was a raving lunatic of an unusually abominable type, or else he was, and is, precisely what He said. There is no middle way. If the records make the first hypothesis unacceptable, you must submit to the second."

Far from being cogent, this argument would make an excellent example of an either/or fallacy for textbooks on logic. It is also called the fallacy of "incomplete enumeration." Christ could have been mistaken about himself without necessarily having to be designated an "abominable lunatic," and he could be misrepresented in the Gospels. These rational alternatives show that the dilemma presented by Lewis for the unbeliever is false. Having introduced how Christianity causes the problem of pain, Lewis then proceeds to deal with it via the free-will defense.

In his chapter on "Divine Omnipotence," Lewis states the following:

"We can...conceive of a world in which God corrected the results of this abuse of free will...at every moment...But such a world would be one in which wrong actions were impossible, and in which, therefore, freedom of the will would be void."

However, the contention that free will necessarily includes the option to commit wrong actions is erroneous. Am I less morally free if I am only able to care lovingly for my little dog and incapable of choosing to abuse him? Is my moral freedom diminished in the least by my incapacity to terrorize mentally and abuse physically the woman I love? Are persons capable of choosing to do evil as morally free as those capable of only choosing good? Free will is always limited by the capacities and opportunities of any moral agent. Hence, there is no logical contradiction in conceiving of a limited moral freedom to choose only from among various good actions.

Furthermore, free will limited to choosing only good options need not diminish the total amount of free will. God creating greater capacities and opportunities for choosing good could replace the loss of the capacity to do evil. Consequently, since even Christian apologists acknowledge that free will is never absolutely free and since the option to do evil is unnecessary to possess limited free will, the free-will apologetic attempting to rationally explain evil in a world created by an omnipotent, loving God is fallacious. Another of the problems for Christian theology concerns a doctrine Lewis discusses in his chapter, "The Fall of Man."

Lewis says that, in the developed doctrine of the Fall, "Man, as God made him, was completely good and completely happy, but...he disobeyed God and became what we now see." This doctrine creates another problem, which Lewis states as follows:

"For the difficulty about the first sin is that it must be very heinous, or its consequences would not be so terrible, and yet it must be something which a being free from the temptations of fallen man could conceivably have committed."

The sin that Lewis suggests as being possible to someone completely good is "turning from God to self" or "self-idolatry." However, the notion that enyone completely good would commit "self-idolatry" or any other sin is self-contradictory. If turning to God and not to self is essential to being good, then a morally perfect agent ipso facto could never turn from God.

Near the close of his chapter, "The Fall of Man," Lewis suggests that "it would be futile to attempt to solve the problem of pain by producing another problem." However, this is just what Christian apologetics does with the problem of pain and evil. It introduces "solutions" that both fail as solutions and actually produce more problems--even when authored by C. S. Lewis.

A word of warning, for probably any devout Christian, the thesis of this book,(If God is good and all-powerful, why does he allow his creatures to suffer pain?) will sound compelling and certainly invoke a desire to read this book. Just be forewarned, it's a complicated issue, and Mr. Lewis has a complicated solution. While this book is probably accessible for anybody, Be aware that this isn't light reading, it , as it says on the quote on the front, "demands the entire energy of the mind".

Over 159 pages, C.S Lewis builds a convincing case for why pain exists. His main(but certainly not his entire) argument for this is that our own ideas and presuppositions about "love" are not God's same ideas. Not that ours and God's are totally different, as black-and-white, but that ours is "like that of a three year old trying to draw his first wheel" in comparison to God's "perfect circle". Also key in Lewis's case are his ideas about free will and how that relates to suffering.

There are also chapters about Heaven and Hell. The chapter on Hell might have been the best chapter in the book and may even solitarily warrant a purchase. It was certainly the most convincing work I've ever read by a Christian apologist attempting to justify the existence of hell. In fact, after reading it you may find that the existence of hell is more just than if it did NOT exist. Very well done.

The one thing that disturbed me about this book was the preface, in which Lewis states that because he wasn't allowed to write the book anonymously, he couldn't make statements of "apparent fortitude that would become ridiculous had people known who wrote them". I kind of feel cheated...does Lewis dummy down his real beliefs on the subject for this book? It is saddening to think so.

Other than that, I found this book excellent.