The Science of Good and Evil: Why People Cheat, Gossip, Care, Share, and Follow the Golden Rule [Paperback]

For his part, Shermer does a decent job (so long as we see his as that of a philosopher, not a scientist; Shermer, I think, would protest this). He presents a case for a naturalistic ethic and goes into a fair amount of detail.

Here's the problem: not only has everything here been proposed before by those more apt than Shermer (Mary Midgley, JL Mackie, Steven Pinker, William James) but the things he says here are quite common, and really in need of little defence.

Shermer's point is that moral 'rules' are naturally endowed by evolution (or so it seems) and are provisoinal - they hold for most people, in most situations; they are more like guilelines for action. Okay, I believe it (just as I believed it when the said authors wrote it). But he really doesn't follow this up with what exactly that means. What are 'most people' and what are 'most situations'? Most troublingly, does merely saying 'evolution did it' and showing that homo erectus shared food (thus enforcing altruism by pasing along their genes) really mean that the theory is 'scientific' (even though it is non-emprical albeit good conjecture?)

I am giving the book a three-star rating, though. Truth be told, I enjoyed it and think its judgments (although better defended, say, by Mackie) are sound (and easier to read than Mackie). Particularly if you are into biology and haven't really done much thinking in philosophy, this book is great! Shermer is an entertaining, and widely learned writer (even though I disagree with some details about, say, group selections power to explain).

If a more detailed, less lay-like book is what you are looking for, I'd suggest: Mackie's "Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong", Midgley's "Beast and Man", and even Paul Ehrlich's "Human Natures".

If you've read and liked this book, read Ridley's "Origins of Virtue" and Flanagan's "Problem of the Soul".

1. Why we have certain moral attitudes (e.g. altruism) towards members of our own social group.

2. Why we have moral obligations to members outside of our social group.

3. Why #2 above (or for that matter why we're even obligated to care about in-group members) follows from our biological origins and evolution.

Shermer does a relatively decent job in explaining #1 above(though Robert Wright's "The Moral Animal" is FAR superior). He utterly fails in #2 and #3 above however.

Aside from the fact that evolutionary biology gives no reason why people would should care for the well being of out-groups that are competing for resources (especially if our group can kick their group's ass), Shermer runs head first into two seemingly insurmountable problems: The Fact/Value gap (and it's cousin the naturalistic fallacy), and the difference between prescriptive and descriptive ethics.

Shermer attempts to address the claim that without God, moral claims would just be subjective expressions of personal attitude and hence anything would be permissible, since one person's preferences and attitudes are no more objectively valuable than anyone else's.

Shermer argues that morality is grounded in the evolutionary biology of humans, and evolution has generated attitudinal proclivities in humans that have helped our survival as a species (or the survival of our genes, to put it another way). Since such morality is universally based in human biology, then the very nature of humanity would be the objective basis of morality that would still exist even if the idea of God was disposed of.

However, Shermer fails to distinguish betweem "prescriptive" amd "descriptive" ethics. Descriptive ethics merely gives an objective account of moral attitudes and behavior. To say "Jones thinks doing X is immoral" would be an exaple of descriptive ethics, since it just describes a fact about what Jones thinks, rather than saying anything about whether Jones has any actual moral obligation to do X. Prescriptive ethics attempts to prescribe what people ought to do. So a statement like "Jones shouldn't do X, because that would be immoral" would be an example of prescriptive ethics.

Arguing that moral attitudes are a part of human biology is an example of descriptive ethics. It objectively describes something about morality, without talking about what we actually ought to do (i.e. prescriptive thics) in any situation. In other words, so what if the history of evolution has instilled in the vast majority of humans certain moral attitudes? That doesn't say athing about whether I should obey such attitudes or not (assuming one has them). In fact, if we conclude that such attitudes aren't a result of some objective truth regarding right and wrong, but simply the result of countless generations of my genes trying to maintaing their survival, then what good reason is that to respect such attitudes when doing so isn't in one's best interests (e.g. as in when one can steal a large amount of money and get away with it)?

In short, Shermer engages in the naturalitic fallacy: It's natural, therefore it's good. This fallacy is doubly problematic for Shermer since he gives biological reasons for some of our immoral behavior as well. So if both immoral and moral attidues are hardwired in us as humans, why should we follow one instinct when it conflicts with another instinct? Shermer gives no good reason. And in fact, the "fact/value gap" says that descriptions of nonmoral facts acn never result in demonstrating (by itself) what we ought to do or not do.

Then, Shermer makes a giant leap by asserting certain moral values respecting the happiness and liberty of people which he thinks are important, but in no way follow from his evolutionary analysis, nor follow from any other reason he gives. The most he does is "test" the values he proposes by seeing how they work with respect to certain moral issues (abortion, animal rights, etc.). Shermer describes himself as a pretty radical libertarian. What a surprise then that the values he personally espouses (but gives no reason why anyone whould adopt them) produce political results acceptable to a libertarian! Amazing discovery: A libertarian's values entail libertarian conclusions.

In short, Shermer gives no good reason why people should not screw over and exploit others when douing so is in their (or their group's) best interests to do so.

That's not saying there is no reason not to, period. It just says that Shermer's attempt to provide some "sceintific" basis for morality fails.