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"Why is this such a vital study? Its significance rests in its analysis of one of the central notions on which both our political life and our political theories rests: 'public opinion.' Presidential candidates worry about it, the press talks about it, political scientists try to measure it, but Habermas is one of the few people to have actually sat down and tried to think about it to ask what it means to have an 'opinion that is not private, not idiosyncratic, but rather 'public.'" James Schmidt , Boston University
"The most significant modern work on its subject.... Habermas offers perhaps the richest, best developed conceptualization available of the social nature and foundations of public life. As scholars set out to make sense of the growing wealth of empirical research on the topics related to this theme, this book will form an indispensable point of theoretical departure.... We should be grateful that it has finally appeared in English." Craig J. Calhoun , Contemporary Sociology
This is Jurgen Habermas's most concrete historical-sociological book and one of the key contributions to political thought in the postwar period. It will be a revelation to those who have known Habermas only through his theoretical writing to find his later interests in problems of legitimation and communication foreshadowed in this lucid study of the origins, nature, and evolution of public opinion in democratic societies.
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Most helpful customer reviews
5 of 6 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,
By
This review is from: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Paperback)
When you talk about the public sphere in front of intellectuals, Jürgen Habermas's name is bound to come up. Habermas's 1962 study, "The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere," examines the creation, brief flourishing, and demise of a public sphere based in rational-critical debate and discussion. The feasibility of a true public sphere, which is inclusive of anyone who would participate, is for Habermas of utmost importance. Habermas follows a methodology similar to the one Michel Foucault takes in "Discipline and Punish," which analyzes the abolition of public displays of power, and the process by which the structures of power are inculcated in the individual from the 17th through the 20th centuries. Habermas analyzes historical, economic, and political conditions from classical antiquity through his own historical moment, tracing the circumstances in which the public sphere arises, how it functions, and ceases to function over time. Habermas begins with a delineation of the terms 'public' and 'private,' orienting them philologically from their roots and meanings in classical antiquity. From here, he traces the adoption of the words and their synonyms into the European Middle Ages and the era of feudalism. Habermas says that in this period, the feudal lord and the monarch, for whom 'representative publicness' functioned as a display of power before their subjects, dominated the public. Authority figures embodied virtues and powers in a public fashion. Public representation of political and economic power continued, unabated until the Reformation, at which time, the privatization of religious faith signaled a separation between society and the state. Economically, in the 16th and 17th centuries, the spread of trade necessitated the spread of news from various locales. As news outside of the home became relevant to home economy, the private individual begins to take an interest in public events. Consolidation of 'national' financial administration and state-controlled taxation, along with the rise of print culture, facilitated the dissemination of news, initially in the form of governmental decrees, market conditions, and happenings at court. Through this, the actions of the authorities came under the scrutiny of a reading public. The 18th century is the key moment for Habermas. In this period, the government, along with private individuals, made use of the press, for the first time, in persuasive appeal to a public made up of private people. The press now presented the public with information, with which they were to use reason and discussion to determine what was in the public's interest. Habermas emphasizes the theoretical parity that this brings about - the rise of the coffee houses and salons, in which merchants met with gentility and engaged in rational-critical debate over issues of public import. Stretching this into the realm of the franchise, Habermas is careful to point out the problematics of a situation in which actual decision-making was restricted to those with money and land, but stresses that the opportunity for anyone to acquire these prerequisites was, again, theoretically, open to all. For a brief time during the 18th century, Habermas sees the flourishing of a public sphere, born out of a reading public, that began to interact with the processes of public policy, legally, and morally. The purpose of this public sphere, according to Habermas, is to eliminate the domination of authoritative power, and establishing a government that is actually representative of the public will and contingent upon public opinion. Unfortunately, in the 19th century, with the stratification of party politics, the proliferating press encouraged less rational-critical discussion. Increasingly, debate moved into parliamentary circles, and the public was asked only to approve of party measures, not participate in the formation of the rules that governed them. In the 20th century, along with the creation of the welfare-state, consolidation of moneyed interests, and the expansion of universal suffrage (ironically), the public sphere disintegrated even further. New media - radio, television, etc. - turned its addresses to the public into mere advertising. Even the illusion of a private people engaged, as a public, in matters of their own governance, was gone, and the public became vessels for mass media. To recuperate a true participatory public sphere, Habermas takes a guarded approach. He indicates that some kind of elite could be formed. These private individuals would undertake the responsibility of rational-critical debate, determining the public interest. The general public, then, would give their approval or disapproval to the measures decided on by this elite. This is kind of a bleak outlook, and one I don't much care for myself. Of course, this is a horribly limited review of Habermas's "Structural Transformation". I haven't even noted the break he takes to outline the historical-philosophical evaluation and critique of the public sphere by Kant, Hegel, Marx, Mill, and Tocqueville. Nor did I note the extensive use Habermas makes of political and economic changes in his key nations - England, France, and Germany - and the contributions these make to the disintegration of the public sphere. At any rate, "Structural Transformation" is an exhaustive (and exhausting) study, as relevant now to the study of literature, economics, government, history, etc., especially of the last three centuries, as it ever was. Even though it is a pain to read, you'll be glad you finally read it. Think of it as theoretical medicine - it may not taste good, but in the long run, it's good for you.
5.0 out of 5 stars
Public Philosophy,
By
This review is from: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Paperback)
What is the value of public opinion, a public mandate, or what passes for public participation in public government? What good is this? Not to be hasty with so curious a question, consider first what makes the public problematic. The public sphere has become a marketplace and publicity a commodity. Anchorpersons, spokespersons, spin doctors, pollsters and media consultants do not facilitate a critical discussion of our government. Instead they for the most part all produce signs which are designed either merely to entertain or discretely to manipulate their consumers. Habermas goes so far as to suggest that what public media publicly circulate as signs of publicness in government, education, justice or opinion now actually 'prevents the formulation of a public opinion in the strict sense.'It was not always like this. Habermas does not allow that there is public opinion unless two conditions are met: First, this opinion is formed rationally, 'that is, in conscious grappling with cognitively accessible states of affairs'; second, the opinion is formed 'in the pro and con of a public discussion.' This was possible some time ago but no longer: 'one can properly speak of public opinion only with regard to the late seventeenth century Great Britain and eighteenth century France.' What passes for a public now is a mutation or structural transformation of a public sphere that came into existence with the ascendancy of private capital in the European 18th century. Habermas concludes that 'the task of providing a rational justification for political domination can no longer be expected from the principle of publicity.' At the same time, and against all odds, he insists that the 'conditions for a public sphere to be effective in the political realm ... can today no longer be disqualified as simply utopian.' He ends on a note guarded optimism: 'the outcome of the struggle between a critical publicity and one that is merely staged for manipulative purposes remains open.' First published in 1962, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere was Habermas's Habilitationsschrift for the Philosophical Faculty of Marburg University. If it comes to us in English 28 years later, it is all the more needed. For nothing has happened in the meantime to make the value of publicness less fundamentally problematic. Our English-speaking philosophy could use a work on this problem--on publicity, public opinion, the good of it. Also we could use the example of a philosopher for whom there is no approaching these matters from a 'purely conceptual' point of view, nothing datum-like about intuitions, and no references that transcend the altogether contingent history of the language game. For it is there that the signs of publicity acquire their discursive and commercial value, and enter into the government of conduct. This review originally appeared in Canadian Philosophical Reviews 10 (1990)
1 of 6 people found the following review helpful
3.0 out of 5 stars
Habermas puts me to sleep,
This review is from: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Paperback)
... This is Habermas' dissertation, but his writing is so poor, in English or in German, that it really doesn' matter. The book is a response, in my opinion, to Carl Schmitt, and specifically to Schmitt's argument that the core of liberal democracy is debate in parliament, that liberal democracy is rule by discussion (or, as its called now, "political discourse"), but that that discussion is now more real than painted flames on a radiator. Liberal democracy is in fact the triumph of aliberal, private, hidden powers, who rule from the shadows and through the true organs of power, the media, and through the hidden power of the private vote cast in the illicit privacy of the voting booth, where the bourgeois individual is free to exercise his worst prejudices and basest motives. So argues Schmitt. Habermas gives an interesting historical account of the rise of "Offentlichkeit" (which translates into the all-too-easy abstraction "public sphere," whatever that is), from the letters passed in the mail relating the news from town to town, to French salons, to newspapers, to television and radio. Habermas, like Schmitt, seeks to unmask the illiberal powers lurking behind the good liberal prejudices, but he, like Schmitt, mistakes liberalism for a debating society when in fact it is much more sophisticated than that. Habermas needs to read the Federalist Papers and the debates (!) at the constitutional convention to understand how little the founders of one liberal democracy thought of the power of discussion.
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