The Virtue of Selfishness [Mass Market Paperback]

Here's one important mistake. A lot of the time Rand misunderstands her own moral and political justifications. She has genuine insights but mistook what they were. For instance, her defense of egoism and laissez-faire capitalism is often consequentialist. That means, the justification she offers for acting egoistically and adopting a laissez-faire capitalist system is in terms of the positive overall outcomes of doing so. Perhaps we could allow that in general she speaks as if egoism and l-f benefit primarily the community in which they flourish, though she definitely thinks that these are the right values for human beings in general, if they live in anything like a modern community. A good chunk, perhaps more than half, of Atlas Shrugged is devoted to making this point. It isn't mere backdrop that the world is falling apart. (Think also of For the New Intellectual.)

All along Rand plays up the positive consequences of egoism and l-f. But she speaks as if what's thus justified is a total, unlimited commitment to those things. That is, it is *always* morally right to act egoistically and l-f should be total, 100%, nothing beyond military, police, courts, and the necessary infrastructure for those functions. And no taxes whatsoever. Rand can say, for instance: *always* act in your own (rational, long-term) self-intereste, *never* take property -- but then she justifies that claim by reference to the positive consequences of doing these things.

Two questions thus arise: first, are there any cases in which it is just *false* that being egoist or adopting unlimited l-f has the best consequences? (It seems to me, frankly, that there are *plenty* of such cases!!! They are the norm, in fact!!! But notice this is purely an empirical question on which I, as a philosophy professor, have no claim to expertise, though I do read a lot.) Second, in such cases, if there are any, *what*'s justified? To act egoistically or adopt l-f -- or to act non-egoistically or limit capitalism in some way? Rand has given us no reason to think that in *these* cases, egoism or l-f capitalism is what's justified. Or at least, insofar as her justification for egoism and l-f in the other cases was the very fact that they did have good overall consequences (a lot!), she's given us no reason to draw her desired conclusion in these cases.

It seems obvious that Rand was scarred by Communism and her ideas rigidified to some extent. In that sense, her convictions were held as if religious (and, like most or all religions, there is much truth in what she says). (Inordinate fear of "creeping socialism" -- which makes the only option to pure capitalism seem terrible -- is of course not unique with Rand. In fact, I think it's much of what makes sincere Conservativism possible. But Rand really took it to special heights.)

Of course, I recognize that Rand says all that stuff about life and choice between existence and non-existence and stuff. Well, that's all just crap, frankly -- here I *do* have expertise. I don't have time to write about it now, though I hope to one day, since it is important (there are many more Randians than is commonly recognized, since you can't really publicly admit the extremity of your views -- although Rand herself would say you should, I think). But take it from me -- whatever truth there is in what Rand wrote with respect to her explicit philosophical defense of egoism and unlimited l-f capitalism falls far short of those claims (that those things are *always* right). Rand set out to supplement her genuine insights (much of which were about the productive invisible hand of capitalism, a fact which even liberals acknowledge) with a philosophical foundation, but her foundation was not only spurious (justified nothing, in fact) but misleading: she thought she'd proven something which went way beyond those insights. She thought she'd proven a kind of Absolutism about egoism and laissez-faire capitalism. (I'm tempted to say: "and you want to see the results? look all around you!")

I'm a consequentialist philosophically (yay to Mill, Sidgewick, Moore, Parfit, Brink, Singer and the rest, though read Glover's Humanity for some warnings) and a liberal politically (yay to all the [genuine] bleeding hearts out there) and nothing Rand says makes me doubt those commitments, though I've absorbed her lessons thoroughly, many years ago in fact.

This conversation, done with two people who are now fairly well-known philosophers, illustrates the deep bias surrounding the concept of self-interest. The fact that Lee Iacoca thought he was pursuing his self-interest in arranging the bail-out does not mean that it really was in his self-interest. If a person is lost in a forest and starving, and then spots a mushroom he/she believes is nutritious but in fact is poisonous, are we to accept that the eating of the mushroom is in the person's interest? The fact that we believe something is in our interest does not make it so.

The author of this book makes a brilliant case for the ethics of self-interest, with this concept being rooted in the organism's identity. It is the characteristics of the organism that determine what is good or bad for it. Ethical values arise when the organism can exhibit choice over a collection of alternatives, and is distinctly self-aware of these choices. And due to the complexity of both the organism and the environment, the context will determine the choices available to the organism. An Eskimo in the Artic North certainly faces different choices than an individual living in the jungles of the Amazon. In addition, because the organism is not omniscient, the choices made may act to the organism's detriment. Adaptation takes time, and the organism will suffer or even die if bad choices are made.

Organisms with a self-awareness of choices, or moral agents, are thus governed by what characteristics they possess, and the environments in which they find themselves. The author of this book argues brilliantly for a morality of self-interest, and her care and skill in elucidating the concept of self-interest and ethics in general, makes this book the best formulation of ethics in the history of philosophy. In addition, the book could be read in the context of modern theories of rational agents, both in philosophy and the field of artificial intelligence.

The author has defined "rationality" in a manner quite different from what the word stands for in economic theory, the latter of which views it as a descriptive concept. If a person is labeled as "rational" in economic theory, it means that the person is attempting to optimize his self-interest, regardless of the facts that might indicate otherwise. "Rational" for the author is quite different. What the author is saying, and is most profound, is that many of the actions that have been taken as an excuse for self-interest, such as lying, deception, and violence, are indeed never in one's interest. To label a human as "rational" in her view, is to characterize the person as one who is optimizing their self-interests, but these interests, because of the nature of the biology of humans, and the nature of the human psyche, never involve lying, deception, and violence. This is a bold and interesting move in ethical theory, and differentiates the author's formulation from most others in the history of philosophy.

The ethical doctrines of this author are also intimately related to what science can tell us what indeed is in the interest of organisms, in order for them to optimize their health and general well-being. Most refreshing though is that this formulation of ethics is exceedingly optimistic. It asks the reader to consider that rationality, productiveness, and pride are the virtues of self-interest. Plundering, violence, cheating, and deception never are. With its emphasis on the power of the human mind and its efficacy, it is certainly a philosophy that meshes will with our time. Even though written down over four decades ago, its optimism coupled with its practicality makes it pure 21st century.