The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008 (Pt. 4) [Audio CD]

"The War Within" is Woodward's 15th book, and his fourth about the Bush administration. I received an advance copy.

Woodward interviewed President George W. Bush twice, and he interviewed Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.

I've noticed that in all of Woodward's books about Bush, he seemed to be full of praise for Bush when Bush was flying high in the ratings. But when Bush was low in approval ratings, so was Woodward's opinion. So I've got to question if Woodward has gone from the great investigative reporter he once was to an establishment me-too type.

After reading this, one can only be grateful that the Bush presidency is close to an end. Trouble is, it leaves a mess behind.

According to Woodward, the surge has worked but Bush failed to lead and made numerous blunders that were very costly.

The White House's National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley, put out a statement Friday, Sept. 5, prior to release of the book, disputing some of the assertions made by Woodward.

Woodward says that Bush has not told the American public the truth about Iraq and the war in general. But I found it of interest that Bush allowed Woodward to interview him and give him access. He said that Bush seems to have aged considerably during his long tenure in office --- he has a "paunch" and slumps when sitting.

Of Bush Woodward says, "He did not seek sacrifice from most of the country when he had the chance. He did not even mobilize his own party. Republicans often voiced as much suspicion and distrust as Democrats. The president was rarely the voice of realism on the Iraq war."

Woodward does, however, admit the success of Bush's surge of additional troops into Iraq in 2007.

"Violence was down so much in a few places that some U.S. soldiers were not receiving combat action badges because there was no fighting in their area," he wrote.

Woodward says in the book that deputy national security adviser Meghan O'Sullivan sent President Bush a daily top secret report that cataloged the escalating bloodshed and chaos in Iraq. He quotes one memo as follows:

"Violence has acquired a momentum of its own and is now self-sustaining." She wrote this on July 20.

Woodward says, "Her dire evaluation contradicted the upbeat assurances that President Bush was hearing from Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the U.S. commander in Iraq. Casey and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld were pushing to draw down American forces and speed the transfer of responsibility to the Iraqis. Despite months of skyrocketing violence, Casey insisted that within a year, Iraq would be mostly stable, with the bulk of American combat troops headed home. "

"Publicly, the president claimed the United States was winning the war, and he expressed unwavering faith in Casey, saying, 'It's his judgment that I rely upon.' But Woodward continues, "privately, he was losing confidence in the drawdown strategy. He questioned O'Sullivan that summer with increasing urgency: "What are you hearing from people in Baghdad? What are people's daily lives like?"

The book reads like a Tom Clancy novel and is full of almost surreal events. But the unusual thing I noticed was that Bush seemed to admit the truth in the book. He acknowledged his frustration and anxiety and that things didn't happen as he had planned. The war was not working and more people were dying than he'd imagined.

Bush said his goals were a free society that could defend, sustain and govern itself while becoming a reliable ally in the global war on terrorism. But he was not sure that could be obtained. "It seems Iraq is incapable of achieving that," Woodward quotes in the book.

Woodward rightly reminds us that Barack Obama opposed the surge and John McCain was "advocating more troops for years."

Woodward says McCain showed considerable anger with the Bush White House by saying, "Everything is f---ing spin."

Gen. George Casey, former U.S. commander in Iraq, said "that President Bush does not understand the war."

Woodward says of Bush, "He had not rooted out terror wherever it existed." He adds, "He had not achieved world peace. He had not attained victory in his two wars."

Woodward takes us into the heart of the White House and Pentagon. He apparently had tremendous sources who were actually in the meetings and conversations. The book reads like a novel by Tom Clancy.

Since the book is based on literally hundreds of interviews with people in the know, it is full of conversations of actual events. It gives us an excellent view of the way Bush thinks and relates to those around him.

We also see how he formed lies about the way --- lies that he thought would sell the war and make it more palatable to the American public.

While the book goes back and pulls information from his previous books on Bush, this book is an excellent read with some new and astonishing revelations.

Highly recommended.

- Susanna K. Hutcheson

"The War Within" begins portraying the Iraq chaos in 2006 - violence and American casualties are increasing, while Bush portrays a rosy picture and his staff realize our strategy needs to be reviewed. Bush agrees, but the "really bad news" is that this strategy review had no deadline and the emphasis was on it being conducted "under the radar" to avoid causing consternation during an election year.

General Casey, head of U.S. forces in Iraq, is trying to convince Bush to reduce troops in Iraq - we were making the Iraqis dependent on us and our large pressure was a sign of disrespect for them. He and General Abizaid had seen how the ethnic groups in the Balkans didn't reconcile until the violence got totally out of hand. Nonetheless, Bush seemed plugged into an attrition strategy (keep killing them until they run out of bodies), but Vietnam had proved that didn't work. Rumsfeld supported Casey - in fact, this was in line with his "new, light" Army vision.

Bush's decision-making style was "gut driven" - thus, his decisions lacked a process to examine consequences, alternatives, and motives. Further, he refused to allow talks with Iran and Syria - even though wanted by his area chief, Admiral Fallon. Finally, lacking deadlines, strategy reviews were underway, but with no seeming movement to fruition.

Retired General Jack Keane emerges as the hero in all this internal chaos, warfare, and delay. Being a member of the Defense Policy Board, he had access to up-to-date information on Iraq, and was encouraged by fellow member Newt Gingrich to take his thoughts to Rumsfeld. Keane's one-man, self-initiated effort outperformed those of all the other groups (eg. NSC, WH consultants, the Iraq Study Group, the Pentagon) and he is the father of the surge and other key ideas.

Keane's ideas included getting troops out 24/7 within the people, away from their air-conditioned based with movie theaters, swimming pools, etc., to protect the people from insurgents, stopping Casey's "ramp-down" (undermined motivation for the troops to risk their lives), doubling the size of the Iraqi security force to 600,000, extending tours to support the surge, strengthening the advisory program (often staffed by National Guard troops who had less experience than the Iraqis they were coaching), moving away from vehicle to foot patrols (less subject to IED damage, better able to obtain intelligence), learn form Col. McMaster's achievements in Tall Afar, increase the number of CIA analysts focusing on Iraq (had only 38 - fewer than those working on China) and bring the DIA intelligence staffing on Iraq (then 61) up to authorized (156), and focus on winning the war in Baghdad.

Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Pace then asked Keane for feedback on his own performance. Keane told Pace that he was failing - not spending enough time on Iraq, and being satisfied with superficial reports. At the same time, American generals in Iraq were working too hard (eg. Gen. MacArthur took time to watch a movie every evening), not allowing them the ability to step back and develop fresh thinking. Keane went on to recommend Petraeus to take over in Iraq, Col. McMaster to be part of a strategy review team, and Admiral Fallon to be appointed in charge of the entire Mid-East area. All these recommendations were accepted.

Petraeus' implementation of Keane's ideas included using ever-expanding concrete barriers that prevented vehicles carrying explosives or rocket-propelled grenades from entering areas once cleared. Petraeus found that the first areas U.S. troops went into were ghost towns - everyone driven out by the insurgents. Another Petraeus contribution was to start thinking about identifying which of the combatant groups could be convinced to stop fighting. Meanwhile, Keane went about assuring that a realistic timeframe was kept in mind - 12-18 months, not the 6 months that so many hoped for.

Admiral Fallon, unfortunately, quickly ended up butting heads with Petraeus over troop increase requests because he was convinced that there were too many troops that were not being effectively used. This led to his replacement.

Readers also learn that Maliki was a major problem, though understandably so - caught between three strong factions. For whatever reason, however, he improved after Petraeus arrived, allowing the pursuit/killing of 50 Shia militia leaders in a row.

Another key point was that tribal leaders with their 90,000+ fighters became very important as they turned against Al Qaeda and were enlisted by Petraeus' forces in the insurgency fight.

Bottom Line: Absent retired General Keane (resisted by the JCS), and then General Petraeus' innovations in support, the Iraq War would be a totally lost cause. Other factors besides the surge included improved intelligence targeting insurgent leaders, Al Qaeda overplaying its hand with its gruesome violence, creating resentment by Sunni leaders, and the Shiite forces adopting a cease-fire when it became clear that many of their own people were being hurt by the fighting.

From "The War Within":

"In Baghdad, [General] Casey appreciated the president's repeated public votes of confidence. But he kept asking himself: What do civilian leaders bring to such a war? After all, neither the full capacity of the U.S. government nor the American people were ever mobilized. No one ever articulated a grand strategy about what the heck the United States was doing. Nearly everything fell to the military."

Actually, the U.S. did have a strategy in 2006 as articulated repeatedly by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. That strategy was 1) train up Iraqi security forces so they could take over the mission and 2) disengage the U.S. military so it would provide additional impetus to the Iraqis to help themselves. The problem was, this strategy wasn't working and had not been working for the previous three years. General Casey was frustrated and he was right about one thing--there was no "grand strategy" that had been formulated and that was being executed by the Bush Administration to bring both political and military resources to bear to strive towards a successful outcome in Iraq. That would come later.

I have always been amazed at the access that Bob Woodward has to high level sources who share with him the inner discussions, challenges and decisions that are made at the highest civilian and military leadership levels. Even President Bush gave extensive interviews to Mr. Woodward who was able to weave the various point of views together to produce a coherent and fresh look at a complex and vexing situation which has cost an enormous amount of human lives and national treasure. History is still being written. The jury is still out. But "The War Within" will be reviewed and studied for decades to come as the assessment continues on what went wrong (and perhaps right) with the Iraq War.

One note on the Kindle edition of this book. I was really happy to pick up this book and read it on my Kindle. This really validates why I have a Kindle because I saved at least $10 on purchasing the book plus saved shelf space -- and probably some backpack space too!