The Way It Works: Inside Ottawa [Paperback]

Eddie Goldenberg worked almost continuously for Jean Chrétien in government and politics from 1974 until Chrétien’s retirement in December 2003. The son of the superbly well connected Senator Carl Goldenberg, Eddie got a summer job working for Chrétien in 1972 through John Rae, Chrétien’s executive assistant from 1967 - 1971 and his perennial campaign manager. At Chrétien’s right hand as a cabinet minister and Leader of the Opposition, Goldenberg became senior policy adviser to Prime Minister Chrétien. At cabinet meetings, meetings with premiers and foreign leaders, wherever the action was, Eddie, as he is careful to point out (and the many photographs in the book show), was almost always there. Often he represented Chrétien. He wrote speeches for him. To the public he was unknown.
Despite his title, Goldenberg had no head for the real work of government. Chrétien had the well known genius Chaviva Hosek as Director of Policy. A self-confessed “political junkie”, Goldenberg was a political strategist and fixer who saw that Chrétien got what he wanted. He was the boss’s grinning consigliere. His idea of government is simply spending. His proudest personal achievement in government was engineering the flow of billions to universities and research in the last Chrétien years.
The Way it Works partly lives up to its title, giving an account of how cabinets are formed, and what goes on at cabinet meetings-boring presentations, ministers catching up with their paperwork, leaving the table to get coffee, how decisions are made, and so on. Goldenberg thinks it all works pretty well. His book’s title implies that critics do not understand how it works, how it has to work. The book is also a defence and celebration of the Chrétien government.
Goldenberg says his aim is to explain that cynicism about politics and government is misplaced. He has some explaining to do. The Liberals came to office by saying that the GST was the work of the devil, that NAFTA was a bad deal, that military helicopters were unaffordable, and that the deficit was not a problem that should crimp spending. They knew all this was untrue. At least they could have figured it out. Goldenberg describes David Dodge, then deputy finance minister, explaining to Hosek and himself the financial crisis Canada faced. Dodge said nothing that had not been in the newspapers for years.
Goldenberg confirms Chrétien’s big picture, his chairman of the board approach to government, which got him compared to St. Laurent in the early years. He makes light of people who would not speak their mind to Chrétien or who took things Eddie said in casual conversation as commands from the prime minister. But if Chrétien was content to leave ministers to get on with their work, he was nonetheless determined to have his way in what interested him. If what that was wasn’t clear, people around him were all that much keener to do what they guessed he wanted. Chrétien’s reputation as a tough boss was not a delusion of the weak and inexperienced politicians under him, or a function of his office. Chrétien was a pure power politician. He enjoyed power and being able to help his friends and hurt his enemies. There was work that had to be done. He could not run the country into the ground and enjoy himself. But he could not enjoy himself if he was not securely in charge.
Chrétien’s one challenge was Paul Martin. Goldenberg paints an unpleasant picture of Martin, though the Goldenbergs had known the Martins since the 1930s. There will be other accounts of Chrétien and Martin, but by Goldenberg’s account Chrétien decided to stay on for a third election in 2000 and hang on for three years after that simply to thwart Martin. It does not add up. The failure of the Martin government makes it no more credible. It was not all about Martin. Chrétien would not give up power except by his own free will. Any other possible successor showing signs of restlessness would have provoked Chrétien. Indeed, Allan Rock did.
A highlight of the book is Goldenberg’s account of Canada’s decision with respect to the war with Iraq. He claims Canada’s position was always clear and consistent. Then why does he insist there was such drama on March 17, 2003, when Britain asked what Canada’s position would be and Chrétien announced to the House of Commons that Canada would not participate?
Goldenberg expresses resentment at what he calls the ultimatum and the fact that it came from Britain. It was not an ultimatum. The coalition was about to go to war and needed to know, given that Canada had been sending mixed signals, whether Canada would be with them. Britain was as much in it as the United States, though necessarily on a smaller scale. Perhaps they felt the inquiry coming from Britain would help avoid the usual anti-American paranoia.
Now that Iraq is a hellish mess the consensus is that the war was wrong and Canada was smart to stand aside. At the time many Canadians thought Canada should join in. Opinion in English Canada was roughly evenly divided. Chrétien could have led either way. Support for the war went way beyond business groups trying to curry favour with the U.S., the only support Goldenberg acknowledges. He rightly minimises the impact of political difference or agreement on trade relations, which are driven largely by U.S. domestic politics.
Goldenberg calls it a brave decision, but what was Chrétien braving? The U.S. was keen to have support but threatened nothing and did nothing after being refused. Chrétien risked no votes over it. The political risk was all on the other side.
There was some drama on March 17, 2003, because Canada’s position was anything but clear and consistent. Shortly before the announcement was made, three Toronto papers headlined three different interpretations: we would go only with the UN; we should go irrespective of what the UN said; we should not go in any circumstances. In the confused debate that took place at the time, it seemed that some would have had us send forces to defend Saddam against a putatively illegal invasion. If UN authorisation was the issue, we still had to decide whether an invasion was justified. If it was, we should have been pressing the Security Council to approve it, and if it wasn’t, we should have been pressing the Council to say so. Our UN ambassador, Paul Heimbecker, a latter day Loring Christie with anti-Americanism replacing Christie’s anglophobia, scurried about promoting a resolution giving more time for weapons inspections coupled with the explicit authorisation from the UN for an invasion-a transparent attempt to thwart Anglo-American plans that were in any event stymied by French opposition.
Goldenberg maintains that Canada’s position was always what Chrétien stated on March 17, but he can give no account of this policy’s development. He describes Heimbecker, Claude Laverdure, Chrétien’s foreign policy adviser, and himself considering the British inquiry for a minute and advising Chrétien to say no. A serious government of an important country weighing up its interests and principles does not appear in this account. The ministers of defence and foreign affairs are barely present in the story.
In Goldenberg’s insider account the context disappears. Francie Ducros’s “What a moron!”, Carolyn Parrish’s “Damned Americans . . . I hate those bastards!”, Canada’s prevarication and the anti-Americanism it nourished resulted in Canada’s decision appearing like a condemnation of the invasion, a position many in Canada were pleased to adopt. It is this rather than the decision itself that may have had an impact on relations with the U.S. and events in Iraq. Those massacring scores of innocents every week in Baghdad were encouraged by it.
There is real drama in the story of the 1995 Quebec Referendum, set in the context of a kind of Whig history of national unity with all being well after the recruitment of Professor Dion, the Supreme Court Reference, and the Clarity Act. Time will tell whether Chrétien has secured Joe Clark a place in history for his description of the Clarity Act as a “blueprint for separation.”
Goldenberg complains that media accounts of government are “incredibly superficial”. The Way it Works reads like a long newspaper feature.
John Pepall (Books in Canada)
--This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

“When it comes to veteran Ottawa insiders, it doesn’t get more inside than Eddie Goldenberg.” The Way It Works is “engaging – part tutorial, part memoir, and the hottest Canadian political book on the fall list so far. . . . The real essence of the book, peppered with opinion and anecdotes – some quite surprising and entertaining – is offering a view of the inside, as promised.”
– Alan Kellogg, Edmonton Journal

“Conservatives are going to be lining up for Goldenberg’s book.”
– Roy MacGregor, Globe and Mail

“While he describes ‘complete co-operation’ between finance minister Martin and prime minister Chrétien on the big job of tackling the deficit, Goldenberg casts Martin in an unflattering light on several files. . . . The Goldenberg book also details the uneasy relationship between Chrétien and Martin, outlining the elaborate steps the staffers for each had to take simply to set up meetings and make sure they came off smoothly. And Goldenberg provides his account of the weekend Martin exited Chrétien’s cabinet, portraying Martin as indecisive at best as he tried to keep open the option of remaining finance minister after his own public remarks on his deteriorating relationship with Chrétien had clearly made that impossible.”
– John Geddes, Maclean’s

“Here is a splendid manual on the art of politics and the art of government from a very discreet Machiavellian manager. . . . a fascinating and valuable account of Chrétien’s rise to power and his uses of it. The author’s conclusions arise from a lifetime of personal experience and first-hand observation.”
– Neil Reynolds, Globe and Mail

“Goldenberg doesn’t disappoint. Part political science textbook, part memoir, The Way It Works is a fascinating and sometimes brutally honest look at the way the federal government really operates. . . . Sprinkled throughout are anecdotes that take the reader into the corridors of power and provide new insight into events like the 1996 Quebec referendum on sovereignty, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Canada’s decision not to participate in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. . . . The Way It Works is a must-read for political junkies, students of history or anyone who aspires to government. However, it’s also a good read for average Canadians who just want to get a better idea of the way their government really works.”
– Elizabeth Thompson, Montreal Gazette

“An elegant primer on government, politics and politicians. . . . As Goldenberg describes it, the improbable relationship to settle separatism began badly. As was his wont, Chrétien set out to put his new minister at ease with a humorous story. Dion’s response was startling: ‘Prime minister, this is a serious matter, and we do not have time for joking around.’ There are other such nuggets that will provide joy for future historians.”
– John Gray, Literary Review of Canada

“The book provides fascinating insights from Goldenberg on one of the leading contenders in the Liberal leadership contest, Stéphane Dion.”
– Barbara Yaffe, Vancouver Sun


From the Hardcover edition.